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3 CHAPTER 1 : Germany 
I.  THE  ECONOMIC  AND  INDUSTRIAL  MODEL  OF  THE  GERMAN  DEFENCE 
INDUSTRY 
The  configuration  of the  German  armaments  industry  and  the  rather  particular  place  it 
currently occupies in the country's economy are shaped,  above  all,  by  the consequences of 
capitulation in 1945. Following the destruction and dismantling of  all production capacity, the 
armaments  industry  was  gradually  rebuilt  during  the  1960s.  Today,  certain  areas  of 
production are even larger than those of the British and French industries. As a result of the 
collapse  of the  Soviet  regime  and  unification,  the  military  budget  declined  sharply  and 
increased focus was given to civil technology. This focus has always been a characteristic of 
arms production in Germany
1
. 
The armaments industry was reconstructed differently depending on the sector concerned. In 
the aeronautics sector, where Germany had been a leader prior to the war, the industry was 
held back by the imposition of  multiple international restrictions. Technological knowledge in 
this case was gained via participation in co-operation programmes. However, in the territorial 
industry and naval construction, German industrial companies were able to use their own skill -
and improve rapidly, without the need for external help. 
One  of the  distinctive  traits  of German  industry  concerns  the  gradual  development of an 
aeronautics  and  defence  sector centring around  Daimler-Benz.  Since  1984,  this  group  has 
acquired  companies  specialising  m  electronics  (AEG,  Telefunken,  Siemens-
Sicherungstechnik),  engines  (MTU)  and  in  aeronautics  (Dornier,  Fokker,  Messerschmidt-
Bolkow-Blohm [MBB]) to  form  one single subsidiary, DASA.  DASA has become national 
aeronautics champion, bringing together the largest companies of these sectors (apart from 
Domier Luftfahrt GmbH, which was sold back to the American, Fairchild, in 1996 and Diehl 
whose  subsidiary,  BGT,  specialises  in missiles).  DASA  is,  by  a  long  margin,  the  largest 
supplier  of the  Bundeswehr  (Tornado,  EF  2000,  Tiger,  NH  90,  etc.),  however,  thanks  to 
1  For  further  information,  see  Joachim  Rohde,  "German  Defence  Industry  and  Defence  Industrial  Policy", 
ESAN-Projekt "Arms Production and Cooperation", Paper No.  10, SWP Ebenhausen,  1997, as well as  "French-
German Arms Cooperation: Issues and Perspectives", in : Les relations franco-allemandes : etat et perspectives, 
IFRI reviews, No. 25, Paris, 1998, p. 69-108; see also Military Technology, Vol. XXII, Issue 2, 1999: "Defence 
Procurement in Germany". 
4 Airbus, it is achieving the greater part of its turnover in the civil sector. The other aeronautics 
companies are small and medium sized specialist suppliers. 
A second sector of the armaments industry centres around naval construction. German naval 
construction generates a turnover of  more than 10 billion DM, a third of  which stems from the 
military  sector.  It is  divided  into  two  groups  according  to  size.  Firstly,  the  large  naval 
construction sites  of Howaldtswerke  Deutsche  Werft AG  in Kiel  (HDW),  Blohm &  Voss 
GmbH in Hamburg and the Thyssen Nordseewerke GmbH in Emden (TNSW), and secondly 
several  average-sized  companies  such  as  Lfussen Werft  GmbH  &  Co  in Bremen (FL  W), 
HDW  specialising  in  non-nuclear  submarines,  Blohm  &  Voss  in  frigates,  FL  W  in  small 
surface  ships  and  corvettes.  All  these  companies  are  active  exporters  (HDW,  TNSW  and 
Ferrostaal  in  the  German  Submarine  Consortium,  Blohm  &  Voss,  HDW  and  Thyssen 
Rheinstahl Technik in the German Frigate Consortium). Lately, naval construction has been 
undergoing considerable change: in 1995, Blohm &  Voss and TNSW were restructured and 
recombined as a holding company, Thyssen Werften GmbH. Having sold 50% plus 1 share of 
HDW to  Babcock Borsig at the  beginning of 1999,  Preussag is  now about to  give  up  the 
remainder  of its  stake  in  HDW  to  Celsius.  Thus  giving  birth to  a  new German-Swedish 
construction  company  (HDW  and  Kockums  Naval  Systems)  which  will  be  the  largest 
constructor of (non nuclear) submarines in the world.
2 
The territorial armaments industry is  also  undergoing restructuring.  In view of the drop  in 
military orders, companies in this sector have undertaken a major process of diversification 
over the  past few years.  At the same time,  there  is  a strong trend towards  concentration  : 
following several mergers and take-overs, only three main players remain in the field of  tank 
and  armoured  vehicle  construction  :  IWKA  AG  (Henschel  and  KUKA),  Krauss-Maffai 
Wegmann  GmbH  and  MaK-Rheinmetall.  Henschel  and  KUKA  specialise  in  mechanised 
combat vehicles, Krauss-Maffai Wegmann and MaK in battle tanks. The fact that the latter 
were selected to manufacture GTK put pressure on IWKA AG to merge its activities with the 
winning team. If this merger goes ahead, there will be only one major German player which, 
thanks to its technological excellence, will probably assume the leadership of  restructuring on 
a European scale. Due to its activities in the field of tanks, vehicles, canons and electronics, 
Rheinmetall will doubtless be the central focus of  these developments. 
2 FAZ, 28.5.1999, S.  16. 
5 Since its reconstruction began, the German armaments industry has remained largely private. 
The exception has been the major stake held by certain Lander (Bavaria, Hamburg, Bremen) 
in the capital of  MBB, but this participation carne to an end following the acquisition of  MBB 
by  Daimler-Benz (except for  Hamburg,  see below).  On a federal  scale, the  State has never 
been  a  shareholder  in the  defence  industry. 
3  The  decision  not  to  become  involved  as  an 
industrial player reflected a widely held view in German society, but it was also intended to 
make it easier to transfer technology towards civil industry. From the 1950s and 60s onwards, 
the  idea was  to  combine  the  defence  and  civil  industries  for  the  benefit of the  economy 
overall. 
Today,  the  influence  of this  idea  is  manifested  in  several  characteristics  of the  defence 
industry  structure  :  firstly,  the  majority  of the  main  arms  manufacturers  also  boast 
considerable  civil  activity.  Even during  the  cold  war,  very  few  major  defence  companies 
generated more than 30% of their turnover with military activity.  Only a few medium-sized 
industries (such as Wegmann and Diehl) and a good number of sub-contractors and suppliers 
are less diversified. 
Secondly, the main players in the German armaments industry are all part of major industrial 
groups which are most active in the civil sector. This is the case both for territorial armaments 
(e.g. Roehling), naval construction (Thyssen) and aeronautics (Daimler9hrysler). 
Thirdly,  armaments  companies have  developed the  same  mode  of governance  as  firms  in 
other sectors. Legally, the majority are limited liability companies (GmbH), but there are also 
a few public limited companies (AG). While the structure and operation of  AG companies are 
predominantly  governed  by  law,  the  GmbH  companies  have  a  fair  degree  of freedom 
regarding their internal organisation. At the risk of generalising, certain characteristics can be 
highlighted, which are true for all companies : 
a) Participation of salaried employees in managing companies : 
Large  German  compan1es  (more  than  500  employees)  have  dual  leadership.  There  1s  a 
Supervisory  Board  and  a  Board  of Directors  consisting  of the  company  directors.  The 
supervisory board monitors the management's activities and for  certain important decisions 
3  Up  until  1992,  the  Federal  State  did  however  hold  an  indirect  share  of 20%  via  the  Kreditanstalt  fiir 
Wiederautbau (KA  W) in Deutsche Airbus GmbH. 
6 holds a power of  veto. The two boards are independent of each other because it is impossible 
for one person to be on both at the same time. In companies of  more than 2000 employees, the 
supervisory board consists half of employees (personnel and union representatives), and half 
is  appointed  during  the  shareholders'  general  meeting.  Nonetheless,  the  presence  of 
employees on the  supervisory board is  tempered by  the  fact  that the  Chair of the  board is 
always  a  shareholder  representative  and  his  or  her  vote  is  decisive  in  the  event  of a 
controversial  decision.
4  Nonetheless,  employees  are  very  much  involved  in  the  decision 
making process, both via the supervisory board and the board of  directors. Furthermore, many 
German directors have often spent their entire careers with the company, having joined very 
young, which helps strengthen internal culture and ensures employees at all levels are taken 
into consideration. On the other hand, the need to reach a consensus with the employees can 
slow down the decision making process, thus depriving the company of a certain degree of 
flexibility. 
b) The importance of banks : 
Banks and companies traditionally enjoy a very close relationship in Germany. Banks act first 
and  foremost  as  financial  organisations.  During  the  period  between  1991  and  1994  for 
example, 83% of  external funding for German companies was obtained via credit from banks. 
But banks are also major shareholders. It is estimated that in 1993, banks had majority control 
of  at least 24 of  the 110 largest companies and nearly 14% of  overall company capital. 5 These 
shares  have  often  been  acquired  under  extremely  favourable  circumstances  in  the  first 
restructuring phase. Banks also wield influence over the decisions of  companies via the voting 
rights bestowed by their clients who  are  shareholders (presuming agreement on their part). 
Thus,  they must manage the  shares that they hold on their clients' behalf because they are 
responsible  for  their  depositors'  savings.  They  make  a  considerable  contribution  to  the 
merger-acquisition process,  encouraging restructuring when they deem  it necessary.  Banks 
can also participate in shoring up companies in difficulty by increasing their share capital. 
c) The presence of reference shareholders : 
Compared  with  Great  Britain  or  the  United  States,  individuals  and  retirement  funds  in 
Germany hold a small percentage of the capital of companies listed on the stock exchange. 
4 See Aktiengesetz, GmbH-Gesetz, 30. Auflage 1998, dtv, Mtinchen 1998. 
7 However, cross-holding of shares is abundant and the proportion of company capital held by 
shareholders is also considerably greater. At the beginning of the  1990s, the majority of AG 
companies in Germany had one reference shareholder who  held at least 25% of the capital. 
The five largest shareholders held more than 40% of  the capital of companies compared with 
a fifth in the US and a quarter in the United Kingdom.
6 
For German industry in general, globalisation has begun to profoundly modify some of these 
characteristics.  Since  the  economic  crisis  of 1993  for  example,  the  number  of German 
companies listed on the stock exchange has continued to rise. Therefore, external funding is 
coming  less  and  less  from  banks  and  more  and  more  from  capital  markets  where  large 
institutional  investors  such as  (international)  investment funds  become  the  major players. 
7 
This  has  important  effects  on  corporate  governance.  Once  the  financial  markets  become 
involved in power and control issues, the companies are obliged to  implement practices that 
stem traditionally from the Anglo-Saxon model. From the companies' point of view, the share 
becomes a product that must be sold to the investors, and to do this, the creation of  value for 
the shareholders, the famous shareholder value, is an absolute necessity. Company directors 
must report on their strategy and profitability and communication with shareholders takes on 
primordial  importance.  Investment bank analysts are  demanding new transparency and  are 
forcing  companies  to  divulge  much  more  information.  The  major  investment  funds  thus 
become  front-line  stakeholders and  directly influence the  governance  of the  companies  in 
which they hold shares. As a result, part of  the control is moved outside the company.8 
The majority of  German armaments companies are not (yet) affected by these trends. They are 
GmbH  companies  and therefore  not  listed on the  stock  exchange.  Among the  main arms 
manufacturers, only Rheinmetall AG is listed, but it has a block shareholding (67.5% held by 
Roehling). The situation is the same for Thyssen Krupp AG, listed on the stock exchange and 
with a subsidiary in the armaments sector (in this case the reference shareholders are Krupp 
Stiftung with  16.75%,  Thyssen Beteiligungsverwaltung and  Thyssen Stiftung with 7%  and 
5%  respectively,  as  well  as  Iran with  7.5%).  This increased concentration of shareholders 
undeniably  encourages  internal  monitoring.  Bearing  in  mind  the  stakes  in  play,  major 
5  See  OECD,  "Germany",  Economic  Studies  of  the  OECD,  Paris  1995  ;  Stephen  Prowse,  "Coporate 
Governance", in: Revue d'Economie Financiere, No. 31, Hiver 1994. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Deutsche Bank, "Kapitalmarktstatistik", statistisches Beiheft zum Monatsbericht, May 1999 
8  See Franz-Josef Leven,  "Aktienkultur in  Deutschland", in  :Norbert Frei, Christoph Schlienkamp : Aktie  im 
Focus (not yet published) ; Georg Weishaupt,  "Vorstande kritisieren die Macht der Fonds",  in : Handelsblatt, 
10.5.1999, p. 37. 
8 shareholders  must  take  an  interest  in  the  companies  they  own,  and  cannot  delegate  all 
management responsibility to  the managers.  On the  other hand,  the  existence of reference 
shareholders can mitigate the pressure for short-term profitability, and enable the directors to 
calculate on a long-term basis. 
Despite  the  lack  of direct  pressure  from  the  financial  markets,  defence  companies  have 
nonetheless had to undertake in-depth rationalisation since the beginning of  the 1990s. In just 
a few years the armaments industry has shrunk dramatically, causing 140,000 out of280,000 
jobs to  be  lost.  This consolidation demonstrates that private companies, listed on the  stock 
exchange or not, cannot escape from the economic logic imposed by the reduction of defence 
budgets. Nonetheless, the more the large groups and their shareholders become international, 
the more they are obliged to ensure that their defence subsidiaries adapt as  well to financial 
market requirements. Daimler Chrysler and DASA are a classic example of  this. 
II. THE GERMAN MODEL OF THE STATE-INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP 
The fact that the federal State is not a shareholder in defence companies does not mean that it 
does not have a role to  play regarding these industries. On the contrary, as  client, regulator 
and  sponsor,  its  influence  over  the  industrial  and  technological  basis  of  defence  is 
considerable.  With the resources  it has  at its disposal,  the German government follows  an 
industrial defence policy that indeed has always been closely tied to  the policy of forming 
alliances. During the cold war, Bonn considered co-operation on armaments issues above all 
as a political way of consolidating its integration into the Western camp and of strengthening 
the ties with its main partners.  This perspective has not changed with the fall  of the Berlin 
Wall. Even if financial logic is also pushing in this direction, Germany's current commitment 
to a European industrial and technological foundation and to transatlantic co-operation, is still 
largely spurred on by political considerations - to  develop a European defence identity and 
maintain the cohesion of  the Atlantic alliance. 
At  the  beginning  of the  1990s,  the  Federal  governments  industrial  defence  policy  was, 
however,  notable by its  absence.  Faced with budget cuts,  the only instrument used by the 
BMVg (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ministry of defence) was to give up equipment 
procurement,  leaving  the  companies  alone  to  meet  their  fate.  The  result  was  a  drastic 
shrinkage of  the defence industry, with the elimination of 50% of  the jobs. In 1992, it became 
9 clear that Germany risked losing the heart of its  defence  industry  if the process continued 
uncontrolled. In collaboration with industry, the government therefore initiated an analysis of 
the situation in order to  define capacity and the minimal essential aptitudes.  On the basis of 
this assessment, the procurement calendar was modified so as to maintain key R&D capacities 
and to stabilise the use of  manufacturing capacity at a minimal level. 
Since  then,  the  objective  of Germany's  industrial  defence  policy  has  not  changed.  The 
preservation of key capacities despite budget constraints remains a priority.  Of course, this 
policy aims to protect jobs and technological know-how. But just as important a reason is that 
these  industrial assets are politically indispensable if Germany wishes to  participate in the 
construction of a European  armaments  structure,  considered  as  an  integral part of a pan-
European defence plan. 
11-1.  The State as Regulator 
By law, the  German government has very few instruments at its  disposal for  exerting any 
influence over the alliance strategies or commercial activities of companies. It does not hold 
any "actions specifiques ",  or any other rights of this sort over these industries. Nor are there 
any  legal restrictions regarding the foreign investment in the capital of German companies. 
Anti-trust laws do exist, but they do not play a major role at a time when the governmel!t is 
seeking consolidation. 
However,  major  restrictions  exist  with  regard  to  exports.  Article  26,  Paragraph  2  of the 
German constitution specifies that "war weapons shall only be manufactured, dispatched and 
sold with prior government agreement. The details shall be covered by a Federal law"  This 
federal law is the  Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (KWKG) of 1961. The KWKG includes a list 
defining  the  notion  of "war  weapons"  and  confirming  that  the  production,  holding  and 
dispatching  of a  war  weapon requires  government  approval.  Under  the  KWKG,  weapons 
manufacturers do not have the right to export. The export of weapons may be forbidden if, for 
instance,  it  would  be  detrimental  to  Germany's  overseas  interests.  Exportation  must  be 
forbidden  if the  weapons  risk  being  used  for  the  purposes  of a  war  of aggression.  The 
conditions under which military equipment and dual-use technology can be exported are set 
out in the  Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (A WG).  Unlike the  KWKG,  the  A  WG  is  based on  the 
principle of free trade.  The exporter must request a licence, but such a licence may  only be 
refused if  the security and overseas interests of Germany and international peace so require. 
10 Exports to NATO member countries are, in theory, unlimited.
9 Nonetheless, the manufacturer 
must firstly request a licence and prove that the weapons will indeed remain in the purchaser's 
country.  For  co-operation  projects  based  on  intergovernmental  agreement,  the  conditions 
governing transfer and export are  set out in the agreement protocols (MoU).  The procedure 
becomes  more  complex  for  companies  desiring  co-operation  without  prior  governmental 
agreement. In this case, the German company needs a licence to transfer equipment, unless it 
is  only providing components or sub-systems which represent less than 20% of the whole 
weapon system. In principle, export to non-NATO member countries is forbidden, unless the 
vital  interests of the RF A or the  alliance require it.  Employment-related issues should not 
feature  among  the  considerations,  and  exports  should  not  lead  to  additional  production 
capacity. In 1982, the government specified that military equipment should not be delivered to 
regions where there is a risk of armed conflict. 
Companies  wishing  to  export  weapons  (under  export  licence)  must  request  official 
authorisation  from  the  Bundesamt fur  gewerbliche  Wirtschaft,  an  agency  reporting  to  the 
ministry ofthe economy (BMWi). If  it is not just a routine case, the opinion of  the ministry of 
foreign affairs and the ministry of defence and (since the victory of the "red-green" coalition) 
the ministry of  economic co-operation (BMZ) must be sought. If  these opinions are divergent 
_ or if  the case is a difficult one, the BMWi calls on the Security Council, the standing members 
of which are the Chancellor and the ministers for the Economy, Finance, the Interior, Foreign 
Affairs  and  Defence.  In  practice,  companies  ask  questions  beforehand  to  ascertain  their 
chances of success. 
There  is  a  long-standing  debate  over  to  what  extent  the  export  regulations  put  German 
industry at a disadvantage beside international competition. According to the companies, co-
operation potential with European partners is also curbed by legal constraints. However, it is 
not the legal framework in itself that sets Germany apart from its main partners in this area, 
but the reticence shown with regard to using exports to strengthen the industrial foundations 
and pursue political objectives on a global level. The KWKG as well as the A  WG leave the 
government quite considerable room to manoeuvre, and the way that the law is applied varies 
significantly depending on the sector. The naval construction sector, for instance, meets with 
little difficulty in selling its  products on the world market and even benefits from  political 
9  A certain number of other countries such as,  for  instance,  Switzerland, Austria,  Sweden and Japan have the 
same status. 
11 support in its export activities. As a result, it alone represents 50% of all military exports. As 
regards  territorial  armaments  however,  restrictions  are  more  strictly  applied.  In  the 
aeronautics  sector,  where  practically  all  projects  are  carried  out  as  part of European  co-
operative ventures, the export issue is resolved by the MoU which shares out the international 
contracts among the members, usually allocating the not too  "sensitive" regions to  German 
compan1es. 
11-2.  The State as Client 
While  the  armed  forces  are  responsible  for  specifying  their  needs,  the  procurement  of 
weapons systems is the responsibility of civil bodies, namely the "armaments" section within 
the  BMV g  and  the  procurement  agency  (Bundesamt  fur  Wehrtechnik  und Beschaffung, 
BWB). The latter reports to the ministry and acts as a contractor to the industry. 
The legal basis for awarding military equipment development, procurement and maintenance 
contracts  is  the  Verdingungsordnung fur  Leistungen  (VOL).  According  to  the  VOL,  the 
contract  needs,  in  principle,  to  be  awarded  following  a  call  for  tender.  Under  certain 
conditions however, the government can limit the bids or even dispense with the invitation to 
tender (jreihandige Vergabe). Regarding armaments, the exception is however the rule. Here, 
more  than three  quarters of the  orders  are  placed without competition.  The explanation is 
simple : given the complexity of weapons systems, there are very few companies capable of 
carrying out such projects.  The lack of competition is  also  shown by the type of contracts 
awarded by the BWB. Half of  these are contracts at cost price, and even if  the BWB awarded 
contracts at market prices, the actual prices are usually only calculated on the basis of  the cost 
of  comparable products-which, after all, leaves rather a lot of  room for interpretation.
10 
As the government does not hold actions specifiques, the awarding of contracts is its only tool 
for  influencing  industry  restructuring.  The  decision  to  attribute  the  GTK  project  to 
Rheinrnetall and Krauss-Maffai for  example, was also  intended to create a single industrial 
pole in territorial armaments. In the case of BAe's share in STN-Atlas, the government took 
advantage  of its  status  of principle  client to  make  it  clear that the  company  must remain 
German  in  majority.  This  client  influence  diminishes,  naturally,  as  soon  as  there  is  a 
10  Reinhard  Hild,  Michael  Breitenbacher,  Bernhard  Pieper  :  Die  deutsche  Luft- und  Raumfahrtindustrie  -
Strukturanalyse und Handlungserfordemisse, ifo studien zur industriewirtschaft, n°  52,  Munchen 1997, p.  132-
137. 
12 monopoly. The same thing happens ifthe economic weight of  the bidder is significant enough 
to "dissuade" any "retaliation". This is the case for example for DASA, the parent company of 
which is all powerful both as employer and tax payer. 
Current plans for the armed forces are based on five-year financing plans which are updated 
and adjusted each year in accordance with the real costs of  the past year. The plans are drawn 
up by the Inspector General in collaboration with the leaders of  the three armed forces and the 
"armament"  and "budget"  sections of the ministry.  Then,  they  need to  be  approved by the 
minister  and  parliament.  The  Bundestag also  decides  how  much  of the  budget  is  to  be 
invested.  Defence  and  budget  commissions  examine,  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  the  major 
procurement projects and must approve each procurement contract of  over 50 million DM. 
Current  plans  for  the  Bundeswehr  emphasise  mobility  and  the  projection  of forces.  The 
territorial  army  includes transport helicopters (NH  90)  and  support helicopters (UHT),  the 
new armoured transport vehicle (GTK) and a new artillery system (PzH 2000) as well as the 
modernisation of the Leopard assault tank and the development of a digitised C2 system. For 
the  Air  Force,  the  ATF  is  a priority,  to  which can be  added the  EF  2000  with  air-to-air 
missiles of both short and medium range, as well as a cruise missile for the Tornado. Other 
programs are the development of MEADS (Medium Air Defence System), the modernisation 
ofPatriot (PAC III) and SATCOM, a satellite communications system. For the marine forces, 
the  plans  include  the  acquisition  of four  F-123  frigates,  three  F-124  frigates,  four  212 
submarines, 15 130 corvettes, two refuelling ships, new maritime patrol aircraft and a new on-
board helicopter. 
In view of budgetary constraints, this programme seems very ambitious. The defence budget 
has diminished in real terms by more than 24% since  1991.  With 1.53% of gross  domestic 
product,  Germany  now  spends  less  on  defence  than  most of its  fellow  NATO  members 
(2.29%  on  average),  and  this  figure  is  continuing  to  drop.  What  is  worse,  R&D  and 
procurement spending dropped from  15.3  billion DM in  1990 to  8 billion in 1994, to  then 
stabilise around 8.5 billion DM. The invested proportion of  the budget remains low (25.4% in 
1999) and the objective of 30% by the year 2002 hardly seems feasible without restructuring 
the armed forces, the only way to make (even) more savings on operating and staffing costs. 
13 As BMV  g's main client, DASA was sharply affected by the budget cuts that caused, between 
1990 and 1995, a more than 60% drop in procurement in the military aeronautics sector alone. 
During this period, DASA's situation was made even more difficult because the collapse of 
the military market coincided with the civil aviation market crisis.  Since then, the situation 
has improved. Over the period from 1995 to 1998, DASA made a military turnover of 19.854 
million DM, of which 5.248 million were for R&D contracts (BMVg exclusively) and 14.609 
million for procurement and maintenance contracts (BMV g and foreign). In 1998, the BMV  g 
dedicated  2.531  million  DM  to  R&D,  of which  DASA  received  1.483  million.  DASA's 
turnover in the military field between 1995 and 1998 (in million DM) is shown below : 
DASA's Turnover in Military-Related Business 
1995  1996  1997 
Procurement &  3.404  3.840  3.468 
Maintenance (1) 
Research &  1.248  1.160  1.357 
Development (2) 
Total  L: 4.652  L: s.ooo  L: 4.825 
(  1) National and international contracts com_bined 
(2)  BMV g contracts alone 
11-3.  The State as "Sponsor" 
1998 
3.887 
1.483 
L: 5.380 
1995-98 
L: 14.609 
L: 5.248 
L:L: 19.857 
In Germany, the defence companies do not receive direct subsidies. However, the integration 
of  civil and defence companies partly obscures the reality of  the situation. To what extent, for 
example,  does  naval  construction benefit  from  subsidies  allocated to  construction sites  in 
general? The same problem arises in the aeronautics and space sectors where the government 
subsidises  civil  research  with  two  national  programmes,  the  Luftfahrtforschungs- und 
Technologieprogramm and the Raumfahrtprogramm. (In the context of  these programmes, the 
ministries of the economy and of research contribute up to 50% of the costs of a research 
project). 
14 Total Federal Spendin2 in the Aeronautics Sector 
1.1  Research  and  208 
technology (BMBF) 
1.2  Research  and  142 
development (BMWi) 
1.3  Funding  of the  buyers'  121 
market (BMWi) 
1.4  Risk  of Airbus  change  -
(BMWi, end 1992) 
4,966 
2.1  Research  and  253 
Technology (BMV  g) 
2.2 Development (BMV  g)  1,362 
2.3 Procurement  1,501 
2.4 Maintenance  1,850 
1,659 
3.1  ESA (BMBF)  1,092 
3.2  National  programme,  491 
including DLR (BMBF) 
3.3  Weather  satellites,  60 
Eumetsat, ESA (BMV) 
3.4  Telecommunications  16 
satellites 
*BMBF =Ministry of  Education and Research, 
BMWi =Ministry of  the Economy, 
BMVg =Ministry of  Defence, 
230  261  263 
98  35  30 
21  56  40 
5,298  5,031  5,845 
263  235  291 
1,524  1,428  1,305 
1,741  1,613  2,559 
1,770  1,755  1,690 
1,618  1,628  1,704 
1,034  999  1,000 
517  451  445 
67  178  259 
n.v  n.v  n.v 
15 BMV =Ministry of  Transportation, 
BMPT =  Ministry  of the  Postal  Service  and  Telecommunications  (the  postal  service  was 
privatised in 1996) 
During the period from 1995 to 1998, DASA benefited considerably from these programmes. 
Of  the  600  million  DM  that  the  government  contributed  in  the  context  of  its 
Luftfahrtforschungs- und Technologieprogramm to the civil aeronautics industry as  a whole 
between 1995  and  1998, DASA received 254.8 million. To  which should be added the 238 
million DM in assistance to the funding of  the buyer's market for Airbus. 
Subsidies Received by DASA in the Context of the 
Aeronautics Research Pro2ramme 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1995-98 
42.9  73.4  77.6  60.9  I  254.8 
*Approximately 8 million DM provided by BMWi, the rest by the BMBF. 
During the same period, DASA received 396 million DM for its space activities in the context 
of the nationaLprogramme and 3,749 million DM from  the  ESA programme, to which the 
federal government contributed 4,125 million DM. 
(*)average 
Subsidies Received by DASA in the Context of the 
Space Research Pro2ramme 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1995-98 
Infrastructures  15  18  7  20  2::60 
Satellites (*)  84  84  84  84  2::336 
Total  2::99  I  102  I  91  I  104  2::2::396 
16 Compared with that of its main partners, the Federal Republic's industrial defence policy is 
rather modest. As regulator, the State exerts considerable influence in the field of exports, but 
it does  not participate in  specifying the  strategic  direction of the  companies at all.  In this 
context, it is interesting to see that the plans for an EADC (European Aerospace and Defence 
Company)- as  envisaged last year- would most likely give the  German government more 
stakeholder rights than it currently holds in relation to its national industry. 
As  client and  sponsor, the German State keeps its commitment to  a minimum, even in the 
"strategic" sectors of aeronautics and space. It is true that the government has just decided to 
extend  the  civil  research  programmes,  but  the  funding  (600  million DM over five  years) 
seems far  from  being assured.  The disagreements  between the federal  government and the 
Lander over the distribution of costs on the one hand and the new strict budget plan of the 
Finance Minister on the other, are liable to  bring the whole programme into question again. 
The awarding of some major contracts, Eurofighter and Tiger for example, provide a more 
solid basis for planning and establishing schedules for the companies. However, overall, the 
planned  modernisation  of the  armed  forces  will  still  be  difficult  to  fund.  Given  that  the 
defence budget will be gradually dropping from 47.05 billion in 1999 to 43.7 billion in 2003, 
we  are  bound to  see,  in the  coming years,  an increasing gap  between orders and  available 
financial  resources.  The  situation  will  doubtless  become  critical  when  several  major 
programmes, such as the Eurofighter, the frigates or the PzH 2000 enter the manufacturing 
phase.
11  It would therefore come as no surprise if current programmes undergo further delays 
and cuts. 
Budgetary constraints also weigh heavily on the government's ability to  influence industrial 
restructuring.  The  Federal  Republic's  inability  to  participate  in  the  Helios  and  Horus 
programmes for example was a major factor leading to the failure of a planned Joint Venture 
project between DASA and Aerospatiale in the satellite field.  Lacking golden share, on the 
one  hand,  and  a  structuring  programme  on  the  other,  the  companies  follow  their  own 
industrial logic which does not necessarily coincide with the government's political aims. 
11  Franz-Josef Meiers, "A German Defense Review", unpublished manuscript. 
17 III. ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIES AND SPREADSHEETS OF THESE COMPANIES: 
THE EXAMPLE OF DAIMLERCHRYSLER AEROSPACE (DASA) 
DASA is a conglomerate of  around thirty companies divided into six sectors of  activity. Three 
of these  sectors  are  organised  as  subsidiaries  (civil  aircraft  and  helicopters,  satellites, 
machinery),  the  other  three  as  divisions  (combat  aircraft,  space,  and  in  part  defence, 
infrastructure and civil systems).  The latter three  are  not independent, and are  directed by 
DaimlerChrysler AG.  In legal  terms,  DASA AG,  DaimlerChrysler Airbus  GmbH,  Domier 
GmbH, Eurocopter GmbH and MTU GmbH constitute the DASA konzern. 
DASA AG is both an AG company under German law, not listed on the stock exchange, and 
a  subsidiary  of the  DaimlerChrysler  group.  Like  Debis  (services)  and  "directly  managed 
shareholdings" (Adtranz, MTU-Diesel, TEMIC), DASA is part ofthe non-automobile section 
of  the group. The ties between the parent company and its aeronautics and defence subsidiary 
are as much capital-related as contractual. 
With a 93.83  % stake in Daimler-Benz-Luft- und Raumfahrt Holding AG, which possesses 
100 % of DASA, DaimlerChrysler is by far the major shareholder (5.99 % of the Holding 
belongs to the city of Hamburg, 0.18 % to Familiengesellschafter (Blohm, Bolkow, Dornier 
and Messerschmitt-Stiftung). This share is the capital-related basis for DASA's domination by 
DaimlerChrysler. 
Legally, DASA is an integral part ofthe holding company that was created in the 1980s to act 
as  a common roof over the different aerospace and defence companies bought by Daimler-
Benz. However, this holding company is now nothing but an empty shell, existing purely for 
tax  reasons.  Of  more  importance  is  the  control  agreement  (Beherrschungs- und 
Gewinnabfuhrungsvertrag) between the holding company and DaimlerChrysler. This contract 
both  delegates  management  of DASA  to  DaimlerChrysler,  and  notifies  DASA  of its 
obligation  to  hand  its  profits  over  to  DaimlerChrysler.  According  to  German  law,  this 
structure is a konzern in which DASA is an affiliated group belonging to the parent company 
DaimlerChrysler. 
18 Familien 
Gesellschafter 
D.  I  Ch  a1mer 
AG  .  .  . 
rys er  1-
................  ··················(················· 
Integration agreement 
(§319 Aktiengesetz) 
Key: 
Daimler-Benz 
- Luft-u.Raumfahrt 
Holding AG  .  .  .  . 
- DaimlerChrysler 
Aerospace AG 
••••••••••••••  : Capital-related ties 
:Legal ties 
-
Hamburg 
•  .  .  ...................  ~ 
Control and 
Payment 
Agreement (§291 
Aktiengesetz) 
19 Familien  DaimlerChrysler  Hamburg 
Gesellschafter  AG 
I a 1a%  93 83%  l. 
I 
I 5,99% 
Daimler-Benz 
Luft-u. 
Raumfahrt 
Holding AG 
1100%  u  DaimlerChrysler 
Aerospace AG 
l 
49%  40%  I 
Familien  j_ 57,55%  96,81%  p.19%  199,99%  1100% 
Gesellschafter  42,45% 
TEMIC  Eurocopter  MTU Miinchen  1'- DaimlerChrysler  Fokker 
GmbH  Holding S.A.  Dornier GmbH  GmbH  Aerospace  Holding B.V.  -
Airbus GmbH 
I  1 
50% I  150%  87%  I 
33%  10%  40%  1  p7%  19%  I 
51% 
Armaments  Dornier 
Norte! Dasa  Airbus  LFK-
Bayern Chenie 
TDA  Satelliten- - ....__  Network  Industria  Lenfklugkorper- - GmbH  SAS  systeme GmbH  Systems  G.I.E  systeme GmbH 
GmbH & Co. KG 
Familien 
Gesellschatter 
1 100%  120%  120%  49%  51%  11,65%  J 
Domier  Dornier  Dornier  Daimler-Benz  83,35%  MTU 
Flugzeugwerft  Luftfahrt  Medizintechnik  Dieselantriebe  Friedrichshafen 
GmbH  GmbH  GmbH  Gbr  GmbH 
18 Restructuring between 1995 and 1998 
To understand DASA's current situation within DaimlerChrysler, we need to turn back to the 
restructuring  undergone  by  Daimler-Benz under the  leadership of Jiirgen  Schrempp  in the 
years between 1995  and  1998.
12  From the beginning of his leadership,  Schrempp - himself 
the  former  chief executive  of DASA  - had  instigated  a  radical  turnaround.  Unlike  his 
predecessor, Edward Reuter, who wanted to bring different areas of cutting edge technology 
together under a single roof (Integrierter Technologiekonzern), he decided to  go back to the 
roots  of Daimler-Benz,  i.e.  automobiles  and  transport.  This  new  focus  was  above  all 
evidenced by the merger of Mercedes Benz AG with Daimler-Benz Holding AG.  (Formerly, 
the first had been one of  the four legally independent entities covered by the common roof of 
the second). 
The key word in the restructuring of Daimler-Benz was  Unternehmenswertsteigerung.  This 
concept is  inspired by shareholder value, but is more extensive and comprehensive than the 
Anglo-Saxon model. Indeed, the objective was to attract investors, not by short-term financial 
success, but by improved competitiveness in the long term. To do this, Schrempp proposed to 
both rationalise the  operations process,  improve the  quality  and range of products,  ensure 
employee consensus and perfect the workforce's motivation and know-how. 
However restructuring began with the transfer of  non-profitable activities. Following the stop 
the bleeding principle, Schrempp systematically assessed the activities of  the group according 
to their profitability and their strategic value. Only those subsidiaries which via high returns 
and technological excellence would be able to achieve leading positions in the world markets 
were to  stay in the  group.  The main victim of this portfolio balancing was AEG, a part of 
which was sold, the other part being integrated into the other subsidiaries of the group. The 
number of  sectors of  activity thus dropped from 35 to 23. 
Even more important than spectacular sales figures were the internal changes to the Daimler-
Benz group. Application of the US-GAAP to the annual reports of all  subsidiaries provided 
more transparency, thus making it easier to gain access to the international financial markets 
and representing a decisive step towards the Americanisation of the group, indispensable for 
12  See  Armin Topfer,  "Die Restrukturierung des  Daimler-Benz Konzems  1995-1997", Uichterhand, Neuwied 
1998. 
19 the subsequent merger with Chrysler. At the same time, a management level in the group was 
eliminated. The directors of activity sectors obtained greater room to manoeuvre, but became 
directly responsible for the management of Daimler-Benz with regard to strategy and results. 
Now it is  not  once  a  quarter  but  once  a  month  that  management  requires  an  operations 
progress report. The ultimate objective set for  each sub-subsidiary was to  obtain a minimum 
of 12% Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) and to be among the most profitable bidders in 
its sector.  To  achieve this,  the  decision making and planning processes as  well as  the way 
work was organised were profoundly changed. 
All these measures were also applied to DASA. 
1)  The  portfolio  was  balanced.  In  1995,  a  part  of MTU  as  well  as  Temic  Telefunken 
Microelectronic  were transferred from  DASA to  AEG Daimler Benz Industrie to  then 
merge with Daimler-Benz AG. At the beginning of 1996, DASA had finished subsidising 
its Dutch subsidiary Fokker, which then went into voluntary liquidation. A few months 
later,  two  of Dornier's  sub-subsidiaries  were  sold  : Dornier Medizintechnik, which no 
longer corresponded to the portfolio, and Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH, which was in the red. 
2)  A  recovery  package,  "DOLORES"  (Dollar  Low  Rescue),  was  set  up  to  increase 
profitability. The aim was to reduce costs by 30% to remain profitable at an exchange rate 
of 1.35 DM to the American Dollar. The rationalisation measures were aimed at supplier 
contracts,  the  organisation  of work  and  staffing  costs.  After  an  initial  large  cut  in 
personnel between 1989 and  1993  (16,000 employees), a further  16,000 positions were 
suppressed in 1995/96. A third wave of cuts (18,000 jobs), scheduled for  1998/99, was 
only partially carried out, thanks to a significant market upturn. 
3)  The organisation and management of  the subsidiary were restructured. With the dissolving 
of the  "Aeronautics",  "Space"  and  "Defence"  branches,  a  management  level  was 
suppressed. The activities concerned were reorganised into sectors, directly answerable to 
the  management  of Daimler-Benz.  The  "Communications  and  Information  Systems", 
"Sensor Systems"  and "Missiles"  branches were integrated into the new "Civil  Systems 
and Defence" branch. 
4)  The accounting system was changed, each DASA subsidiary becoming responsible for its 
own financial results. Within the new group it is no longer possible to off-set the losses of 
one branch with the profits of  another. 
5)  Another new feature is that DASA subsidiaries present their reports both to the Managing 
Director  of DASA  and  to  the  functional  central  services  of the  parent  company 
20 ("Management",  "Finances/Controlling",  "Research/Technology"  and  "Strategy/ 
Development"). The latter support DASA's general management and participate, from the 
outset, in the strategic and tactical planning for DASA' s subsidiaries. Having been jointly 
set by DASA's subsidiaries and management, the objectives for each subsidiary are then 
approved by the parent company's management. 
The economic and financial situation 
Financially,  the  restructuring  of the  group  was  a  huge  success.  In  1995,  Daimler-Benz 
recorded a deficit of  6.57 billion DM and for the first time in history, the shareholders did not 
receive a dividend. In 1996, Daimler-Benz made a profit of 1.29 billion DM, which increased 
to 5.79 billion in 1997. The merger with Chrysler opened up new horizons : the turnover in 
1998 was 257.74 billion DM (+12%) and operating profit was 16.80 billion DM (+38%). The 
dividend of 4.60 DM per share is on a par with American levels and is well above average 
European returns. The financial markets honoured these results, and between 1995 and 1998, 
the share price rose from 64 to  180 DM.  The value of the group thus rose from 34 to more 
than 100 billion DM.
13 
DASA's  development  is  equally  impressive.  After  the  disastrous  year  in  1996  (losses 
amounting to 6.72 billion DM, largely due to Fokker), results have climbed steadily. Several 
~ 
factors  have  been at the root of such a recovery  : the rapid expansion of the civil aviation 
markets,  a  favourable  exchange  rate  with  the  dollar,  but  also,  the  positive  effects  of the 
restructuring measures. The key figures for DASA are shown below (million DM) :
14 
13  RUdiger Liedtke, "Wem gehort die Republik", Eichborn, Frankfurt, 1998, p.  132-146 
14 All figures according to the Annual Reports of 1997 and 1998. 
21 Key figures by subsidiary and division 
DaimlerChrysler  Results 
Aerospace 
1996  1997  1998 
DASA  Turnover  12,699  15,286  17,200 
Orders  16,658  19,399  27,000 
Research  and  3,681  4,367  4,004 
Development 
Operating Profit  196  432  1,218 
ROCE  n.c  8.8%  18.7% 
Employees  44,174  43,521  45,858 
Civil  aircraft  Turnover  3,501  and  4,758  and  5,800  and 
and helicopters  1,102  1,212  1,400 
Orders  6,381  and  9,041  and 
1,421  1,600 
Research  and  483 and 229  306 and 244  470 and 239 
Development 
Operating Profit  n.c.  n.c.  440 and 65 
ROCE  n.c  n.c  19.0%  and 
6.0% 
Employees  15,319  and  15,403  and  16,195  and 
3,987  3,847  4,065 
Combat Aircraft  Turnover  1,589  1,654  1,900 
Orders  1,152  1,964 
Research  and  403  407  425 
Development 
Operating Profit  n.c.  n.c.  160 
ROCE  n.c.  n.c.  65% 
22 Employees  5,567  5,640  5,913 
Satellites  Turnover  1,183  1,450  1,300 
Orders  1,475  1,140  ... 
Research  and  851  1,503  1,040 
Development 
Operating Profit  n.c.  n.c.  23 
ROCE  8.5% 
Employees  1,648  1,623  1,652 
Space  Turnover  1,012  1,105  1,130 
Infrastructure 
Orders  2,189  833  ... 
Research  and  708  720  628 
Development 
Operating Profit  n.c.  n.c.  100 
ROCE  n.c.  n.c.  45.0% 
Employees  1,919  1,946  1,990 
Civil  Systems  Turnover  2,747  2,841  3,400 
and Defence 
Orders  2,511  3,036  ... 
- Research  and  631  861  901 
Development 
Operating Profit  n.c.  n.c.  90 
ROCE  n.c.  n.c.  6.0% 
Employees  9,254  8,724  9,109 
Engines  Turnover  2,311  2,963  3,249 
Orders  2,127  2,703  ... 
Research  and  305  319  299 
Development 
Operating Profit  n.c.  n.c.  220 
ROCE  n.c.  n.c.  30.0% 
Employees  6,007  6,023  6,633 
23 Thanks to its participation in many European programmes, DASA achieves 2/3 of its turnover 
via  international  co-operation.  Its  involvement  in  joint  ventures  such  as  Airbus  and 
Arianespace  also  explain that the  European Union is,  with  50%  of the  turnover,  the  main 
market (Germany 28%, USA 16%, rest of  the world 6%). 
The rapid increase in civil aircraft contracts since  1995  has  improved DASA's situation in 
general and increased the proportion of  turnover related to civil activity (from 62% in 1996 to 
69% in 1998). This development does not, however, indicate a withdrawing from the military 
sector. On the contrary, in the coming years, all subsidiaries concerned will be carrying out 
very important projects. The combat aircraft subsidiary has Eurofighter, Eurocopter has the 
Tiger  and  the  NH  90,  LFK  has  the  Taurus  and  EURAAM  programmesY  Estimates  of 
DASA's key figures for the next three years are shown below (million DM) : 
15  Ibid. 
24 Projections for 1999-2001 
Results  Projections 
DaimlerChrysler 
Aerospace 
1998  1999  2000  2001 
DASA  Turnover  17 200  18600  19550  19950 
Operating Profit  1218  1040  1530  1460 
ROCE  18.7%  13.5%  19.0%  17.5% 
Civil Aircraft  Turnover  5800  6500  7050  6900 
Operating Profit  440  400  800  650 
ROCE  19.0%  16.0%  30.5%  24.0% 
Helicopters  Turnover  1400  1480  1550  1550 
Operating Profit  65  100  95  110 
ROCE  6.0%  9.5%  9.0%  9.5% 
Combat Aircraft  Turnover  1900  1950  2075  2200 
Operating Profit  160  170  190  200 
ROCE  65.0%  38.0%  34.5%  35.5% 
Space  Turnover  1130  1385  1350  1220 
Infrastructure 
Operating Profit  100  85  90  90 
ROCE  45.0%  31.0%  30.0%  28.0% 
25 Satellites  Turnover  1300  1190  1095  1225 
Operating Profit  23  25  35  40 
ROCE  8.5%  10.0%  12.0%  13.0% 
Civil  Systems/  Turnover  3400  3600  3850  4350 
Defence 
Operating Profit  90  170  220  290 
ROCE  6.0%  9.5%  14.0%  17.5% 
Machinery  Turnover  3249  3315  3410  3500 
Operating Profit  220  220  230  220 
ROCE  30.0%  22.0%  19.0%  15.0% 
*projections according to Capital, n°5/1999, p. 81 
The ties between the parent company and the aeronautics subsidiary 
Neither the restructuring of 1995  - 1998, nor the subsequent merger of Daimler-Benz and 
Chrysler changed DASA's legal status. The company is still an AG (public limited company), 
and its organisational structure is therefore determined to  a large extent by German law.  A 
board of directors is responsible for the company's operations. Its members are appointed and 
monitored  by  a  supervisory  board  which  consists  of,  in  compliance  with  management 
equality, an equal number of  shareholder representatives and employees. While the former are 
appointed  by DaimlerChrysler,  the  latter are  elected by  the  staff.  There  is  also  a  General 
Assembly. 
However, the fact that DASA is a subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler greatly influences how these 
bodies  operate.  The  general  assembly,  for  example,  is  not  public  and only takes  "formal" 
decisions, such as to give full discharge to the board of directors or approve the annual report. 
The  supervisory  board  is  important  in  that  it  enables  employees  to  participate  in  making 
company decisions. However, the majority shareholder has no need for it as an instrument of 
control  because,  as  the  parent  company,  it  has  other  means  of watching  over  DASA's 
operations. 
26 In legal terms, DaimlerChrysler is  governed by the control agreement (which is not public). 
This agreement comes with structural ties and a considerable number of  key positions : 
•  The composition of DASA's supervisory board and  board of directors and those of the 
holding company is identical ; 
•  The CEO as  well as  several members of DaimlerChrysler's board of directors (Strategy, 
Finance, Technology) are members of the supervisory boards of DASA and the holding 
company; 
•  The CEO ofDASA's board of directors represents the aerospace and defence sectors as a 
whole and is responsible for the activities of the different sub-subsidiaries. At the same 
time, he is a member of Daimler's board of directors and chairs the supervisory board of 
Adtranz, the railway subsidiary of  DaimlerChrysler ; 
•  Generally,  the  exchange  of  directors  between  DASA  and  other  DaimlerChrysler 
subsidiaries is encouraged (even if it is limited by the specific nature of  DASA and by the 
difference in management salaries) ; 
•  DASA's  general  management  is  made  up  of members  of its  board  of directors,  the 
directors of its subsidiaries and divisions as well as two directors responsible for central 
services  (Finances  and  Controlling,  Strategy  and  Technology).  The  latter  two  are 
supported by the corresponding departments of DaimlerChrysler. The board of directors 
of DASA  itself  has  only  three  members,  and  of  these  only  one  has  functional 
responsibilities covering the whole ofDASA (Personnel). 
•  While DASA's subsidiaries are responsible for R&D  (relating to  specific programmes), 
R&T (general) is centralised for the DaimlerChrysler group  as  a whole.  DASA puts in 
requests for research to the "DaimlerChrysler Forschung" amounting to around 30 million 
DM per year.  If the research could also  interest the other subsidiaries of the group, the 
parent company subsidises the project with the equivalent sum. The objective is to create 
optimum synergy and to direct R&T towards the widest possible application. 
Another important tie is that DASA's strategic planning is integrated into the planning of the 
parent company. It is divided into four stages, as for the other subsidiaries, which take place 
between March and June: 
•  Stage 1 : DaimlerChrysler's board of directors gives the overall guidelines for all the sub-
subsidiaries (Strate  gieforum). 
27 •  Stage 2 : DASA's subsidiaries follow these guidelines to specify their own objectives and 
the resources to  be  used and policies to  be followed  to  achieve these objectives.  Then, 
these plans are brought into line with the others by DASA's general management. 
•  Stage 3  : the two  co-CEOs and the directors of central services (Strategy, Technology, 
Finance) of DaimlerChrysler's board of directors, meet with the general management of 
DASA  to  discuss  and  decide  upon  the  strategy  and  projects  of each  sub-subsidiary 
(Strategisch-Wirtschaftliche Gesprache, SWG). 
•  Stage 4 : the strategic plans of the different subsidiaries are integrated into the strategy of 
the group as a whole (Konzernstrategieklausur). 
One of the  essential characteristics of this  process  is  the  permanent co-operation between 
DASA's  subsidiaries,  DASA's  general  management  and  DaimlerChrysler's  "strategy" 
management.  This  co-operation  is  ensured  by  means  of a  working  group  made  up  of 
strategists from the three levels. The group constantly monitors the development of strategic 
plans and thus guarantees that there is a permanent link between sub-subsidiaries, subsidiaries 
and the parent company. 
Despite its legal stand-alone status, DASA is therefore closely tied to DaimlerChrysler. It is 
true that the specific nature of  the aerospace and defence sector as well as the tradition of  the 
original companies, still alive in the subsidiaries, give DASA a certain degree of  autonomy. It 
does  not  mean  that  there  are  not  many,  strong,  capital-related,  contractual,  staffing  and 
organisational ties. Legally, DaimlerChrysler has the right to give instructions and have them 
executed.  It  is  the  parent  company  that  takes  the  major  strategic  decisions,  specifies 
profitability  criteria,  determines  internal  procedures  and  participates  in  its  subsidiarys' 
planning.  The  objective  is  not,  however,  to  be  constantly  interfering  in  DASA's  daily 
operation, but to guarantee that its policy is appropriately in line with the group's philosophy. 
For example, the principles for restructuring were the same in all Daimler's subsidiaries. For 
DASA, there was, nonetheless, a certain degree of flexibility allowing for the specific nature 
of its activity. The aeronautics subsidiary has, for instance, its own definition of the ROCE, 
and it still uses the ROCE in parallel with the new system, RONA (Return On Net Assets). 
Similarly, it is Daimler that set the objective of lowering costs by 30%, but it is DASA that 
drew up  the  corresponding  restructuring  plan (DOLORES),  and DASA's subsidiaries that 
provided the details. 
28 Furthermore, DOLORES is a good example of a certain "German" approach to restructuring, 
an approach which seeks, on the one hand, to  maintain a consensus with employees, and, on 
the other, to safeguard long-term competitiveness : 
•  Despite considerable cost reductions, spending dedicated to R&D has remained relatively 
stable; 
•  To  avoid negative effects on the company's age  pyramid, DASA endeavoured to  avoid 
operating  redundancies  (betriebsbedingte  Kiindigung),  but encouraged  early  retirement 
and redundancy packages for people who would leave voluntarily. Similarly, the company 
never  reduced  either its  training  activities  or its  recruitment  of young  executives  and 
engineers; 
•  Measures  such  as  increasing  flexibility  of work hours,  extending  work  hours  without 
compensation and suppressing non-contractual services, were taken in close consultation 
with the works councils ; 
•  Sites that were not profitable enough (Laubheim, Speyer and Paisenberg) were not simply 
closed, but were restructured and transformed into independent SMEs. 
Of course there were protests against DOLORES, but given the huge scale of restructuring, 
the degree of consensus between management and employees was quite remarkable. It is true 
that the  stability of relations  between management  and  employees  is  characteristic  of the 
entire  German  economy.  But,  "social  harmony"  in  defence-related  industries  in  general, 
within DASA in particular, does however, display certain specific characteristics. Firstly, the 
rate  of union  membership  is  relatively  low  in  this  sector,  which  corresponds  to  the  high 
proportion of engineers and executives among the employees.
16  Secondly, German unions are 
still marked by a strong pacifist tradition, leading implicitly to a certain isolation of employee 
representatives  in  the  sector from  other union  members.  Mobilisation of the  powerful  IG 
Metall in support of Eurofighter, for example, was practically non existent, despite the fact 
that several thousand highly-qualified positions were at stake. Conversely, the members of  the 
affected  works  councils of DASA joined forces  with management to  put pressure  on the 
social-democrat politicians. 
16 Of  the 45,858 employees of  the konzern (Dasa AG, Domier GmbH, Eurocopter GmbH and MTU AG), 13,833 
exert  industrial  activities  and 27,920  are  non-manual  employees.  The  rate  of union  membership  among  the 
former is 85% (IG Metal!), that of  the latter is only 10% (DAG). 
29 The System of Works Councils Within DASA 
CENTRAL WORKS COUNCIL OF DAIMLERCHRYSLER 
i 
CENTRAL WORKS COUNCIL OF THE DASA GROUP 
~  t  t  t  ~ 
Central  Central  Central 
Central 
Central 
Works  Works  Works 
Works 
Works 
Council  Council  Council 
Council EC 
Council 
MTU  Airbus  DASAAG  Domier 
ttt  ttt  ttt  ttt  ttt 
~  s  ~  s 
~ 
ELECT  ~  ~ 
WORK  ~ 
COUNCILS  ~ 
EMPLOYEES OF THE DASA GROUP 
30 The Dual Nature of a German-American Group 
The  question of whether DaimlerChrysler will be,  in the future,  a more American or more 
Germany  company  has  given  rise  to  much  speculation.  It is  true  that  the  United  States 
represent the largest market for the new group (US turnover of 127.7 billion DM, in Europe it 
is 94.8 billion DM, and the rest ofthe world 35.2 billion DM).
17 As regards the shareholders, 
the attempt to attract American investment has nonetheless met with failure. At the time of  the 
merger, 44% of  DaimlerChrysler's capital was held in the United States. Over the past twelve 
months,  this  percentage  has  dropped  considerably.  Today,  47%  of the  capital  is  held  m 
Germany,  25%  in  the  United  States,  10%  in  other  European  Union  countries,  5%  m 
Switzerland and 10% in the rest of  the world (including 7% in Kuwait). Therefore, there was 
a marked shift towards Europe and Germany.
18  The withdrawal of American investors goes 
hand in hand with the departure of  many of  Chrysler's American directors. Thus, the so-called 
"merger of equals" now looks more like a hostile take-over of  Chrysler by Daimler. 
Nonetheless, regarding behaviour, the Americanisation of the group will probably continue 
and even accelerate with the absorption of  Chrysler. The adaptation of  management salaries to 
American levels, the introduction of English as the official language of the Konzern and the 
increase of the fixed profit margin (12% to  15.5%) bear witness to  this.  Shareholder value 
takes on even more importance, as shown by the large dividend per share (2.35 Euros = 4.60 
DM) and the ambitious objective of  increasing operating profit from 8.6 billion Euros in 1999 
to  10 billion in 2000 and doubling turnover every ten years.
19 
The Americanisation of the group is also manifested in how it is governed. Since the merger, 
the  German dual  management system (supervisory board and board of directors) has  been 
17 Merger of  Growth, Annual Report 1998, DaimlerChrysler. 
18 There are many reasons behind this movement : considered to be a German company, (the headquarters is still 
at Stuttgart), DaimlerChrysler was not accepted on the American S&P 500 index. For this reason, the American 
funds  that work on the basis of this index were forced to sell their shares.  According to  Goldman Sachs, this 
involved 47 million shares (4.7%). For their part, European funds had to buy 2.6 million shares to allow for the 
future weight of DaimlerChrysler in the European indexes. In the DAX for example, the share of this company 
alone represents 12% of  the total values (compared with the 7% of former Daimler shares). In the EURO-Stoxx 
50, the weight of  the share has risen from 3.5% to 6%. In addition, the dividend from the new share, particularly 
large  compared with  European values,  has  attracted a  large  number of European  investors.  On  the  contrary, 
many  American  investors  have  been  reticent with  regard  to  the  value  of this  company as  it  is  much  more 
complex than Chrysler, which was just an automotive manufacturer. 
19 Handelsblatt, 1.4.1999, p.  14. 
31 supplemented by a shareholders' committee, consisting of the two  co-CEOs of the board of 
directors as  well as  the ten shareholders' representatives within the  supervisory board.  This 
committee  is  not  covered  by  German  law,  but  corresponds  to  the  structures  of American 
companies. Even if it cannot take decisions, it still holds a strong position. The shareholders' 
committee must monitor operations and advise the board of  directors between meetings of the 
supervisory board (the former meets every two months, the latter every three months). It is 
clear that in such a system, the shareholders' representatives are in a much more advantageous 
position  than  the  employee  representatives.  In  other  words,  employee  participation,  a 
characteristic trait of the  German model  will  continue by law,  but in effect will have  less 
value.
20 
The  Americanisation of the  group  was  begun  by  Schrempp  to  prepare  Daimler-Benz  for 
globalisation. The capital markets for him were certainly a very important factor, but he was 
not pushed in this direction by investors. Firstly, he did not need pushing, because Schrempp 
is  a wholehearted advocate of Anglo-Saxon methods.  Secondly, the influence of American 
institutional investors over the group's governance remains smaller than was believed at the 
time of the merger. There are three main shareholders in DaimlerChrysler who hold 27% of 
the capital : the Deutsche Bank (12%), Kuwait (7%, managed by Dresdner Bank) and Kirk 
Kerkorian  (4%),  former  reference  shareholder of Chrysler.  In addition to  these,  there  are 
around  17,000 institutional investors and  1.45  million individual investors  (of which more 
than 850,000 small  shareholders) who  hold respectively 49%  and  24% of the capital.  The 
largest  proportion  of the  capital  is  therefore  well  dispersed,  and  there  are  very  few 
institutional investors that hold more than 1% of the capital (AXA, DEKA, Dresdner Bank, 
Commerz-Bank). American investment funds together hold about 20% of the capital, but not 
one  of them alone holds  more than 1%.
21  The merger therefore reduced the weight of the 
reference  shareholders  (Deutsche  Bank  and  Kuwait  held  24%  and  12%  respectively  of 
Daimler Benz), without really changing the influences affecting DaimlerChrysler governance 
(or, for that matter, representation on the supervisory board). 
In this context, it is important to  underline that DaimlerChrysler's reference shareholders are 
non-industrial financial investors. They monitor economic developments but do  not interfere 
in  strategic decisions. This constellation gives the board of directors and,  above all,  Jurgen 
20  See Holger Appel, Christoph He in, "Der DaimlerChrysler Deal", DV A,  Stuttgart 1998, p. 208. 
21  Figures from DaimlerChrysler Investor Relations. 
32 Schrempp, greater room to manoeuvre. The position of the  German co-CEO is made all the 
stronger in that his American counterpart, Robert Eaton, had, from the outset, announced he 
would be retiring after two years. Schrempp can also benefit from a very good, long-standing 
personal  relationship with Hilmar Kopper,  who  chairs  both the  supervisory board and  the 
shareholders'  committee of DaimlerChrysler as  well  as  the  supervisory board of Deutsche 
Banl<.
22 
The Strategy of DaimlerChrysler and its Subsidiary, DASA 
Globalisation is still DaimlerChrysler's objective. The German-American merger has already 
made it possible to  achieve the first objective, the parallel penetration of the American and 
European  markets.  The  next  step,  conquering  the  Asian  market,  is  proving  to  be  more 
difficult. Following the failure of rapprochement with Nissan, DaimlerChrysler will probably 
develop its own automobile targeted at the Asian (and Latin American) market. The aim is to 
increase the Asian contribution to turnover from 4% today to 25% by 2010. At the same time, 
globalisation  is  still  an  objective  with regard  to  investors.  Seeming to  have  accepted  the 
reticence of  American shareholders, group's management is now hoping to attract more Asian 
investors. 
23 
For the  moment,  there  is  no  indication  that DaimlerChrysler  could  call  into  question  its 
commitments in the aeronautics and defence fields.  In fact, there is no reason for it to do so 
while DASA continues to produce good results. Nevertheless, the weight ofDASA within the 
group  has  been considerably reduced by the  merger.  It only represents  7% of the  group's 
revenues (83% vehicles). This marginalisation is also apparent in the fact that Mr.  Bischoff 
does not sit on the Chairmen's' Integration Council which, consisting of 8 of the 18 directors, 
represents the hard core ofDaimlerChrysler's management.
24 
The fact that the group's leaders are currently studying the possibility of DASA entering the 
stock exchange shows that marginalisation of the subsidiary could lead to  its  emancipation 
with regard to capital. This would have a dual advantage : firstly, the parent company would 
22 s  . .  15  ee op.  czt.  m note  . 
23 FAZ, 10.5.1999, p.  19. 
24 Although the directors officially have all the same rights, the members of the council are de facto on a higher 
level  in  the  hierarchy.  They see  each  other more  often  (once  a  week,  whereas  the  committee meets  once  a 
month), have access to more information and work on the key issues relating to the new group. 
33 gain  visibility  and  secondly,  DASA  would  increase  its  strategic  room  for  manoeuvre  for 
future mergers, because mergers are sealed more by the exchange of shares than of cash. 
25 
Meanwhile,  DASA  is  following  the  global  guidelines  of the  parent  company  aiming  for 
"profitable  growth".  For  the  aeronautics  and  defence  subsidiary,  these  guidelines  consist 
firstly  of "organic growth"  in the basic sectors and secondly,  in developing new contracts. 
With  the  acquisition  of Siemens  defence  activities  (SI  Sicherheitstechnik),  DASA  has 
significantly  strengthened  its  position  in  the  electronics  field.  In  the  future,  it  wishes  to 
become  more  involved  in  space  (communication  and  navigation  by  satellite,  earth 
observation)  and  service  activities  (after-sales  service,  maintenance,  modification).  At  the 
same time, DASA is trying to strengthen its presence on the world markets. It is participating, 
for instance, in the Brazilian contest to replace the F-X BR combat aircraft
26 and proposed to 
increase the proportion of  its Asian contracts to 25% ofthe overall turnover. 
From this point of view, DASA considers its participation in trans-national restructuring as a 
means, not an end per se. It is ready to merge with one or more partners- on the condition 
that such a marriage meets the economic and financial criteria laid down by DaimlerChrysler. 
Indeed,  the  favourable  economic situation enables DASA to  be  on the  lookout for  a good 
occasion and not hurry integration into a multinational company. 
Strategically  speaking,  the  company  now  seems  to  be  well  placed  for  the  next  stage  of 
restructuring. It remains to be seen if the parent company's strong base in the United States 
will help DASA to form  a partnership with an American, but the German champion would 
certainly not hesitate if a transatlantic merger or acquisition became viable. In relation to its 
European partners, the merger with CASA significantly improved DASA's situation. Within 
the two  main European projects, Airbus  and  Eurofighter,  the  new  German-Spanish couple 
holds a key position. Whether restructuring takes on a more European or trans-Atlantic hue -
the  failure  of  negotiations  with  BAe,  the  absorption  of  CASA  and  moves  towards 
Aerospatiale Matra clearly show that DaimlerChrysler would not allow its subsidiary to be a 
minor partner in future mergers. 
25 Ulrich Friese, Walter Hillebrand, "Lockruf der B5rse", in: Capital5/1999, p. 78-87. 
26 Paolo Valpolini : "Shark bites into fighter contest", Jane's Defense Weekly, 5-5-1999. 
34 IV. STUDY OF AN ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION MODEL WHERE 
A GERMAN COMPANY IS INVOLVED 
IV-1. STN-ATLAS 
STN-ATLAS Elektronik GmbH was created in 1994 by the merger of STN Systemtechnik 
Nord GmbH and ATLAS Elektronik GmbH. With a turnover of more than 1.2 billion DM (in 
1997), it is one of  the largest German companies in the defence electronics field. 
STN-ATLAS is divided into four sectors of  activity: 
•  Land- und Flugsysteme (Aeronautics and territorial systems), 
•  Naval Systems, 
•  Simulationssysteme (simulation systems), 
•  Marine Electronics. 
Of  these sectors, Marine Electronics has several distinguishing characteristics. Firstly, it is the 
only one to be organised as a subsidiary, and is therefore legally independent (in the form of a 
GmbH  company).  The  other  sectors  are  organised  into  divisions.  Secondly,  Marine 
Electronics  generates  - with  31%  - the  largest  part  of STN-ATLAS's  turnover  (Naval 
Systems 29%, Simulationssysteme 22%, Land- und Flugsysteme 18%). Thirdly, it is the only 
sector where civil activities exceed military activities. 
35 Distribution of Turnover between Civil and Military Activities in each 
Division of STN-ATLAS : 
Sector o[ActivitJ!.  Proportion 
Marine Electronics  80%:20% 
Simulationssysteme  40%:60% 
Naval Systems  10%:90% 
Land- und Flugsysteme  5-l 0% : 90-95% 
Approximate figures according to estimates made by managers at STN 
Until 1997, STN-ATLAS was part of a large construction site, the Bremer Vulkan Verbund. 
When  it  went under,  the  company was  bought by a consortium made  up  of Rheinmetall, 
Badenwerk  AG  and  British  Aerospace.  Soon  afterwards,  Badenwerk  gave  its  share  to 
Rheinmetall, which now holds 51% of  the social shares. 
STN-ATLAS is not a joint venture, but a German company in which a British company has a 
large  stake  (49%).  Rheinmetall  is  the  majority  partner  and  industrial  leader  and  it alone 
specifies the strategy of STN-ATLAS. The latter is part of the Rheinmetall group, where it 
represents the "Defence Electronics" sector. As such, it is has been headed, since 1 July 1999, 
by  a  new  holding  company,  "DeTec"  (Defence  Technology)  which,  at  the  same  time, 
absorbed the  activities of Rheinmetall in the territorial armaments sector (former  "Defence 
Technology" sector). 
For tax  reasons,  Rheinmetall  holds  its  financial  share  through  a  holding  company  (STN 
ATLAS Holding GmbH). On the British side, the social shares are held by BAe Deutschland ; 
economic and industrial responsibility falling to  the  "Defence Systems"  division of BAe  in 
Famborough. 
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 As  the  associate of a GmbH under German law,  BAe  benefits from  patrimonial rights  and 
administrative rights. The latter include the right to participation, information and opposition. 
The chair of the BAe board of directors meets five or six times a year with his counterpart at 
Rheinmetall  during  STN-ATLAS  associate  assemblies.  The  Finance  and  Controlling 
Directors of  the two associates also participate. The assembly takes strategic decisions of the 
company on a unanimity basis. 
Within the  STN-ATLAS  supervisory  board,  two  of the  six  associates'  representatives  are 
delegated by BAe : the director of BAe Defence Systems as well as the managing director of 
BAe  Deutschland.  BAe  thus  participates  in  all  decisions  submitted  for  approval  by  the 
supervisory board (such appointment of  directors) and all decisions needing approval by both 
associates. 
BAe does not have a representative on the STN-ATLAS board of directors. However, one of 
the three German directors is responsible, among other things, for relations with the British 
associate. He is  employed by  STN-ATLAS, but acts as  interlocutor and "representative" of 
BAe's interests. 
Each of the two associates monitors the accounts of STN-ATLAS, but they do  not exercise 
this right in the same manner. While Rheinmetall acts more as a financial holding company, 
interested "only" in the overall results, the British associate demands detailed information on 
current business and the financial aspects of each project. Furthermore, Rheinmetall and BAe 
have different reference periods, which causes co-ordination problems with the accountants of 
STN-ATLAS. 
While  STN-ATLAS  and  the  "Defence  Technology"  sector  of Rheinmetall  are  industrial 
partners in several projects, co-operation between STN and BAe Defence Systems is limited 
to  marketing  for  the  moment.  In  this  field,  common  organisations  exist,  responsible  for 
overall  co-ordination,  the  exchange  of information  on  contracts  and  co-operation  during 
exhibitions.  Furthermore,  a  marketing  expert  from  BAe  is  permanently  based  in  Bremen 
where he acts as a focal point for the contacts at below-management levels. In certain cases, 
38 STN-ATLAS and BAe Defence Systems co-ordinate their access to international markets, but 
there is no general sharing out of  the world market. 
However, there are many contacts in other fields which remain informal. The members of  the 
research and development teams for  example see each other irregularly, even occasionally, 
engineers exchange information on their basic research, but not on specific projects- which 
would  indeed  be  forbidden  by the  national  security  regulations.  These  work  contacts  are 
increasing, but do  not follow any pre-set agenda.  Rheinmetall appears to  be more active in 
this "spontaneous" rapprochement than BAe. This is not due to any difference in strategy, but 
to the administrative obligations to which the industrial leader is subject. 
By  committing  to  STN-ATLAS,  BAe  and  Rheinrnetall  were  pursuing  the  same  overall 
strategy : to strengthen their capacity in defence electronics. However, there is a difference : 
while Rheinrnetall was looking for a supplementary electronics component for its activities in 
territorial armaments, BAe wanted to invest in naval electronics, a field where it was not yet 
present.  This  situation  has  now  changed.  Since  the  absorption  of Marconi,  the  British 
associate now has in its portfolio the very activities it wanted to "purchase" by participating in 
STN-ATLAS. It remains to be seen to what extent this change will influence BAe's strategy in 
relation to STN-ATLAS ; it is expected that in the future the British will be more interested in 
the territorial activities of  the German company. 
Finally, the pairing up that we are witnessing in the armaments industry is sometimes liable to 
call the activity-based joint ventures into question by in effect creating competitive strategies. 
Indeed, the merger of BAe-GEC also made BAe a partner in two competing joint ventures in 
the sonar field because GEC-Marconi had its  own joint venture with Thomson-CSF in this 
field: Thomson-Marconi-sonar. 
As Thomson-CSF had pre-emptive rights in Thomson-Marconi sonar, the CEO of Thomson-
CSF, Denis Ranque, asked the directors of BAe to take the side of Thomson-Marconi sonar 
threatening to withdraw from the JV in sonar with Marconi if  they did otherwise. 
27 
39 IV-2. Eurocopter 
Eurocopter's origins go back to  1985. At the time, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) and 
Aerospatiale had created a consortium to develop the Franco-German attack helicopter, Tiger. 
However, it was an "empty shell" :a  company with no employees which only existed for legal 
reasons, essential for managing certain business. 
The group moved onto the next stage in May  1991, with the creation of a joint subsidiary, 
Eurocopter International. It took the  form of an Economic Interests  Group,  responsible for 
marketing  equipment  manufactured  on  both  sides  of the  Rhine  throughout  the  world. 
However, the approach taken to create the group proved to be far from simple. Three years of 
work were required before Eurocopter International could be officially baptised. In addition to 
the many administrative contortions and struggles with bureaucracy, everybody's fears had to 
be allayed. Even more so considering that in the meanwhile, Daimler-Benz had taken control 
of  MBB, and that, for one year, rapprochement was not the prime concern of  Daimler-Benz's 
management. 
Despite all these difficulties, the rapprochement did not end there. In order to strengthen co-
operation, not only in the context of an economics interests group,  but as  a true company, 
DASA and Aerospatiale transformed Eurocopter into a public limited company. The signing 
of  the development contract for the NH 90 made a large contribution to sealing the union that 
represented  a  desire  for  permanent  co-operation.  In  agreement  with  the  European 
Commission, Aerospatiale and DASA made the merger of their helicopter sector activities 
official on 1 January 1992. And Eurocopter was born. 
Due to  the lack of a joint European regulatory framework,  the instruments of both German 
and French law were called upon in constructing the  group.  Thus a company governed by 
French law was created, Eurocopter S.A., which is controlled to a limit of 75% by a financial 
holding company, Eurocopter Holding, in which Aerospatiale holds 60% of the capital and 
DASA holds 40%. In addition, Aerospatiale directly holds 25% of the capital of Eurocopter 
S.A. Initially, Eurocopter S.A. had 100% control of  three operational subsidiaries (EC France, 
EC  Deutschland,  EC  International).  These  controlled  another  joint  subsidiary, 
27 Les Echos 18 August 1999 
40 EC Participations.  In  1997,  this  structure  was  significantly  simplified  :  three  of  the 
subsidiaries (EC France, EC International and EC Participations) were integrated into a single 
entity, Eurocopter S.A., leaving just one subsidiary, EC Deutschland GmbH. 
The three-stage system reflects the industrial and financial contributions of the two partners 
and  follows  the  outline of their  former  "helicopter"  divisions.  The  structuring  by  holding 
company is based on the principle that each partner structures the activity concerned by being 
a partner in a company under national law, then bringing it to a holding company created for 
the  specific  circumstances  and  governed  by  the  law of one  of the  countries  involved.  In 
Eurocopter, several holding companies are used to settle dividend increases or power sharing 
issues.  Assessment  of the  industrial  capacities  revealed  a  total  of 80%  in  favour  of 
Aerospatiale ; thanks to the payment of a further sum, DASA increased its share to 30%. To 
get  even closer to  a  "politically correct"  distribution of 50-50,  the  capital-related  share  of 
Aerospatiale had to  be divided up  (60% to the holding company, 25% to  the public limited 
company).  Therefore the dominance of Aerospatiale was mitigated at each level, and made 
the unanimity of strategic decisions (launch of new programmes, closure of sites, etc.) more 
"legitimate". 
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3
 In the  French parent company,  as  in the  German  subsidiary,  there  is  a dual  management 
system (board of directors and supervisory board).  Although there is a French majority  on 
both boards, important decisions must be unanimous. For political reasons a difference was 
therefore  drawn  between  voting  rights  and  capital  rights.  Another  Franco-German 
compromise is the structure ofEurocopter S.A .  .'s board of  directors. The "cohabitation" of two 
CEOs is a solution halfway between the conventional French societe anonyme (which just has 
one CEO) and the German Alctiengesellschaft (which has a collective board of  directors). 
The link between Eurocopter S.A. and its German subsidiary is personalised by the CEOs of 
the two  boards of directors.  The  chair of one is vice-chair of the other and vice versa At 
below  management  level,  there  is  partial  integration  of positions.  Eurocopter  S.A.  and 
Eurocopter  Deutschland  GmbH  are  set up  according  to  the  same  structure  with  "service 
centres" and ''business centres" and both companies have the same directors at the head of  the 
respective centres. All these directors make up the executive board, which meets regularly and 
prepares the decisions  of the board of directors.  Given that these  directors  often meet  in 
France, they are assisted by deputies who represent them in Germany during their absence. 
The exceptions are marketing - which is centralised at the parent company - and the Airbus 
profit centre of Eurocopter Deutschland, because the German subsidiary is the sole Airbus 
supplier  within  the  group.  The  structure  of the  management  bodies  is  organised  both 
according  t~ functions  and  to  activities  and products.  This  distinction corresponds  to  the 
major difference between civil and military clients. As regards distribution of  positions, there 
is a French majority, corresponding to the proportion of  Aerospatiale's industrial contribution. 
While  DASA  and  Aerospatiale  specify  the  "major"  economic  and  financial  objectives, 
Eurocopter S.A. is responsible for strategic decisions regarding its products and contracts as 
well as daily operation. At this level, the different centres of the German subsidiary are as 
much answerable to the management of  Eurocopter S.A. as to the French centres. This does 
not  prevent  DASA  from  still  considering  Eurocopter  Deutschland  as  "a  member  of its 
family".  Like  the  other  subsidiaries  of DASA,  Eurocopter  Deutschland  must  meet  the 
economic objectives set by DaiJnlerCbrysler. In addition, the German directors of  Eurocopter 
are involved in staffing planning for DASA, and they also participate in the many working 
committees of  the latter. 
44 As  regards  employee  participation,  two  systems  coexist  : half of the  German subsidiary's 
supervisory board is made up of  employees, only a third of that of the French parent company 
consists of employees.  Another particularity of Eurocopter Deutschland compared with the 
French parent company is the Arbeitsdirektor (director of social and personnel affairs) who is 
a member of the German board of directors. Appointed by the supervisory board, he is a full 
member and participates in all decisions made by the German board of directors. However, he 
is  actually  primarily  concerned  with  personnel  matters.  These  differences  reflect  the 
differences in the two social and legal systems governing the various units of the group. The 
same  applies to  matters of pay and social services. For Eurocopter Deutschland employees 
these are controlled, in general terms, by DASA's collective agreement, for Eurocopter S.A. 
employees they are dependent on Aerospatiale's price scale. Nevertheless, the decisions of  the 
parent company do, of course, directly affect Eurocopter employees.  Therefore, the French 
unions made room for a representative of  their German colleagues on the supervisory board of 
Eurocopter S.A. 
Originally, the German subsidiary specialised in the manufacture of light equipment, and the 
French subsidiary in equipment weighing over 3.5 tonnes. However, this distribution of  work 
proved to hinder industrial integration and so was abandoned. The objective now is to create 
skills centres and achieve reciprocal dependency. However, even in the civil sector, it remains 
difficult to  integrate the whole cycle from  development to  after-sales service.  Cross-border 
onsolidation is fraught with national considerations, often relating to employment, and each of 
the two units still maintains all their technological capacities. For new products, the greatest 
workload falls to the unit that is leading the programme, even if strictly economic logic calls 
for  different  distribution.  While  technological  specialisation  is  progressing  gradually,  the 
other fields are already consolidated. Eurocopter has already integrated marketing as well as 
sales,  is  gradually rationalising the  product range  and  is  organising bulk purchasing.  The 
exchange of experience between the two competitors is  also an advantage, a difficult one to 
gauge, but nonetheless an important one. 
In the military sector, the industrial organisation of  the Tiger and the NH 90 has, in the event, 
been largely integrated into the "normal" structures of Eurocopter S.A., even though the two 
stand-alone  subsidiaries  (Eurocopter  Tiger  GmbH  and  NH  90  Industries)  are  legally 
responsible for the programmes. For the Tiger and the NH 90, workloads had already been 
distributed even before the creation of Eurocopter. Therefore, in both cases rationalisation is 
45 limited  by  certain  regulations  under  the  agreement  protocol,  requiring,  for  instance,  two 
assembly lines for the Tiger. 
According to  the German directors, Eurocopter's integration has  always depended upon the 
quality of relations between the  parent companies.  DASA and Aerospatiale are  partners in 
specific sectors when they act as shareholders in joint companies, but they remain rivals in the 
overall restructuring process. This competition could cause their strategic interests to diverge, 
which could, in turn, have a negative impact on the joint company. 
Interference by the  shareholders is,  of course,  closely  associated with the joint company's 
degree  of independence.  In  fact,  the  independence  of Eurocopter  depends  not  only  on 
shareholder approval regulations, but also on the identity of the company developed by the 
joint venture. The more the directors and employees identify with the new company, the more 
room  to  manoeuvre  with  regard  to  the  shareholders.  For  an  integrated  company  like 
Eurocopter, which is meant to be a permanent structure, the development of such an identity 
is essential. At executive level this has already happened, but in general, the staff continues to 
identify with "its"  national unit.  Therefore staff exchanges across the borders are  still very 
limited. 
In this context, it has been generally recognised that the human factor is a decisive factor in 
the success of any international merger. Paradoxically, the higher the degree of integration of 
an international company, the greater the issue of national and corporate cultural differences. 
While  setting  up  a  joint  management  system  is  difficult,  it  is  even  more  difficult  for 
individuals of different nationalities and professional origins to  work together within a new 
organisation.  Eurocopter  is  therefore  a  "social  laboratory"  which  could  provide  valuable 
experience for future mergers between national champions. 
46 CHAPTER 2: SPAIN 
I. THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL MODEL OF THE SPANISH PUBLIC SECTOR 
Spain's  current  government  is  stepping  up  the  restructuring  and  privatisation  of public 
companies.  A modernisation programme, presented in  1996,  aims  to  improve the  financial 
performance of public companies  and  privatise them  over the  next few  years.  This policy 
reflects the idea that government control has led to  reduced efficiency for the economy and 
that the budgetary spending it generates is too great. 
1-1. Main Characteristics of  Public Sector Companies 
Spanish public companies are governed by a whole series of organisations
28
. Until September 
1997, industrial companies in the red were grouped together within the Agencia Industrial del 
Estado (AlE), while those in the black were directed by the holding company SEPI (Sociedad 
Estatal de Participaciones Industriales). Other major public companies are controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance (Direccion General del Patrimonio del Estado (DGPE)) and its agency 
responsible for privatisation (Sociedad Estatal de  Participaciones Patrimoniales (SEPP A)), 
or are  public entities with the  status of public organisation. Public companies that provide 
public  services report to  the  ministry  concerned.  Finally,  regional  and  local administrative 
bodies have also created public companies that they control directly. 
This constellation of public companies includes companies that belong to very diverse sectors 
and the financial  situations of which vary considerably. This is  also the case in most other 
countries. 
Bearing  in  mind  the  high  capitalistic  intensity  of a  great  number  of public  companies, 
productivity  was,  quite  naturally,  higher  than  in  the  private  sector.  However,  public 
companies  benefited much more  than the private  sector from  aid  in the  form  of operating 
subsidies  or  capital  grants  and  were  comparatively  more  indebted.  If we  divide  public 
companies up according to the organisation controlling them, high productivity can be noted 
28 A company is considered to be public by the Spanish authorities when : 
- the government directly or indirectly holds at least 50% of  the capital, or 
47 for  those  companies  covered by  the  SEPI.  However,  even these  companies,  which benefit 
from considerable government assistance, had a lower rate of profitability than in the private 
sector. 
Having been over indebted for a long time, and in view of profitability problems, the Spanish 
aerospace industry is maintained by State financial support for a sector it has always deemed 
strategic.  Sole  shareholder of CASA  and  majority  shareholder in the  capital of Indra and 
Iberia, the SEPI is the financial instrument for the government's policy of support. 
1-2.  There are not many public sector companies and they are becoming fewer 
Over the past few years, the number of public sector companies has fallen, due to an increase 
in the rate of  privatisation. This rate of privatisation is now more rapid than in a great number 
of other European countries. In  1996 and  1997, the  State gave up  its residual shares in the 
telecommunications  company  (Telefonica)  and  its  subsidiary  specialising  in  international 
calls,  the  petroleum company (Repsol),  the  gas  company (Gas Natural), the  iron and  steel 
industry (CSI) and the aluminium manufacturing company (Inespal). It also gave up a part of 
its  shares in the  electricity company (Endesa) and in the second largest telephone operator 
(Retevision). Furthermore, it plays little part in banking and insurance. 
While the public companies controlled by the central government were gradually restructured 
and privatised, those controlled by territorial communities seem to  be multiplying at a great 
rate. The number ofthese public companies rose by 45% between 1990 and 1996. 
1-3. Assistance for public companies 
Operating subsidies and capital  grants  awarded by the  State to  public companies averaged 
around 1.5% of the annual GDP between 1987 and 1996. This figure is well below the total 
assistance given to public companies because it does not include contributions in own funds 
and debt cancellation. 
- the government does not hold a majority share, but effectively controls company operation. 
48 The State also assists public companies by more indirect means, particularly by taking charge 
of commitments arising  from  early retirement schemes and redundancies  and by  acting  as 
guarantor for loans, particularly in the case of  companies or entities that are in debt. 
The  monopolistic  environment in which certain public  companies  operate  and  a policy of 
budget transfer have not encouraged the control of labour costs. Salaries seem too high in the 
public sector. 
1-4. A new policy with regard to public companies 
In  June  1996,  the  government  announced  an  ambitious  programme  to  modernise  State-
controlled enterprises, the aim being to guarantee the future viability of this sector and, as  a 
result, maintain its employment levels.  This modernisation programme is  based on the two 
following principles : 
Separate  management  and  ownership  of public  companies  in  order to  improve 
restructuring and privatisation operations, 
Modernise with transparency, this commitment led, in particular, to the creation of 
an  organisation  responsible  for  assessing  the  equity  and  transparency  of 
privatisation (Consejo consultativo de Privatiziones), and 
Among the  acceptable  financial  offers,  give  preference to  those  that will create 
investment  and  maintain  employment.  The  privatisation  programme  plans  for 
public companies to be privatised as soon as possible. 
This new strategy allows for the  great disparities among public companies as  regards their 
financial  situations  and  the  competitive  environment.  This  is  why  public  companies  are 
divided into several categories, for which a specific calendar and approach have been drawn 
up in line with their performance and competitive environment. 
49 1-4-a. Consequences for employees 
In addition to  reducing transfers to  public companies, measures have been taken to  control 
salary costs. In a context of a wage freeze for civil servants in 1997, the government tightened 
up the salary standards applicable to companies controlled by the State and, for the first time, 
tied  salary  increases  to  improvements  in  productivity.  More  specifically,  actual  salary 
increases were dependent upon increases in productivity in profitable companies. The ceiling 
on  overall  salary  mass  increase  had,  however,  been  set  at  the  official  rate  of inflation 
predicted for 1997 (2.6%). 
As regards companies running at a loss, the total salary mass was frozen in nominal terms in 
1997. The salary standards for 1998 are less restrictive. There will not be a rise in salaries in 
real terms, but there will be nominal increases dependent upon productivity gains. 
1-4-b. Monitorin(t the competition 
To  implement  its  new  strategy  with regard  to  public  companies,  the  government  is  now 
envisaging other modifications to  the policy of competition.  It will  involve more effective 
action and greater independence for the organisations responsible for monitoring competition. 
The current system consists of  two levels : 
The Servicio de  Defensa de  !a Competencia,  which is an integral part of the Ministry of the 
Economy,  and  an  independent  body,  the  Tribunal  de  Defensa  de  la  Competencia.  The 
Servicio,  acting as  its own boss or, more and more,  in response to  complaints from  private 
individuals,  decides  which affairs require  an  inquiry to  be  opened  and  brought before  the 
Tribunal. 
1-4-c. Shareholders 
The  shareholders of newly  privatised public companies reflect the  efforts deployed by  the 
government to give small shareholders more influence. During recent privatisation operations, 
around half the shares on offer were reserved for small individual investors who were able, 
50 furthermore, to  acquire the shares for a lower price than other potential buyers. To  have an 
even more  diverse range  of shareholders,  international institutional investors were  recently 
offered a high percentage of shares.  Despite all  these  efforts,  major banks  also  obtained a 
significant  stake  in  companies  that  had  just  been  totally  or  partially  privatised.  These 
companies themselves wove a network of crossed shareholdings leading to close relationships 
between vertically connected sectors. 
As  a result,  two  banking  groups  still  play  a  pivotal  role  in the  capital  structure  of these 
companies.  The first is  the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV)/la Caixa and the other the Banco 
Central Hispano (BCH)/Banco Santander. 
This  situation  can  be  explained  by  the  traditionally  close  relations  between  banks  and 
industry, which is supposed to create captive markets for the banks. The shrinking of  banking 
margins on loans over the past five to ten years has also given banks added incentive to take a 
stake  in  industrial  groups.  The  privatisation of monopolistic  industrial  sectors  offered the 
banks an attractive new source of investment. The Cajas (regional savings banks) followed 
the  banks'  example  and  were  able  to  invest  heavily  in  these  companies.  The  regulations 
encourage such initiatives, granting financial incentives to acquire significant share packages. 
Despite efforts to  achi~ve a diverse range of shareholders, the ties between banks and industry 
remain strong.  This type of structure  is  reminiscent of the  one that exists  in Germany for 
example. This system of corporate governance is supposed to offer the advantage long-term 
relations creating a stable environment for the directors, which is  auspicious for long-term 
investments. Banks are thus in a better position to monitor the situation, because they would 
be acting as both lender and major shareholder. 
Nonetheless,  this  formula presents  certain disadvantages  : companies  with  inter-connected 
interests  are  not  motivated  to  compete  with  each  other  on  linked  markets.  Crossed 
shareholdings can also create systemic risks damaging the liquidity of the stock market and 
making shares less attractive for foreign investors. 
Despite  everything,  a fair  balance  could be  achieved  if small  shareholders  continue  to  be 
encouraged and if access remains open to foreign institutional investors. But in Spain, shares 
with specific rights which enable the government to  retain significant control over the main 
51 strategic decisions, particularly for major cession of shares, can still hamper the entry of new 
investors and mitigate the threat of  a take-over- which affects management effectiveness. 
This practice is the opposite of that in many countries, which tend to encourage shareholding 
by  institutional  investors  independently  of banks,  and  foreign  investment,  which  can also 
come with technological know-how and strengthen the rights of  minority shareholders. 
SUMMARY 
Definite  progress  has  been  made  recently  in  the  restructuring  and  privatisation  of state-
controlled  enterprises.  The  government's  ambitious  programme  aimed  at  ensuring  the 
financial independence of public companies and privatising any remaining public companies 
by the end of this century should significantly lighten the load that has previously put such a 
strain on the budget. Over the past decade, the total funding requirements of  public companies 
covered by the State's budget have represented a high proportion of  the debt accumulated over 
that period. Estimates attribute a quarter of  governmental debt to public companies. 
Thanks to progress made thus far and the measures still to be implemented, Spain should be 
well ahead of many other European countries in its reform of the public sector. Action taken 
to  promote  competitiveness  and  efficiency  in  sectors  previously  dominated  by  .R_ublic 
companies will now be a determining factor in this reform effort.  Revenue stemming from 
privatisation has lightened public debt.  Between 1996 and 2000, income from  privatisation 
could increase public revenues to the order of  4% of GDP. 
If the reforms are implemented rapidly, the expected profits will be forthcoming and Spanish 
companies will leap ahead of  their European and other world market competitors. 
52 II. THE SPANISH MODEL OF STATE-INDUSTRY RELATIONS 
11-1. Building the Spanish Model 
Similar to the French model, and to a lesser extent the Italian one, the Spanish model of State-
Industry relations is very progressive. 
The  Spanish  armaments  industry  has  evolved  in  different  ways  throughout  the  twentieth 
century. 
Historically, the first third of  the century was the golden age of the Spanish defence industry. 
In 1935, it was a leader on the international stage. After the civil war, a period of  reorientation 
began.  From 1935 to  1970, national industry went through a serious crisis. American aid in 
the name of military co-operation made up for these hardware restrictions. Apart from a few 
rare  exceptions,  national  production ground to  an  almost  complete  halt.  But in  1971,  the 
military grants law gave rise to ambitious programmes  : Baleares Frigates,  construction of 
AMX 30s and ofNorthrop F-5s under licence. 
In 1981, the defence industry employed 57,000 people and its exports were worth 1.5 billion 
French francs. 
- Ever  since that period,  Spain has  considered co-operation in the  armaments  field  and  the 
purchase of military equipment to  be the way to  reconstruct a defence industry fabric.  The 
"fair  return"  policy  makes  it  possible  to  provide  this  country  with  real  technological 
capacities, compensation is systematically requested for foreign orders. 
This policy has been faithfully followed until the present day. This explains why negotiations 
for  Spanish  entry  into  the  OCCAR are  so  difficult.  This  country  considers  that  the  rule 
stipulating  that  "fair  return"  must  be  applied  to  several  programmes  over  a  several-year 
period,  cannot apply to  them because  Spain considers  that  its  technological  and  industrial 
capacities are superior to its relative weight in the European defence industry
29 
. 
In  the  years  following  the  new  golden  age  of the  early  eighties,  the  Spanish  armaments 
industry again met with difficulties. Although companies' turnovers were continuing to  rise, 
profitability  was  not  forthcoming  and  the  government  was  forced  to  inject  capital  into 
29 La industria de defensa en Espana. Reyista espaftola de defensa numero 129 September 1998. 
53 companies  in  difficulty on numerous  occasions.  In the  nineties,  this  industry also  suffered 
from severe defence budget cuts. The number of  jobs in the armaments industry plummeted. 
Today, this industry employs slightly less than 25,000 people for  a turnover of just under 2 
billion Euros. The Spanish themselves recognise that they are at a lower level than France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Italy in the European armaments industry. However, they also 
consider that this industry has  a role  to  play in safeguarding Spanish security, that it will 
generate employment and particularly high technology employment. It is this last factor that 
largely explains Spain's interest in this industrial sector. 
Furthermore,  although this industry has not made specific moves to  diversify,  neither is  it 
totally dependent on military activity because civil production represents 40% of  the turnover 
of Bazan  (naval  sector),  64%  of the  turnover  of Indra  (defence  electronics)  58%  of the 
turnover of CASA (aeronautics) and 50% ofiTP. 
11-2.  The State as Client 
The drop in the Spanish defence budget is all the more significant in that during the cold war 
this country did not make any particular defence efforts in this field.  From 1.7% of GDP in 
1990, the defence effort dropped to  1.1% of GDP. The drop in inve§tment credit during this 
period was 41%, a figure greater than in the UK or France, but lower than that of Germany. 
As in France, Italy and Germany, the drop in investment credit was able to occur during the 
fiscal year, a practice which helped unravel the organisation of the defence industry a little 
more.  Spanish defence credits are  now stabilised and  are  concentrated on three  equipment 
programmes for the Spanish armed forces, that are also fundamental for the defence industry : 
the combat aircraft, Eurofighter, the combat tank Leopard 2 bought from Germany, and the 
frigate,  F  -1 00.  Efforts were  even made to  increase research and development spending by 
awarding interest-free loans from the ministry of  industry. 
The ministry of  industry also participates indirectly in the defence effort by financing research 
programs, particularly for the combat aircraft, Eurofighter. 
54 Although total  defence  credits remain a very  modest  sum,  the  Spanish  State  is,  however, 
pressing hard to help its industry profit from technology and work-load transfers by means of 
compensation tied to purchasing or industrial co-operation. 
One  of the many examples is  the  Leopard 2 for  which the territorial armaments company, 
Santa-Barbara,  became  a true  partner of Krauss-Mafei,  the  tank designed by the  Germans 
being manufactured in Spain.  Similarly, the Cougar helicopter manufactured by Eurocopter 
was  only chosen by Spain in exchange for the delivery to  France of seven CASA CN  235 
military transport aircraft. 
11-3.  The State as Shareholder and Regulator 
Historically,  it  is  clear  that  the  Spanish  State  is  very  directly  involved  in  its  armaments 
industry.  As  a result of this  involvement, the  Spanish State is  the main shareholder in  this 
industry and all the companies still have a status of public company. However, this situation 
is changing. 
Although the armaments industry continued to develop from the beginning of the eighties, it 
was at the cost of major losses which the public shareholder had to cover. Between 1989 and 
1995,  the  State  had to  contribute  335  million French francs  (around  50  million Euros)  in 
subsidies to Spanish companies. 
In  this  context,  the  arrival  in power of a  liberal  Government has  doubtless  accelerated  a 
Europe-wide movement of  government withdrawal from the armaments industry. 
This policy was  developed in a more  global  context,  in which the  Government adopted  a 
programme to modernise public enterprise which was approved by the council of ministers on 
28 June 1996. 
This modernisation programme was applied in the armaments field by the sociedad estatal de 
partcipaciones industriales (SEPI) which is the company that manages the public shares held 
by the Spanish State in the armaments industry. 
The model of corporate  governance shows that the  SEPI plays  a very important role  with 
regard to  Spanish armaments companies,  more  important even than that played by  the  IRI 
with regard to Italian armaments companies. 
55 Whereas  the  IRI  manages  a very  large  number  of public  shares  and has  a formal  control 
function in the running of Finmeccanica, the SEPI demands a clear role in the management 
and strategy definition of Spanish defence companies. 
This  role  is  formally  specified  in  the  relationship  between  the  SEPI  and  armaments 
comparues. 
Indeed, it is the SEPI that appoints the CEO's of  armaments companies. 
However,  once the  appointments have  been made,  the  SEPI  again intervenes  in  company 
management and strategy.  Indeed, just under the  President of the  SEPI,  are two  managing 
directors,  responsible  for  managing  armaments  industry  shares.  The  first  deals  with  the 
defence electronics and aeronautics sectors, and the second with the territorial armaments and 
naval construction sectors. 
The role of  these two directors is very important, because they sit on the boards of  directors of 
these companies and are responsible for approving a certain number of  decisions : 
approval of  investments above a certain amount ; 
approval of  the business plan ; 
approval of  increasing subsidiaries' capital. 
approval of  new programmes. 
Therefore, it can be said that these two managing directors fulfil an executive function. 
Finally, the SEPI is principally responsible for preparing the privatisation of the armaments 
industry. 
In order to prepare for such action, the SEPI has adopted a policy of acquiring the companies 
in which it managed shares, to restore balance and gradually minimise and eventually stop the 
practice of granting balancing subsidies.  Today the SEPI can boast that it has succeeded in 
putting at least the aeronautics and defence electronics sector into order ; the companies in 
this sector are even making a profit now. 
The SEPI is answerable to the ministry of industry and therefore would presumably receive 
orders regarding policy mainly from this ministry. 
56 Ill. ANALYSIS OF CASA'S STRATEGY AND BALANCE SHEETS 
CASA's heritage is gradually diminishing (drop of23% between 1992 and 1997). Since 
1996, CASA - doubtless to improve its situation with regard to third parties - chose to 
reduce its share capital by 20%. 
In  1992,  CASA's  results  were  in the  red.  After a spectacular  recovery  in  1993,  the 
company was once again making a profit, which kept rising steadily. Profits rose six-
fold between 1993 and 1998. 
III-I. Asset Evolution 
III-1-a. Fixed Assets 
The relative proportion of fixed assets is  diminishing.  Investments in corporeal assets 
necessary to industrial activity are low. 
However,  the  increase  in  long-term  financial  fixed  assets  (shares  in  the  group's 
companies and subsidiaries) is constant, because financial investments tripled between 
1992 and 1998. Nonetheless, a slight fall-off in financial assets can be noted in 1998. 
This reveals a tendency on the part of CASA to favour financial investment rather than 
activity  development  itself.  This  choice  to  invest  in  financial  assets  rather  than 
manufacturing equipment is indicative of  the company's external growth strategy. 
It should be noted, however, that although shares enable a company to control another 
one, the risk run by this parent company is  not limited to  the  share value alone,  but 
includes the risk of  insolvency ofthe subsidiary. 
Other financial assets (shares in other companies) have followed the general downward 
trend. 
Development  in  R&D  investments  can  be  noted,  with  a  more  than  36%  increase 
between 1992 and 1998. 
57 111-1-b.  Current Assets 
This  consists of  all assets that are not intended to  remain forever in  the company,  i.e. 
stocks, accounts receivable,  VMPs and liquid assets. 
The  total  sum  of current  assets  dropped  by  12%  between  1992  and  1997,  but 
experienced a sharp upturn in 1998 (+ 25% between 97 and 98). 
The reduction in stocks and accounts receivable reveals CASA's management's desire to 
improve the running of the company. Good management of stocks makes it possible to 
reduce operational costs and following up on creditor client payment enables CASA to 
honour its commitments to  suppliers.  Indeed, a company relying on loans will suffer 
greatly from the interest payments. 
VMPs (securities, shares and bonds acquired by the company to create short-term direct 
revenue or added value. They can be considered to be liquid assets), are the exception in 
the general downward trend shown by current assets, having skyrocketed over the past 
six  years.  These major investments even doubled between 1996 - 1997  and  1997-
1998. This confirms the importance given to the company's financial policy. 
111-2. Evolution of  Liabilities 
111-2-a. Fixed Capital Assets 
A drop of 20% in share capital can be noted from 1996 in comparison with the years 
between  92  and  95.  In  theory,  this  reduction  is  due  either  to  reimbursing  the 
contributions of associates,  or to  a  decision by the  associates  who  consider that the 
capital is too high in relation to volume of activity and by decreasing it wish to improve 
the financial situation of  the company with regard to third parties. 
From 1992 to 1997, shareholder equity increased by 50%. This is thanks to very good 
results achieved since 1993, and to savings set aside since 1996. 
58 - Current liabilities hold an important position which increased steadily until 1998 They 
may  have  been  over-valued  to  cause  an  underestimation  of the  result,  or  else  to 
counteract the financial difficulties of  the subsidiaries. 
Current liabilities are intended to be used if ever current assets are unavailable. These 
current liabilities are  set aside even before the results are  established. Therefore, they 
reduce profits before any risk has actually occurred. No doubt shares in the subsidiaries 
do not give the results expected and CASA prefers to set aside reserves to compensate 
for poor performance by the subsidiaries. 
-Investment subsidies increased by 19% between 92 and 98. 
- The  proportion  of medium  and  long-term  debt  has  diminished  considerably.  It 
represented 61% of fixed capital assets in 1992, by  1998  it only represented  16%.  In 
1992, loans from credit establishments represented more than 62% of all financial debt 
and 38% of  fixed capital assets. 
In 1998,  the proportion of this long-term debt was 9% of all financial debt and 1% of 
fixed capital assets. 
The proportion of all financial debt corresponding to loans from credit establishments is 
as follows: 
1992: 62%  1993: 57%  1994: 46%  1995: 35%  1996: 22%  1997: 5% 
1998: 9% 
The proportion of fixed capital assets corresponding to loans from credit establishments 
1992: 38%  1993  : 31%  1994: 21%  1994: 4% 
1998: 1% 
1996: 5.5%  1997: 6% 
These  elements  contribute  extremely  important  information  on  the  financial 
management of the company.  Indeed, minimising the use of this type of loan enables 
interest charges to be dramatically reduced. 
59 However, an increase in borrowing by the subsidiaries and companies in which it hold 
shares can be noted, particularly since 1996. 
The proportion of  total financial debt corresponding to this debt : 
1992:5%  1993: 8%  1994:8.5%  1995: 10%  1996:28%  1997:31% 
1998: 34% 
The proportion of  total fixed capital assets corresponding to this debt : 
1992: 3%  1993: 4.5%  1994: 4%  1995: 4%  1996: 5.5%  1997: 6% 
1998: 6% 
Indeed, this change in borrowing by the subsidiaries gave the group more flexibility in 
reimbursing  the  loans,  particularly  as  regards  negotiating  the  payment  dates  in 
accordance with results. 
111-2-b. Short-Term Debts: 
In percentage terms, commercial debt has notably increased. In 1998 it represented 43% 
of total liabilities whereas it only represented 33% in 1992.  But in absolute terms,  a 
regular drop in commercial debts can be noted until 1996, with an upturn in 1997 and 
1998. 
CASA's efforts to honour its commitments to its suppliers fell off sharply in 1997 and 
1998. 
Indeed, commercial debts represent the main (despite the fact that they are diminishing) 
source  of short-term  financing  (sort  of "free  credit"  granted  by  CASA's  suppliers) 
because they represent between 80 and 75% of  short-term debt. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that CASA is working hard to  bring its level of debt 
under control,  because all  financial  and commercial debts  are  dropping  significantly. 
60 CASA needs to  preserve its  image  of a healthy and  well-managed company because 
financial institutions will loan more money to a company that is not too far in debt. 
111-3. Breaking even : 
Independently of  the quest for profitability which is the very reason for its existence, the 
company must ensure its durability and stimulate long-term  growth by reinvesting in 
fixed  assets.  The  company must spend  a certain amount of money,  which it  cannot 
postpone.  It offers  credit to  its  clients,  and  in return,  the  suppliers  agree  to  delayed 
payment.  The  company must therefore,  in its  operating cycle,  spend before  earning. 
While  awaiting incoming payment, outgoings continue.  These can only be covered if 
the company has sufficient working capital. Therefore, there is a permanent net funding 
requirement. 
The  working  capital  is  the  excess  of  stable  resources  (or  fixed  capital  assets 
(shareholder equity+ long and medium term debt)) over fixed assets. In other terms, it 
is  the percentage of fixed  capital assets which is  allocated to  financing the operating 
cycle (current assets). 
The first point to be made is that CASA's working capital is positive. This means that 
one  of the  fundamental  financial  rules  is  being  followed  :  indeed,  all  permanent 
employees (fixed assets) are financed by stable resources. The excess is used to finance 
current assets. 
CASA's working capital dropped by  14% between  1992  and  1997  but it  returned to 
1992  levels  in  1998.  However,  the  total  working  capital  is  only  significant  when 
compared to  the  net funding  requirement.  It can be  noted that the working capital is 
lower than the net funding requirement in 1992 and 1993, indicating that the company 
cannot meet its commitments, due, in particular, to major creditors. 
Balance was restored in 1994-95 and 96 because the working capital was exactly equal 
to the net funding requirement. This meant that the fixed assets and the working capital 
necessary for the company to run properly were covered by  stable capital. The profits 
61 which tripled in 1994 and which have continued to  increase (12.5% in  1995,  16% in 
1996 and 45% increase between 1996 and 1997) contributed to this financial balance. In 
1998,  the  working  capital  greatly  exceeded the  net  funding  requirement,  due  to  the 
increase in commercial debt. 
IV.  STUDY OF  MODELS  OF  ECONOMIC  AND  INDUSTRIAL  CO-OPERATION WITH 
SPAIN. 
As  the  Spanish armaments industry is  fairly small,  and the  decision has just been made to 
privatise it, no real economic co-operation exists yet between the Spanish armaments industry 
and other European industries. 
The  armaments  industry  in  this  country  does,  of course,  participate  in  the  conventional 
armaments co-operation programmes initiated by the States such as the Helios satellite or the 
Eurofighter combat aircraft. Similarly, co-operation can be established on a case-by-case basis 
for  export  programmes  such  as  the  sale  of Scorpene  submarines  to  Chile,  or Bazan  co-
operates with the French naval constructor, DCN. Finally, the Spanish armaments industry is 
systematically  involved  in  purchases  by  the  Spanish  armed  forces  of foreign  military 
equipment. 
The  only  major  example  of association  with  a  foreign  industrial  partner  concerns  Indra 
Systemas in the defence electronics field,  resulting from a joint venture between Taneo and 
Thomson-CSF, created in 1995. 
IV-1.  Indra systemas : individual case or precursor to  the Spanish model of 
European grouping ? 
In this joint venture, Thomson-CSF held 33%, and the Spanish State the remaining 66% via 
the SEPI. Rather than joint venture, it was therefore more appropriate to  talk of opening of 
capital by seeking a reference industrial partner, which was Thomson-CSF. The particularity 
of this  JV  is  that it  was  originally  created between two  public  companies,  but since then 
Thomson-CSF has been privati sed, as was Indra in March 1999. 
62 However, the privatisation of Indra in  March  1999 dramatically changed the distribution of 
capital. Thomson-CSF was asked to reduce its stake to 10.5%, in particular by selling some of 
its  shares  to  the  Spanish  banks  Caja  Madrid  and  Banco  Zaragozano.  In  addition,  with 
privatisation, 65% of  Indra's shareholding was planned to be reserved for Spanish investors. 
In the end, the Spanish government decided to retain a golden share in Indra systemas for a 
duration of  five years, which may be extended by two years. 
In an initial analysis it can be supposed that the Spanish State was fairly cautious in tackling 
the  privatisation of Indra  systemas,  retaining  numerous  means  of control  over the  future 
company 
the French reference industrial shareholder only holds 10.5% of  the capital, 
one of  the shareholding banks holds an equal percentage, 
the shareholding is averagely diluted, and Spanish investors remain the majority, 
the Spanish government decided to retain a golden share. 
An interview held with the director of shares of the SEPI, Pedro Castro Borrego, sheds some 
light on the choice made by the SEPI. Apparently, the analysis of the experiment led by the 
Spanish with Thomson-CSF since 1995 seems to be mitigated. The SEPI has been well aware 
that there is some disappointment with the industrial partnership provided by Thomson-CSF. 
The  amount of technology,  investment and  workload transfer proffered by  Thomson-CSF 
seems rather insufficient, and this is, no  doubt, the reason steps were taken to in advance to 
balance the privatised company's shareholder power and provide protection against possible 
withdrawal by Thomson-CSF. 
The  importance of this example  should be put into  perspective while  at the  same time,  it 
should be used to draw certain conclusions regarding Spain's immediate concerns. 
It should be put into perspective in that Indra systema's share distribution model is not likely 
to prevail for all Spanish industry. According to comments made by SEPI directors, it appears 
that the choice is dependent on the economic conditions, that there is no  typical doctrine for 
privatising the armaments industry, but that many decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis 
in accordance with various factors.  It is  the analysis of these factors that will influence the 
decision making. 
63 The factors taken into account to determine the type of privatisation process chosen are both 
endogenous and exogenous. 
There are three endogenous factors: 
- The number of employees in the company liable to be privatised and where these employees 
are located. 
- The technological skills already acquired by the company to be privatised. 
- The overall character both in terms of high technologies and number of  jobs in the sector to 
be privatised. 
There are four exogenous factors : 
the workload provided by 'the company that will be the reference shareholder ; 
the technology transfers envisaged ; 
the market share contributed by the company that will be the reference shareholder 
overall  analysis  of the  global  and  European context of the  sector in which the 
restructuring is taking place. 
IV-2. Analysis of  the role of  the different factors governing restructuring 
Employment would appear to be a very important endogenous factor for  Spain. This small 
player in the armaments field understood that its companies would be "wooed" by larger ones, 
be they European or American, and that full advantage should be taken of  the situation. 
At this stage, an initial turnaround in Spanish strategy appears. In sectors which appear to be 
of  the future, both in terms of  high technology and market share, and where Spain considers it 
has technological prowess, the  European groups seem to  be favoured.  This is the  case  for 
defence electronics and aeronautics. However, alliance with the United States does not seem 
to  be  excluded when European prospects seem fraught  with risk,  and  Spanish skill  seems 
limited. Thus the SEPI has not excluded the possibility of choosing General Dynamics as  a 
partner for Santa Barbara in the territorial armaments field. 
64 The form privatisation takes also depends on the sector concerned. If the Spanish company's 
technological  capacity  is  minimal,  and  if their  contribution  in  terms  of market  share  is 
negligible, then the search will be for a company interested in buying the Spanish company, 
the choice being in favour of the  one that brings with it the  greatest workload and  market 
share.  This is  again the case for  territorial armaments.  It is  fairly  unlikely that under these 
conditions  the  Spanish government will  opt for  retaining  a  golden  share  in the  territorial 
armaments company, Santa-Barbara. 
However, the more the sector is considered to be technologically important, future provider of 
high-technology jobs and market share, the more the Spanish government will be tempted to 
retain decision-making power in the context of European grouping and restructuring. For the 
moment, this policy is  illustrated by Spanish attachment to  unanimous decision making for 
launching programmes and distributing workload among the different States that participate in 
Airbus,  and  even  though  the  Spanish  are  making  insistent  demands  that  this  Economic 
Interests Group be transformed. 
Finally,  all  decisions  are  taken  bearing  in  mind  the  overall  environment  m  the  sector 
concerned,  particularly  as  regards  the  balance  of power  between  Europe  and  the  United 
States. What are the foreseeable developments ? What is the desirable European and trans-
Atlantic set-up ? How can Spain better integrate into a system of  restructuring ? These are the 
sorts of  questions being asked. 
IV-3. How are the different factors applied in CASA's case? 
Those involved in the privatisation of CASA were unanimous : this company was considered 
to be very important for the Spanish government at all levels : 
in terms of  employment ; 
in terms of  overall technological issues associated with the aeronautics sector ; 
in terms of CASA's skills  and  investments,  particularly in the military transport 
field; 
in terms of what was at stake with regard to  the restructuring of the aeronautics 
sector. 
65 With all this at stake, it could be assumed that the Spanish State would try to retain significant 
decision-making  power  in  a  privatised  CASA.  Observers,  including  those  within  the 
company, were convinced that a solution would be found whereby an industrial partner would 
be  involved,  a reference  shareholder but a minority one,  the  rest  of the  company's capital 
being  shared  among  banks,  institutional  investors  and  individuals.  The  possibility  of 
registering of  a golden share was not excluded either. 
As  it happened,  another solution was  adopted,  but this  does  not necessarily mean that the 
philosophy  governing  the  rapprochement  between  CASA  and  DaimlerChrysler  Aerospace 
was all that different. 
Firstly, this decision was  made by the highest Spanish authorities : the prime minister,  the 
minister for industry and the president of  the SEPI, thus involving the top level of  the Spanish 
State. 
Secondly, it seems that the determining factor behind this merger was the general context of 
aeronautics restructuring in Europe and the world. 
The decision taken can be interpreted in two ways : 
The  Spanish  government  opted  for  the  most  integrated  capitalistic  alliance 
possible. It therefore seemed that the choice of  a simple industrial partner in CASA 
would  not  enable  the  Spanish  to  guarantee  the  durability  of their  aeronautics 
sector.  They needed to become part of a larger entity, which could only happen 
with a merger. 
This merger with DaimlerChrysler Aerospace also reduced the number of players 
involved in this European restructuring, which simplified subsequent discussions, 
particularly in the civil aeronautics field with Airbus. 
All in all,  this merger slotted perfectly into the context of the declarations made by the  six 
ministers  for  defence  on  20  April  1998,  and  reiterated  on  6  July  1998,  calling  for  the 
construction of a major European aeronautics and defence company. Once the solution of a 
"big  bang  from  the  top"  became  impossible  following  the  merger  of GEC  and  BAe,  the 
solution of two-by-two mergers should, effectively, lead to  the same result in several steps. 
Rather than push back the deadline and integrate into a larger group later on, the Government 
chose to ally CASA with a larger company immediately. 
66 As the restructuring of the aeronautics sector had been a determining factor, we now need to 
assess the role played by the other factors. 
The  choice  of  DaimlerChrysler  Aerospace  rather  than  BAe,  Aerospatiale  Matra  or 
Finrneccanica seems to be the result of  several considerations. 
The desire to  retain as  much control as  possible over CASA's fate  worked in favour of an 
association with a company that was not too large. At the same time, too small an ally would 
not have significantly increased their weight for future negotiations. Taking this criterion into 
consideration meant that the  large  partners  like  BAe/GEC and  Aerospatiale Matra and the 
smallest partner, Finrneccanica were not in the running. 
In terms of  industrial attractiveness and distribution of  civil and military activity, Aerospatiale 
Matra seemed without a doubt the best choice. At this level BAe was hindered by its focus on 
the military sector and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace did not perhaps offer the same guarantees 
of  technological competence as Aerospatiale Matra. 
However, DaimlerChrysler Aerospace had an essential advantage over Aerospatiale Matra : 
the fact that they were an active partner in the Eurofighter programme which, as  mentioned 
above, was one of  the Spanish armed forces' largest financial investments in the future. 
Finally, it would appear that the top Spanish authorities felt rather worried about allying with 
a partner where  a  major public  shareholder remained,  even if Aerospatiale  Matra is  now 
formally privatised and the industrial reference shareholder is indeed the Lagardere group. 
IV-4. How would  power be distributed in DaimlerChrysler Aerospace/CASA ? 
It is  still too  early to  assess  all  the  consequences of the  merger between DaimlerChrysler 
Aerospace and CASA with regard to the economic and strategic co-operation model set up 
between the two  companies.  In  any  case,  this model  could be  a determining factor  in the 
subsequent  restructuring  of the  armaments  industry  in  Europe,  because  it  is  the  first 
capitalistic trans-European merger that has not been 50150. 
We have seen that the Spanish model of State-Industry relations revealed an obvious interest 
on the part of  the State in this industry. It remains to be seen how the Spanish will look out for 
their interests in the future company. At this level, certain conclusions can already be drawn 
by analysing the capital distribution of  the future company. 
67 The agreement made public on 10 June 1999 plans for a merger between the two companies 
in which the shareholder will be a holding company via which the SEPI will hold 13% of the 
merged entity. In fact, this shareholding needs to evolve rapidly because it is planned that: 
The SEPI will put 40% of  CASA on the market, bringing its share down to 60%. 
DaimlerChrysler Aerospace, of which the shareholder is DaimlerChrysler at 94%, 
be listed on the stock exchange, which would cause the shareholder distribution in 
DaimlerChrysler  Aerospace  to  be  rapidly  modified.  Mention  was  made  of the 
possibility  of  placing  around  60%  of  the  capital  of  the  subsidiary  of 
DaimlerChrysler Aerospace on the market, which would bring DaimlerChrysler's 
share in an entity merged with CASA to slightly less than 30%. 
If this overview is correct, DaimlerChrysler would become a kind of reference shareholder, 
but the SEPI would retain a sufficiently significant stake to be able to make a shareholder's 
pact with terms  that would protect  Spanish interests.  Furthermore,  when this  merger  was 
announced, the Spanish minister for industry, Mr. Pique, declared that CASA's interests had 
been protected by the agreement that was reached
30
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It is more than likely that the general terms of such an agreement were what was decided upon 
before the announcement of 10 June and that made them possible. 
In view of the declarations able to be made before this merger, it could be thought that the 
terms of  this agreement could cover the following main elements : 
Management of DASA/CASA will  essentially be  in  German hands.  However,  it  could be 
assumed that the Spanish would have ensured that a certain number of measures require the 
agreement of the Spanish public shareholders, if it is confirmed that the SEPI retains a share 
in  the  capital  of the  merged  entity.  Examples  of the  sort of decision  that  would  require 
approval by the SEPI would be : 
closure of sites 
the entry of  another reference shareholder in the capital 
the strategy and decisions to be taken within Airbus. 
68 Finally, the agreement must certainly provide guarantees as to the choice of  the site of Seville 
as final integration line of  the A  TF. 
All in all, it is not certain that a golden share will be registered by the Spanish State if it is 
guaranteed the right to control the subsequent restructuring process via the granting of a sort 
of  right of  veto on the entry of  other reference shareholders to the company. 
Subsequent declarations by the  CEO  of CASA, Alberto Fernandez, are interesting, because 
they help us to better understand what the Spanish want. 
As  soon as the agreement was announced, Alberto Fernandez, CEO of CASA, invited BAe, 
Aerospatiale and Alenia to join the new company, thus confirming that the option chosen had 
been taken with a view to seeing the main European aeronautics companies join together at 
the highest level. 
In  the  days  that  followed,  Alberto  Fernandez  specified  his  point of view,  focussing  this 
prospect of  subsequent association on Alenia, of  the Finmeccanica group. 
In a declaration to Flight international, he stated that Alenia could be the next ideal partner for 
CASAIDASA.  It  is  certain that  besides  the  industrial  community on a  certain number of 
subjects  : the  Eurofighter programme, the  future  military transport  aircraft A-400 M,  even 
Airbus, such a merger would enable both the German-Italian-Spanish industry to  be almost 
identical  in size  to  the  British and  French.  However,  it would  also  enable  the  Spanish to 
slightly further dilute the-majority shareholding of  DaimlerChrysler in the company, and thus 
be forearmed, with the help of the Italians, against any decisions that might go  against their 
interests. The Italian option would therefore sustain and confirm what we could envisage as a 
possible distribution of  power and decision-making process within the merged Daimler-Benz-
Aerospace/CASA group. 
In conclusion, it can therefore be said that even with a greatly reduced public shareholding, 
doubtless without golden share,  this  economic and  capitalistic  co-operation model  aims  to 
grant the minority shareholder (i.e. the State and the company that represents it) rights that are 
not in line with the industrial and financial weight it carries. As such, we would be faced with 
a model that would continue to provide intergovernmental representation (i.e. complying with 
State  law),  in  a  company  that  is,  indeed,  totally  similar  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  models  of 
30 DASA-CASA merger ends single industry dream; Jane's defense weekly 23 June 1999. 
69 corporate  governance with a relatively diluted shareholding
31
.  It remains to  be  seen if this 
form of antinomy can function over time. It is plausible that conflicts of interests could arise 
between  the  States  on  the  one  hand  and  the  industrial  reference  shareholders  and  small 
shareholders represented by pension funds, on the other. 
31  It should, however, be noted once again that the Spanish model is relatively similar to the German model in 
that it makes banks major shareholders. 
70 CHAPTER 3 : France 
I. THE FRENCH ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL MODEL 
One  of the  French  model's  characteristics  is  that  the  State  plays  the  role  of regulator, 
entrepreneur  and  shareholder.  It is  a  long-standing  role,  rooted  in  the  Colbertism  of the 
seventeenth  century.  However,  growing  market  globalisation  and  strong  reservations 
expressed by foreign investors are increasingly calling it into question. A second prominent 
feature  is  the high proportion of intersecting participation between companies (both private 
and public).  Of course, what we call the  "French model"  is  not one single structure, but is 
rather  a  mosaic  of organisations  in  which  the  Government,  private  investors,  banks  and 
sometimes other stakeholders play roles of  varying importance. 
The following will be presented: 
A recap of  the particularities of  public companies and the role of  the Government ; 
An analysis of the powers of Boards of Directors (for public and private companies) as 
structures representing several groups of  stakeholders ; 
An assessment of  the place of  banks in the system ; 
A typology of  how these companies (public and private) are monitored. 
1-1.  The particularities of  public companies in France 
The  main  particularity  (from  a  theoretical  point  of view)  anses  from  the  difficulty  in 
identifying and dealing with the agency relationship that could exist in the case of a public 
enterprise (particularly between the voter-taxpayer (Principal) and the director (Agent)), due, 
among other things, to several political layers interacting between the two. This particularity 
carries  repercussions  on  the  monitoring  procedures  and  mechanisms  employed  by  the 
Government, as both shareholder and representative of  the owner Nation. 
External monitoring and sanction mechanisms : 
71 The Government having a share in the capital gives rise to certain characteristics, in particular 
the inalienability of the shares that it holds (hence lessened liquidity and effectiveness of the 
financial market for title deeds). On the debenture market, the Government's guarantee could 
lead to  less discipline being imposed on the public company which is liable to  generate high 
levels  of  debt  and  relatively  lax  management.  Furthermore,  the  participation  of  the 
Government in certain banking institutions has sometimes lead to rash or inefficient support 
being given to public enterprises (contrary to what the market might have done). 
The  Government's  imprint  can  sometimes  even  affect the  accounting  data  sent by  public 
companies.  CHARREAUX [1997]  uses  interviews with directors  (or ex-directors) of these 
firms  to  highlight  the  fact  that  in  such  contexts,  French  accounting  is  fairly  flexible 
(everything depends  on what the  majority  shareholders wish to  hear),  and  encourages the 
discretionary power of the Director (and that of some certifying organisations) as the driving 
belt. 
With regard to integrating salaried employees into the mode of  governance, it is appropriate to 
note  that these employees  benefit from  more  favourable  financial  treatment and  are  better 
represented than their counterparts in the private sphere.  However, it can be noted that the 
directors of  public companies sometimes attempt to portray the unions as unrepresentative to 
weaken  the  powers  of employee  representatives  and  adopt  a  more  Anglo-Saxon  form  of 
governance. 
Internal monitoring and sanction mechanisms : 
The  Government is  the majority shareholder in the  company,  but its  involvement can take 
several  forms  (monitoring  being  able  to  be  carried  out  directly  or  indirectly)  : under  the 
supervision of a Government ministry, Government representatives on the Board of  Directors, 
directives,  circulars or audits  by  the  Audit Court and Parliament.  With regard  to  informal 
influences, networks of  acquaintances can be mobilised to monitor a company discretely. 
The Government is often accused of having a more lax attitude than private investors for two 
reasons  : firstly,  its  share  portfolio is  very widely spread,  hence  it  has  little  inclination to 
monitor everything, and secondly, the decision makers (of the company or the Government) 
are not personally responsible, and any losses are eventually borne by the tax-payer. 
72 Regarding the relative inefficiency of public companies : 
Economic publications generally consider public companies to  be  less efficient than private 
ones. The management of public companies is subject to certain constraints (the presence of 
the  Government,  more  rigid  or  not  so  rigid  funding  possibilities,  varying  degrees  of 
independence in management and strategy  etc.). Shortcomings in the systems of governance 
can be clearly seen, such as audits essentially carried out "after the event", in accordance with 
the  principles of accounting and financial  "compliance"  rather than in accordance with the 
economic  and  strategic  pertinence of decisions taken.  However,  it should be  recalled that 
public companies are still more efficient when market imperfections are present (barriers to 
entering a sector,  natural monopolies  etc.).  Furthermore,  as  soon  as  a conflict of interests 
arises, the management of coalitions becomes more complex, even though in an unstable and 
complex environment, market mechanisms seem to become more efficient. 
One of  the explanations given for the reduced efficiency of  companies is the unrest that a high 
turnover of directors can sow within a company. Nonetheless, like those in the private sphere, 
directors  in the public sphere have  plenty of room to  manoeuvre.  From which springs the 
question asked by ZECKHAUSER, HORN &  MURPHY[1989]  :can we  attribute the poor 
economic performance of public companies to a shortcoming in _the  system of governance ? 
Or, on the contrary, are there too many constraints placed on the directors who run them, in 
certain cases leading them to make inappropriate choices ? 
1-2.  The powers of  the Board of  Directors 
This  point  underlines  the  particularities  of public  companies'  Boards  of Directors  in 
comparison with those of private companies in France. Numerous legal constraints pertaining 
to the appointment of board members, of the Chairman of the board as well as the length of 
their mandate, affect the life of  public companies. These constraints are as follows : 
73 For public companies with more than half their capital in the hands of the Government, 
the  Chairman of the  Board of Directors is  appointed  by  decree  from  among  the board 
members and on proposal by the board. 
The length of a Chairman's mandate is usually three years. The Chairman is invested with 
a range of powers : all decisions relating to the major strategic, economic, financial  and 
technological  lines  of action  taken  by  the  company  may  not  be  made  without  first 
consulting him and obtaining his prior approval. 
There  are  two  typical  configurations for  the  Board of Directors  : either tripartite  with 
equal representation of  the Government, the workers and the other shareholders, or a third 
for  the  employee  representatives  and  two  thirds  for  the  other  components.  For 
CHARREAUX[1997]  "Public control, even if it takes a form other than direct majority 
control of  the Government, must be accompanied by elected employee representatives and 
Government  representatives  appointed  by  decree".  This  helps  us  to  understand  the 
reaction of  the British in the Aerospatiale case. 
The role of  the members of  the Board of  Directors, both observers and monitors (whether 
in a public or a private company) is three-fold : check and approve the accounts, monitor 
general  company  policy  and  ensure  the  internal  organisational  structure  operates 
efficiently. In public companies, the presence of employee representatives causes certain 
important  decisions  to  be  made  outside  (such  as  those  with  direct  repercussions  on 
employment) and the Board of Directors can become a formal source of information and 
place for recording decisions made. 
In the  event of a crisis, the role of the Board member representing the  Government is 
supposed to become more active. He must keep the other Board members informed, and, 
if necessary, bring the dispute before the Chairman ensuring the shareholders' rights are 
upheld. The mandates for members of the Board of  Directors in public companies are five 
years long with a maximum limit of  three successive mandates. The members representing 
the Government and qualified public figures are able to be dismissed. For salaried Board 
members, dismissal is possible in the event of serious fault, via the legal system and on 
the request of  the majority of  members of  the Board of  Directors. 
74 The fundamental difference between the Boards of Directors of public and private companies 
is  that  those  of public  companies  play  a  more  consultative  than  active  role,  the  true 
counterweight to the powers of  the Chairman being the Government authorities. Furthermore, 
the Board of  Directors of public companies have less legal power, but it would appear that the 
members representing the Government benefit from easier access to information than private 
firms  do,  due, among other things, to their relationship with the Treasury and major public 
financial organisations. 
It should be specified that the Government can intervene in decisions whenever it deems it 
necessary,  outlining  the  direction  it  would  like  to  see  taken  (explaining  why  certain 
companies sometimes wander misguidedly, such as  the  Credit Lyonnais, which the Anglo-
Saxons  never cease to  hold up  as  an example of the  risks of State intervention in a large 
company). 
1-3.  The role of  banks. 
In France, the role of  banks is quite different from the role we described in the German model. 
Historically and legally, the sectioning-off of banking activities and the Government's desire 
to  develop markets have contributed to reducing the influence of banks as shareholders. Up 
until  1984 (Loi bancaire  ),  the separation of deposit banks and business banks did not give_ 
businesses easy access to saving ; on the one hand this limited the relationship between banks 
and  industry,  and  on  the  other  encouraged  development  of financial  markets.  French 
companies, which favoured funding via an intermediary up until the beginning of  the nineties, 
now turn more naturally towards the markets, and do not think twice about playing the banks 
off  against one another. 
1-4. An outline of  monitoring methods. 
The  objective  of this  outline  is  to  specify,  without  being  exhaustive,  the  major  types  of 
shareholdings  listed  in  France.  These  will  be  presented  in  increasing  order  of State 
intervention. 
75 Control  Holding  Company  :  Such  companies  do  not  exercise  a  specific  activity  and 
generally manage the stakes they hold in their subsidiaries. The advantages of this system 
are  : direct monitoring of subsidiary management (in a  caricatured way,  the  managers 
keep to managing the daily running of  the subsidiary and making tactical decisions, while 
strategic  choices are  made  by the  owners)  ; arbitration in the case of dispute between 
subsidiaries ; the possibility of  righting any financial imbalance within the group ; and the 
impossibility of  losing control of  the group (no new shareholder without the agreement of 
all  the  other owners).  The  Government  does  not  usually  get  involved  in this  sort  of 
structure (at least, not directly). 
Open shareholdings. In this case, the market is the companies' main source of finance, in 
accordance with the rules of the game. The shareholding therefore varies (depending on 
the industrial and financial logic of  the investors) and the group becomes more vulnerable. 
However,  given  the  rapid  development  of financial  engineering,  there  are  enough 
categories of  non-voting shares to increase the capital, without placing the structure of  the 
directing team in danger (right of double vote, certificate of investment without voting 
rights, non-voting share with priority dividend etc.). Privatised, private or mixed-economy 
companies often turn to these "safety-net" financial products to  develop their funds  and 
help globalisation. 
Reference shareholdings. The reference is, of course, the German model. It would seem in 
the case of Aerospatiale that the German partners reproached the French Government for 
not playing the  role  of reference  shareholder well  enough,  and  only intervening  in a 
discretionary manner. In fact, they would prefer the French Government to behave like an 
active shareholder and wise manager.  In the  specific case of Aerospatiale, Dasa would 
actually like the French Government to let the enterprise develop in the same way as a 
private company. 
Hard core shareholdings : This is  the model in which private and privatised companies 
constitute the nebulae of shares which enable the shareholding and power structure to be 
locked (conventional acquisition of holdings: "circular holdings" between subsidiaries of 
the same group ; "crossed-holdings" between allied companies). This system limits access 
of outside  investors  to  the  group  (hence  criticism),  and  freezes  the  capital  of the 
companies concerned.  In  France, the  central  element of this  system is  the  grouping of 
76 companies around the poles which are now Axa-UAP and the Societe Generale, after the 
financial scene was rearranged and the Credit Lyonnais weakened in its role as the third 
pole, of  public origin. 
In the context of privatisation, hard cores have often been set up  : it involved constituting 
"private groups under high public surveillance" (with a public company shareholding in the 
financial  hard  cores).  This  method  made  it  possible  to  "choose"  the  shareholders  of 
companies, from the outset reserving a certain proportion of the capital for the industrial and 
financial allies who willingly accepted reciprocal acquisition of  holdings. 
The system of hard cores also makes it possible to  strengthen existing ties between teams of 
directors (the majority of directors have been to  the same schools and universities) and to 
entrust the directors with considerable room for manoeuvre as  well as  significant financial 
support.  Nonetheless,  this  delicate  and  subtle  balance  remains  sensitive  to  transfers  of 
ownership from the public to the private sector, and vice versa, which can render the directors' 
positions very fragile. 
In theory, this threat of eviction should be sufficient to keep the directors in line (particularly 
since they are supposed to value their reputations with a view to being head-hunted later on) 
and to put them to work for the good of  the shareholders. Unfortunately, the ties and networks 
that they weave with the public and private sectors allow them to act as they see fit,  without 
being too  concerned for their future.  The observation that can be made is that a managerial 
elite has existed for  decades in France, hence the  following comment : "French capitalism 
functions  more  and  more  like  a  dictatorial-type  technocratic blend and  family  capitalism. 
Managerial capitalism is hardly to be seen in France" BARRER and MOUROT [1995]. 
At the current time, companies are re-centring their activities and are tending to remove non-
strategic shareholdings from their share portfolios. We could therefore assume that the French 
system of  hard cores is on a natural course towards extinction. In reality, the shares are merely 
changing hands within the  group  and tend to  consolidate the  financial  poles (according to 
Francois Morin : "There is too much shared interest involved for the system of hard cores to 
be done away with"). 
77 It would seem that the French model is developing along the lines of  the Anglo-Saxon model. 
This trend is obviously heightened by globalisation of markets and capital. However, bearing 
in mind the  characteristics of the companies and  activities which concern future  European 
enterprise,  study  of the  particularities  of the  three  models  we  have just described  is  still 
relevant. 
1-5.  Analysis  of the  group  Aerospatiale  Matra  with  regard  to  Corporate 
Governance 
It is  difficult to  give  a precise analysis of the  group  Aerospatiale Matra with regard to  the 
rules of corporate governance since the company was only created recently.  Obviously we 
will need to wait for a few months before being able to give a detailed description of  how this 
company  works.  However,  knowing  the  culture  of the  two  companies  and  the  general 
development of  relations between the French State and armaments companies provides a basis 
for some initial comments. 
1-5-a. Analysis of  Company Structures 
Aerospatiale  Matra management is  shared between a board of directors  and a supervisory 
board. 
The board of  directors consists of  two people, Yves Michot who is the CEO, and who was the 
CEO of  Aerospatiale and Philippe Camus, the Managing Director who comes from Matra and 
was the director ofMatra Haute Tecnologies. 
The supervisory board is made up of 16 members. Six are appointed by the French State, four 
by  Lagardere,  two  are  persons  qualified  in  the  company's  sector  of activity,  one  is  an 
employee shareholder representative and three are elected by the employees. There is also a 
seventeenth administrator who  does  not have voting rights and represents the  golden share 
retained by the State. As  in the case of Thomson-CSF, the general delegate for armaments, 
Jean-Yves Helmer, has been appointed to this position by the State. 
This company structure, with a board of directors and supervisory board is not common in 
France. It is a sign of  the fact that the company Aerospatiale Matra is the result of a merger of 
companies rather than a take-over. This form of union is also unusual in the corporate world. 
78 It highlights the State's goodwill underlying this merger, along with the need to consider the 
sensibilities of public company structure and private company structure in France, particularly 
regarding  the  employees  of both  companies.  An initial  analysis  of whether  the  bringing 
together  of Aerospatiale  Matra  constitutes  nationalisation  of Matra  or  privatisation  of 
Aerospatiale gives the answer : neither. 
Therefore the structure of  Aerospatiale Matra can be compared to that of a 50/50 joint venture 
where the balance is found between the board of directors and the supervisory board on the 
one hand, and the two directors on the other. 
This  balance  can also  be  found  within management,  because the  executives of Matra and 
Aerospatiale  are  evenly  distributed  among  the  company's  management  positions  (see 
organisational chart below). 
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 However, the fact that Jean-Luc Lagardere will be the chair of the supervisory board puts this 
balance into perspective. 
1-5-b. Distribution of  Capital and the Shareholders' Pact 
Initially,  the  distribution  of capital  in  the  company  Aerospatiale  Matra  can  be  seen  to 
correspond to nationalisation because it was decided on 22 July 1998, the date the merger of 
the  two  companies  was  announced,  that  the  Lagardere  group  would  hold  33%  of the 
company's capital after the contribution of Matra-Hautes Technologies. This analysis should 
not be retained for two reasons. 
1)  The distribution of capital will change. When the merger was announced, it was decided 
to  privatise  the  company  Aerospatiale  Matra  by  putting  17.5%  of the  capital  on  the 
market.  This  privatisation  process  was  completed  on  4  June  1999,  the  first  day  the 
company was listed on the stock exchange.  In total, the State now only holds a 47.5% 
stake. It could even be considered that the State's moves to disengage itself will continue, 
an analysis which would back up the shareholders' pact. 
2)  Indeed, the shareholders' pact gives particular rights to the private reference shareholder, 
the Lagardere group, in particular as regards capital evolution. If the capital was required 
to evolve, Lagardere has the option of maintaining its stake at 33%. If the State gives up 
any of its capital, the Lagardere group has a right of pre-emption over the State's shares, 
an important factor should it merge with another company and the French State wish to 
withdraw.  On  the  other  hand,  the  French  State  has  a  right  of pre-emption  should 
Lagardere wish to disengage capital from Aerospatiale Matra. 
All in all, the general feeling is that this is a company undergoing gradual "depublicisation". 
This  disengagement  is  happening  gradually,  couched in  euphemistic  language  in order to 
reassure the employees of Aerospatiale and to  focus  on the  advantages of shareholder value 
and the creation of  company value with regard to foreign companies and governments. 
81 The entry of this company into the competitive sphere seems to be both inexorable and rapid. 
The  role  of the  individuals  in  charge  of managing  the  new  company  is  of the  utmost 
importance in this process. It can be confirmed that the  combination of Matra management 
(accustomed to this exercise in managing an industrial sector company listed on the financial 
markets) and high civil servants who : are former members of ministerial cabinets, are part of 
both the management of Aerospatiale and of Matra and are converts of this evolution, will 
help the future company to develop all the more rapidly. 
The only factors that could put a brake on this evolution lie firstly in the continued existence 
in the new company's management of people still from the inner circle that set up the French 
armaments manufacturing system between the sixties and the nineties, and who have passed 
through the General Delegation for Armaments. The second hindering factor lies in a board of 
directors that still remains partly traced on the public company model, a board of directors 
that is used to being "transparent" and, in line with the French model, not being the centre of 
governance. 
II.  THE  FRENCH  MODEL  OF  THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  STATE  AND 
INDUSTRY 
11-1. Background of  the French model 
11-1-a. The political factor: from the power theory to national soverei~nty 
Without going into details,  it can be  said that the  historical context weighs heavily on the 
model of  our relationship between the State and the armaments industry. 
In France, even more than in the United Kingdom,  armaments constitute one our country's 
factors  of power.  From  the  time  of Colbert  arms  manufacturing  has  been  one  of the 
Government's prerogatives, and this monopoly has never,  until  now,  been truly  called into 
question. At the beginning of the century, an aeronautics industry was set up and, when the 
military interests for aviation were realised, it was nationalised. 
82 After the World War II, two events shaped the physiognomy of our armaments industry. The 
fourth republic arose from  a popular patriotic reaction and upheld the values of the nation, 
representing the people as a whole. Social rights were written into legal codes in the foreword 
to  the  constitution,  and  a  certain  degree  of mistrust  was  instilled  with  regard  to  private 
interests when an activity was of interest to the nation as a whole. The armaments industry is 
a public activity by nature and the engine manufacturer Snecma was nationalised in 1946. 
However, French industrial fabric then had to  re-build itself and our armies used American 
equipment. 
The French armaments industry would certainly not have become as important as it has if  two 
political events had not given a new lease of life to the theory of nationalised industry. Ten 
years  apart,  the  Suez  crisis  in  1956  and  the  withdrawal  of NATO's  integrated  military 
structure in 1966 justified the existence of an industry which enabled us to pursue a foreign 
policy that was independent of  our American ally. 
The  renovation of the  French armaments industry therefore  stemmed from  an initiative of 
public power which was to  shape, to  a large extent, the relationship with this industry. The 
industry itself was at the service of a political policy, it did not have an economic objective 
per  se,  yvhich,  for  a  long  time  explained  the  relative  lack  of interest  in the  structure  of 
armament companies. 
Il-l-b. Industrial structure: the weight o(strata rather than ideologies. 
Studying the structures of French armaments companies tends to show that historical heritage 
explains, in essence, the structure of French companies. Beyond the major political changes 
that occurred in  1936,  1945,  1981  and  1986, one  is  forced to  realise that in France  today, 
industrial  structures  under  Government  authority  (the  DCN),  public  enterprises  (Giat-
industries  and Aerospatiale  ),  companies with a grouped  shareholding  (Thomson-CSF)  and 
companies with a diluted shareholding (like the Lagadere group and Alacatel) can all exist 
side-by-side. Therefore, this examination reveals that different Governments have not tried as 
hard  as  one  might  have  thought  to  establish  a  theory  on  the  economic  structure  of the 
armaments industry, or at least that their influence has been more limited than we  imagine. 
83 Furthermore, when theories were developed, as in 1981, and in 1986, they took little account, 
in general, of the particularities of this industry. The wave of nationalisation in 1981, which 
led to the nationalisation of  Thomson of  Matra and in theory of Dassault, was part of  a policy 
generally aiming to acquire production means which could contribute to increasing the direct 
influence of the Government's economic, social and international policy. Nationalisation in 
the armaments industry in 1981  constituted but a part of  the wave of nationalisation, just as in 
1986 privatisation in this industry only constituted a part of  the wave ofprivatisation. 
Overall,  it  should  be  remembered  that,  outside  the  nuclear  sector,  the  older the  type  of 
armaments,  such as  powders  and  explosives  or land  and  marine  weapons,  the  more  the 
structure  of production  is  governed  by the  State.  However,  "recent"  armaments  (defence 
electronics, missiles) tend to be manufactured in industrial structures which have always been, 
or are once again, private. The aeronautics sector falls between the two. It was nationalised in 
the middle of this century, with the exception of Dassault which was established after World 
War II.  Therefore, we posses an industrial  structure  marked by this phenomenon of strata 
more  than  by  a  fundamentally  State-oriented  or  liberal  ideology.  The  trend  is  veering 
nonetheless  towards  privatisation of armament  companies,  as  in  all  industry  and  service 
sectors,  but this  is  evolving slowly,  no  doubt due  to  the  conservative  structure  of French 
society. 
11-1-c.  The  or~anisational  factor  of the  relationship  between  State  and 
industry : the DGA 
In France, the nature of  the relationship between the State and industry almost certainly owes 
as  much to  company  structure  as  to  the  relationship  that was  set up  with the  Bureau for 
Armaments (Delegation Generale pour l'Armement, DGA). 
The French armament industry is both a French tradition and a recent product, dating back to 
the end of the fourth Republic and the beginning of the fifth Republic. It is  a product which 
the DGA has played a major part in shaping. 
Since it was created in 1961, at the time called the Delegation ministerielle pour l'armement, 
it has been endowed with very wide-ranging powers : 
It manufactures certain armaments itself 
84 It specifies and runs the programmes 
It purchases materials 
Finally,  and  perhaps  more  important  still  but  rarely  studied,  in  terms  of organisational 
sociology  the  DGA  is  made  up  of a  relatively  coherent  core  of individuals,  armaments 
engineers,  able to  move around the companies either to  manage and advise,  or to  monitor 
them in the case of  public enterprises. 
This provides a relatively coherent ensemble where the DGA is  the instrument of a strong 
political will, the construction of an armaments industry, with a large amount of credit (for a 
long time there were no major financial constraints) and where the industry, regardless of its 
legal status, pursues objectives strictly in line with those of the Government that monitors it. 
This is  what caused Jean-Paul Hebert to  say in his book on "armament production", that a 
company like Dassault "despite being private from a legal stand point ....  can be characterised 
as having the culture of  a national enterprise". 
In fact, perhaps the question at that time was raised in terms of company culture.  In the sense 
that the relations between the State and industry were friendly and characterised by common 
objectives (to construct the highest-technology armaments industry regardless of cost- in the 
sense that the DGA takes respo_nsibility, in choosing its contracting parties, for organising the 
competition and the industrial fabric and for keeping foreign competition at arms length), the 
legal definition of the structures of those companies that manufactured its products was of 
little  concern.  It  was  the  political  objective  attributed  to  the  armaments  industry  and  the 
relationship between the DGA and the companies, which shaped the French system, not the 
legal structure of the companies. As a result, up until  1981, structures as different from each 
other as Dassault Matra and Thomson on the one hand and the DCN and GIAT on the other, 
were able to rub shoulders without raising comment.  This also explains how the leaders of 
armaments  companies have  long,  and  unquestioningly  (political  ideological considerations 
aside) considered that privatising the armaments industry would not constitute a fundamental 
change with regard to a public company structure
32
. 
32  Jacques Buzenet expressed an opinion along these lines during a symposium organised by the  IRIS on the 
future ofthe defence industry on 9 June 1993 
85 11-2. A model turned upside down 
For the past few years, the French armaments industry model has been experiencing a period 
of change, not to say crisis. In  1994, Jean-Paul Hebert described this change in his thesis on 
weapons  manufacturing.  The  past  four  years  have  thrown  further  light  on  the  main 
conclusions of  this thesis : 
Firstly, what Jean-Paul Hebert calls the diversion of costs is perhaps not a phenomenon 
resulting from abuse of  the relationship between the Sate and industry, but a phenomenon 
inherent to the very system of this relationship. The aim of armaments manufacturing in 
France has never been to  manufacture better equipment for  less,  but to  incorporate the 
highest-performing technology in  the  equipment whose  operational  specifications were 
liable to vary with time. Rather than a diversion of costs, it would be more appropriate to 
talk about a lack of cost control,  a phenomenon which only proved awkward once we 
reached the limits of France's economic ability to  finance the production system under 
such conditions. Then resulting cuts in the defence budget from  1992 onwards, and the 
crisis of  the consumer credit mechanism, added to the difficulties. 
Whenever  it  was  possible,  certain  companies  increased  their  civil  activity  almost 
mechanically. Dassault, Aerospatiale and Snecma, did not really want to move away from 
the defence sector, there was simply a corresponding reflection in their results when they 
gradually replaced the military market by the civil market, because at the very time the 
former was cutting back, the latter was tending to expand. Simply by moving away from a 
protected market, these companies entered into a competitive sector, and felt the need to 
benefit from  the  same advantages as  their competitors. Thus,  in  1993,  the  president of 
Aerospatiale, Louis Gallais, pleaded the case for the privatisation of his company so  he 
could  fight  on  an  equal  footing  against  competitors  such  as  Boeing,  and  MacDonnel 
Douglas. 
Those  who  saw  their  situation  as  being  protected  by  this  combined  State-industry 
regulatory model and who only operated within the context of the armaments field have 
found  their  situation  dramatically  called  into  question  due  to  the  drastic  reduction  in 
Government orders and their inability to adapt to a new style of relationship which now 
takes the cost of armaments into account. This was the case for companies such as  Giat 
Industries and the DCN. 
86 The  old  model  is  no  longer  efficient  and  has  been  called  into  question.  But  one  of the 
particularities  of the  current situation is  that  it  is  very  difficult to  qualify the  relationship 
model which has been set in place. 
11-3 A new, but  poorly-defined model 
The model described by Jean-Paul Hebert and which involved friendly relations between the 
State and its industry, with identical interests (to  be  distinguished from relationships in the 
United Kingdom where the current situation satisfies State and industry interests even though 
the two do not share common goals) no longer prevails. A new model has been set up, but one 
of its main particularities is that it is neither truly defined nor truly established with a view to 
consistency. The responsibility for this would appear to lie with a double political division. 
11-3-a. the split between sovereien industry and expression ofthat sovereit:nfY 
The reform of the relationship between the State and the armaments industry truly began in 
1995 when Jacques Chirac was elected President of the Republic. However, there is no real 
theory which defines the new relationship. 
With regard to the principles, we reiterate that the French armaments industry is necessary for 
the  expression  of our  sovereignty.  The  different  views  on the  subject  which  arose  from 
Jacques Chirac's speech on 22 February 1996, from public appearances made by the Minister 
for Defence, Charles Millon and from the military programming law for 1996-2002 are but an 
extrapolation  of the  1994  white  paper  on  defence.  The  worth  of the  French  armaments 
industry extends beyond mere economic worth, but nothing distinguishes this line of  thinking 
from that which can be seen in the United states and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the 
importance  placed  on  export  development  shows  the  necessity  for  this  industry  to  stop 
depending on the French Government alone to guarantee such development. Above all, at no 
time  has  the  relationship  between the  State  and  industry  been described  : the  armaments 
industry  is  an industry necessary to  the  expression of sovereignty,  but how the  State  will 
ensure that its interests are safeguarded is not explained. 
87 11-3-b  The  split  between  what  1s  political  responsibility  and  what  is 
administrative responsibility 
To  give a brief outline, it could be said that the policies implemented since 1995  are in two 
parts: 
The  privatisation of Thomson CSF  and  Aerospatiale  which  was  planned  in  the  1993 
privatisation law but was not carried out. 
The modification of  the relationship between industry and State which includes the reform 
ofthe DGA. 
However,  it can be  noted that these  two  reforms  were  never  actually  incorporated into  a 
global concept of the  State-industry relationship.  In fact,  it seems as  if privatisation of the 
armaments industry is a decision of a political nature, while reform of the DGA is purely an 
administrative matter.  Thus,  from  1995,  the  government ran the  process of privatising the 
armaments industry, while giving the impression of leaving the DGA to carry out its process 
of reform  alone,  as  if the  stakes  involved  were  nothing  more  than  a  simple  matter  of 
administrative efficiency. 
In  this  context the  debates  on  both  subjects,  rather  than  dealing  with the  issues  in  their 
complexity and particularly in their entirety, focused on a few specific aspects. 
The  armaments  industry  privatisation  debate  is  only  approached  via the  public  company 
"efficiency vs.  inefficiency"  issue and not via a complex issue where three things must be 
known : whether the  State should (or not)  organise industrial restructuring in this phase of 
privatisation of the industry ; what is the most suitable capital and financial  structure for  a 
market which is  becoming  global  ; and  how the  State  will  ensure that its  interests  in the 
armaments industry retain their value in the future. 
However, we have seen that in the British model it was not so much the golden share that was 
the  State's  instrument  for  action  in  the  armaments  industry,  but  the  manner  in  which 
procurement  was  organised.  Furthermore,  this  system  of procurement  had  to  be  able  to 
continually adapt to the evolving industrial situation. 
Thus  it  can  be  considered  that  although  the  privatisation  of the  armaments  industry  is 
necessary  above  all  to  seal  foreign  alliances  and  to  free  the  State  from  its  social 
responsibilities in an industrial sector, it is actually the reform of the DGA and procurement 
88 which is liable to fundamentally transform the relationship between the State and industry in 
France. 
However, this question only seems to be dealt with from the very simplistic stance of  the cost 
of armaments.  The  reform  of the  DGA  and  its  relations  with  the  industrial  sector  is 
particularly intended to reduce the cost of the programmes, the objective of a 30% gain has 
been set in a context of  reduced financial availability. 
Yet the thinking followed by the British also makes itself felt ; 
Competition? Aside from the aeronautics sector where competition seems an impossibility, it 
is desired, including in the missile sector. But the restructuring/grouping movement is already 
underway, even at European level and can only limit its effects. 
In practice, the desire to enter the competition seems to be real but difficult to implement with 
regard  to  the  State  sector  or  near-State  sector  being  in  difficulty  (the  DCN  and  Giat-
industries  )
33
. 
The need to  extend the study phase for the programmes, the need to  involve the  industrial 
teams  in  carrying  out  the  programmes  ;  all  things  that  became  relevant  with  Smart 
Procurement in the United Kingdom three years down the track, will also arise in this reform 
oftheDGA. 
Three years after it began to be applied, major doubts remain as to the result of  this reform of 
the DGA and especially as to its industrial objectives. 
The practice of grouped orders is being set up, but this measure at the very IJlOSt is the result 
of  a cleaning up of  budget management. 
Other issues also need to be dealt with in the context of  the reform. 
How are the programme teams operating ? 
Does  the  DGA  have  the  means  to  control  the  specification  of the  industrial  cost  of the 
programmes and the profit margin of  the companies ? 
Will the armaments contracts enable the ? companies to achieve the profit margins required to 
satisfy private shareholders ? 
How is  a balance achieved between the  available  budget,  the  sophistication of armaments 
required and keeping costs to a minimum ? 
What is the financial impact of entering the competition and the limitations of this exercise 
during a phase where monopolies are being created ? 
One of the  lesser paradoxes of the  armaments industry today is  indeed that preserving the 
State's sovereignty requires it to  be able to  generate the  profits from  this industry and thus 
89 satisfy  the  shareholders'  interests.  Objectively  speaking,  this  goal  is  in  contradiction  with 
those  of the  client State  which wants  the  lowest prices,  but it  is  not necessarily cause  for 
antagonism, as we have seen in the United Kingdom. 
The French approach thus seems to take inspiration from that followed by the British since the 
early eighties. However, it should not be  forgotten that a certain number of parameters have 
changed  since  then.  Indeed,  the  British  initiated  their  approach  at  a  time  when  defence 
budgets were at their peak and the concentrationist initiative of certain armaments companies 
attempting  to  attain  a  monopoly  situation  had  not  truly  begun.  And  still,  certain  British 
companies experienced difficulties in their period of  adaptation. 
Therefore it cannot be denied that the approach undertaken in France is being carried out at a 
time when budgetary circumstances are least favourable and when competitor companies are 
the most likely to have a predatory attitude. 
II-3-c.  Orieins,  terms  and conditions  of use  and scope  of French  action 
specifique 
It will never be emphasised enough, the action specifique (French translation of the golden 
share) is not a legal invention sui-generis, but is associated with the privatisation of French 
companies. France experienced its first privatisation movement in  1986, with the change of 
government, and followed the wave ofprivatisation resulting from the Left coming to power. 
At that time the objective was to return to the situation which had previously prevailed. 
Among the companies listed for privatisation by the Law 86-793 of 2 July 1986 authorising 
the government to take various economic and social measures, was the company Matra. After 
being adopted,  this  draft law was submitted to  the  constitutional council which,  in France, 
ensures  that  laws  comply  with  the  Constitution.  The  constitutional  council  explicitly 
expressed reservations regarding the privatisation of companies needed to safeguard national 
independence.  Law 86-912 relating to  the terms and conditions of privatisation decided by 
Law 86-793 of 2 July 1986 established, in Article  10, the need for an action specifique when 
it was necessary to protect national rights. 
According to this Article 10, if  the State decides to transform an ordinary share into an action 
specifique, the latter "enables the minister for the economy to authorise shares in excess of 
33 cf  matter regarding ordering a trailer for the Leclerc tank and repairing the Jules Vemes. 
90 10%  of the  capital  held  by  one  person  or  by  several  persons  acting  together".  This 
authorisation can be demanded at 5% for companies covered by Article 223 of the Treaty of 
Rome, that is to say armaments companies. 
However, it should be noted that this action specifique has a life span of 5 years. It was under 
this system that Matra was privatised in January 1988. The action specifique was requested by 
the State. The effects ofthis action specifique therefore came to an end in January 1993. 
After a change of power in 1993,  the  government led by Edouard Balladur decided upon a 
new wave of privatisation for that year. Privatisation Law 93-923 of 19 July 1993  plans for 
the  privatisation of 21  groups, the terms and conditions for  privatisation being those,  with 
some modifications, ofthe 1986 privatisation law. 
To  be  counted among these modifications is  that of the terms and conditions for using the 
action specifique. 
Law 93-923 of 19 July allows : 
that  the  decree  establishing  the  action  specifique  sets  the  thresholds  beyond  which 
authorisation is required from the minister for the economy, 
for  the  nomination to  the  board of directors  or monitoring  body of one  or two  state 
representatives, appointed by decree and without voting rights, 
that this action specifique allows the state to oppose "decisions to transfer shares or use 
them as a guarantee, when such decisions could harm the national interests". 
Finally, there is no longer a limit to the time in which these actions specifiques are effective. 
The transformation of  this action specifique into an ordinary share even seems impossible for 
defence companies because in the last paragraph of  Article 7 of  this law states that : 
"Unless  national  independence  is  in  question,  the  action  specifique  can,  at  any  time,  be 
permanently transformed into an ordinary share by decree". 
To  explain this "hardening" of the terms and conditions for using the share, the minister for 
finance explains : 
"We were concerned about the risks regarding national sovereignty which the privatisation of 
certain companies involved in strategic activities or the defence sector could engender. The 
device  I  have  just  described  accords  the  State  very  important  prerogatives  as  regards 
privatised companies when national interests are in play" .
34 
34 Assemblee Nationale, 28 June 1993 
91 With these new terms and conditions for application, the French State has used this ability to 
set up an action specifique on two occasions ; on the privatisation of Thomson-CSF and of 
Aerospatiale. 
The  two  decrees  setting  up  the  action specifique  were  enacted  on 3 August  1996  and  16 
February 1999 respectively. 
On studying these decrees it can be seen that the spirit of the law has been applied differently 
in the two cases, particularly as regards share transfer. 
In  the  case  of Thomson-CSF,  the  share  covers  the  entirety  of the  company,  including 
subsidiaries and joint ventures with other European companies, thus preventing application of 
the clause covering the pre-emptive right to  profits of the partner companies in these joint 
ventures. 
The action specifique also covers the foreign subsidiaries of Thomson, such as Thomson UK 
Holdings Ltd. 
However,  and  still  as  regards  share transfer,  the use  of the  action specifique  is  limited in 
Aerospatiale to the ballistic missile sector as well as to Aerospatiale's majority shareholdings 
in the companies CILAS, SODERN, Nucletudes and the Cosyde group. 
On the other hand therefore, it-excludes the use of  this action specifique for share transfer for 
the civil aeronautics sector, for the Eurocopter joint venture and for tactical missiles. 
Thus, the notion of action specifique is wider than the notion of golden share in the United 
Kingdom because it applies both to the control of investments and the share transfer. 
However, this control of  share transfer is more recent than is generally thought because it only 
dates  from  1993.  After being applied extensively for  Thomson-CSF, this ability to  oppose 
share transfer was limited to activities associated with deterrence forces and the manufacture 
of lasers  in the  case of Aerospatiale,  i.e.  sectors where one  can imagine that the notion of 
national independence, in its strictest sense, still means something. 
The  investment  question  never 
92 Nonetheless,  these  tools  have  never  been  used  and  debate  over  the  future  of the  action 
specifique is particularly associated with negotiations over the AEDC. 
The recent application of the action specifique in the case of Aerospatiale tends to prove that 
applying  it to  share  transfer would  not  pose  any  problem  for  the  AEDC  because  sectors 
associated with deterrence would be given special treatment in any case. 
From a French standpoint, the existence of an action specifique could, however, be useful if a 
trans-national European company were to be established, diluting the shareholding of such a 
company  almost  mechanically.  However,  who  would  hold  such  an  action  specifique  and 
against whom it could be directed would remain to be seen. 
11-3-d. Summary o(the French model 
In its principles and in its line of thinking, the French model is still a model of sovereignty. 
With regard to its objectives this model is more difficult to grasp, because, at no moment has 
a comprehensive theory establishing the relationship between the means implemented and the 
objectives sought been put forward. 
Fundamentally, the means implemented bear a strong resemblance to the British model. But 
we  have  seen that this  model  is  not without  its  pitfalls,  particularly during the  transition 
period, and can lead to a loss of  control of  the armaments industry. 
It therefore  appears  necessary  to  always  make  optimum  use  of precise  instruments  for 
measuring the  cause  and  effect relationship  between the  practice  of procurement and the 
economic, financial and industrial situation of the armaments industry. The maxim according 
to which the client State would be sufficient to guarantee the State's sovereignty, is indeed far 
from  reflecting  the  complexity  of the  problems.  Indeed,  it  would  appear  today  that  no 
European State can guarantee, as sole client of its industry, the interests of this industry and 
therefore its durability. It also appears that the procurement method plays a major role both as 
regards the structure of  this industry, and as regards the control the State can exercise over the 
equipment manufactured and the costs involved. 
In the  line of thinking there is  certainly a model which aims to  preserve these interests of 
sovereignty, in reality it is not certain that the economic situation of this industry will enable 
us to fulfil this objective. 
93 III. ANALYSIS OF FRENCH COMPANIES' STRATEGY AND BALANCE SHEETS 
111-1. Aerospatiale 
111-1-a. Strate(fiespursued between 1992 and 1998 
Until now, Aerospatiale's strategy has been one of  specialisation. Knowing how to stay at the 
cutting  edge  of technology,  the  French  group  has  been  able  to  maintain  a  competitive 
advantage  so  far.  This has  certainly  been  felt  as  regards  its  competitive  position,  in that, 
according to the group's directors, Aerospatiale was the only group able to maintain, and even 
improve its position on a topsy-turvy market. 
However, Aerospatiale did not neglect its partnerships in any way. In fact, since around 1994, 
Aerospatiale would have been more than happy to  see  a Franco-German bond form  in this 
sector,  combining  technical  and  technological  efficiency  and  marketing  force,  continuing 
well-honed activities as well as branching out into new areas. It was with this in mind that it 
had already drawn closer to DASA. 
On an operational level 
Unlike its German partner, Aerospatiale benefits from being at the forefront of technology in 
many areas, which has enabled it to be among the world leaders and number one in Europe. It 
should  be  noted  that the  French  group's  strategy  is  to  specialise.  All  activities  are  finely 
honed,  in order to  maintain a technological  advantage,  and  alliances  made  are  principally 
aimed at reaching critical size (to be profitable on the world market). Nonetheless, it would 
seem that the public company is under-capitalised in comparison with its competitors, which 
does not prevent it in the slightest from being profitable. 
The annual reports show that Aerospatiale was aware of  the need to have partners, rather than 
go it alone. The terms and conditions for such partnerships, however, were not specified, but 
it would be logical to assume that Aerospatiale was thinking of becoming a private company 
so  it could then strike alliances with other European companies.  The following  clues  lend 
substance to such an assumption : 
94 It is  clearly  written  in  the  1995  report  that  Aerospatiale  was  studying  the  terms  and 
conditions for transforming the company in the middle of  the financial year ; 
It can be noted that of the people appointed by decree to  the board of directors,  several 
have  called  for  the  privatisation of the  public  company under their  governance  ; it is 
therefore plausible that the idea could have crept into Aerospatiale's board ; 
It cannot be forgotten that the European bodies have been trying for several years to limit 
the financial support given by the Member States to their public companies. It would be 
appropriate to study European jurisprudence relating to the aeronautics and space sector to 
be sure that it is not the exception to the rule ; 
Finally, Aerospatiale and DASA gave the impression of being a united front when they 
pleaded  in  favour  of the  rapprochement  of the  companies  in  this  sector,  therefore  in 
theory, the decision-makers of  the two groups held a relatively similar view of  the future. 
111-1-b. Comment on the Accounts 
General characteristics of the balance sheets 
The first thing that catches the eye when comparing the accounting structures of DASA and 
Aerospatiale, is  that the total sum of fixed  assets and stockholders' equity are  significantly 
lower  in Aerospatiale  than DASA.  [This  would  tend  to  suggest that the  French  group  is 
smaller than the German one].  However, the two  groups have essentially the same level of 
activity (see : current assets, where the stocks and accounts payable play an important role ; 
an important detail is  that the  discrepancy existing between accounts payable and  deposits 
received on orders is fairly small, which is healthier for the group's accounts). 
Aerospatiale's accounts reveal that it dips into its savings less frequently than DASA. As for 
its net results, these are constantly improving, proving that the Aerospatiale group is efficient 
and profitable. 
However, this is not the main characteristic of Aerospatiale, in fact,  it carries a considerable 
level of debt (currently being reduced), which is  significantly greater than the stockholders' 
equity - a result of under-capitalisation. A private company could not sustain such a level of 
95 debt for long (furthermore, it would certainly have to deal with creditor mistrust, who could 
demand immediate payment, thus exacerbating the company's financial difficulties). 
It is appropriate to highlight, however, that the majority of  this debt is medium/long-term debt 
to  financial institutions, thus somehow guaranteeing "good relations" between the group and 
its banks (these relations being long term). 
Other accounts 
The consolidated results reveal Aerospatiale's effectiveness : its RACI have been improving 
significantly since 1993, and have been in the black since 1994. 
Regarding sales, and therefore the group's specialisation, it can be noted that everything relies 
on the  aeronautics sector in particular (planes and helicopters).  For the past two years, the 
Space  and Defence division has  markedly improved performance.  It should be highlighted 
that Aerospatiale participates in the majority of  international aerospace projects. 
The  contribution to  Aerospatiale of the  State's 45.76%  stake  in Dassault Aviation had the 
logical  consequence  of increasing  the  group's  stockholder  equity,  without  immediately 
increasing the capital, the corresponding sum is registered in Aerospatiale's  _financial report as 
funds  to  be  capitalised, this  contribution will  be  covered by  an  increase  in  Aerospatiale's 
reserved capital at the beginning of 1999. In return, the French State will receive Aerospatiale 
shares. 
The  current assets,  which reveal  a company's  level of activity,  have been increasing since 
1996.  However,  the  integration of new activities,  particularly those  of Dassault Aviation, 
obviously generate a larger volume of  stocks. 
The group's net results are 27% down on those of 1997. This drop in Aerospatiale's profits is 
partly due to the increase in grants to  cover current liabilities (  +  20%  ), when between 1996 
and  1997  they  decreased.  These  liabilities  consist  mainly  of the  risks  associated  with 
marketing the Airbuses. The principal issue concerns the guarantees given to investors who 
have bought certain aircraft and who are renting them out to airline companies. 
96 The favourable impact of Dassault Aviation's VMPs (rapidly liquifiable assets) on the group's 
treasury can be noted. Indeed, the VMPs contributed by Dassault Aviation represent 70% of 
the VMPs in the consolidated financial report. 
Global  debt  (financial  debt  +  commercial  debt)  remains  higher than  1997  (+  13%).  But 
whereas financial debt is falling - 9% lower than 1997 and 1996, commercial debt has risen 
by 16% since 1997. 
The increase in stockholders' equity has improved the group's working capital. However, new 
funding  needs (net funding  requirement  : + 42%) have  arisen with the  increase  in stocks, 
client accounts and attached accounts. 
97 Notes : Accounts : Definitions. 
*Working capital: 
The working capital is the excess of fixed capital assets (stockholders' equity +current 
liabilities+ medium to long-term liabilities) over net fixed assets. It represents "the proportion 
of  capital put forward to fund the operating cycle". 
Indeed, to  function normally, a company must finance not only its fixed assets, but also its 
current  assets.  As  these  current  assets  are  not  necessarily  perfectly  liquid,  they  generate 
funding requirements. In the majority of  companies, short-term debts (working debts) are not 
sufficient to cover operating needs, hence generating a net funding requirement, which should 
be covered by the fixed capital assets if  the company wishes to avoid cash flow problems. 
* Situations : 
Working  capital  positive,  net  funding  requirement  positive,  accounts  positive  :  the 
working capital is thus greater than the net funding requirement and so  the accounts are 
positive. This is a satisfactory and usual situation, providing however, that funds are used 
correctly, that is to say invested appropriately. 
Working capital positive, net funding requirement negative, accounts positive : the current 
operations  of the  company  bring  in resources  over and  above  those  generated by the 
working capital, and the accounts are positive. This is a very favourable situation in that it 
enables the company to invest its funds and improve its profitability thanks to the interest. 
It is  sometimes possible for companies to finance their RACI with the interest they earn 
on investments. 
Working  capital  negative,  net  funding  requirement  negative,  accounts  positive  :  the 
company has  a negative  working  capital,  lower in absolute  value than its  net funding 
requirement, also negative. The accounts are positive. This paradoxical situation generally 
characterises companies of the hypermarket type : their operating system enables them to 
draw sufficiently stable resources from their current operations to enable them to finance a 
part of  their fixed assets. 
98 111-2. Matra 
* Problem raised by activity reports : 
This problem concerns the extent of incorporation of the accounts made available. Indeed, it 
concerns the accounts of the Lagardere group, which include the consolidated results of the 
Matra-Hachette group responsible for the Defence and Space sectors. The processes carried 
out for the three major European aeronautics groups cannot be implemented here. 
The  only  elements  developed  by  the  annual  reports  are  very  succinct,  the  consolidated 
accounts of  the Matra group and those of  the two sectors were not provided. Therefore we do 
not have any information on the results, the debt situation or the breakdown of results. It is 
therefore impossible to  specify company strategy in the two sectors and subsequently assess 
their impact on the accounts. The main elements concerning the two aforementioned sectors 
are as follows : 
* Matra 1992. 
* Main events : 
Progr.ess  made with group's turnover thanks to  Space and Automobile branches, but the 
Space  sector does  not seem to  have  had  a decisive  impact on the upturn in operating 
results (an upturn attributable to  the results in the Automobile and Telecommunications 
sectors). 
The year's major operations occurred in the Press and Communication sectors. 
* Space Branch : 
Activity deemed satisfactory, will soon enable performance to be consolidated and a phase 
of stability to  be reached.  Efforts to  be  competitive to  be  made  "making it possible to 
compete on the national market under the best possible conditions". 
4 new Hispasat programme satellites -Matra Marconi  Space is  the project manager for 
several phases-, sent into orbit thanks to Ariane. 
Confirmation ofMMS's strategic choices; 15% increase in turnover and increase in order 
book, representing 18 months' turnover. 
99 * Defence Branch : 
Export penetration into Far East. 
Success of international programmes, particularly Franco-German programmes. 
According to  members  of the  Lagardere  Group,  a tight budget has  not harmed  Matra 
Defense's  activity.  Nonetheless,  the  turnover  is  down  on  1991  (-6%),  export  sales 
representing 50% of  total sales. Marked increase in incoming orders. 
Restructuring of the industrial perimeter : strengthening of R&D and commercial teams, 
to the detriment of  production. 
Information systems well placed on the international stage (considered to  be  an area of 
excellence at Matra Defense). Birth ofMatra Cap Systemes. 
Work with Fairchild Space, on behalf ofNASA and the American government. 
* Matra 1993. 
* Space Branch : 
Difficult context, increased competition, but MMS maintained high level of  activity (order 
book- 15 months' turnover). 
Several missions relating to Satellite activity met with success. Apparently, the design and 
development of telecommunications  and  observation satellites  is  a  speciality of Matra 
Marconi Space. 
In space  transport,  the  production units  began  to  be  rationalised,  in order to  improve 
competitiveness. Hence a cost reduction policy (particularly staffing costs), accompanied 
by  a reduction in productive workforce  and the recruiting of young graduates,  and the 
implementation of  a total quality management policy. 
* Defence Branch : 
Also a difficult context, but slight upturn in turnover compared with 1992. 
4%  increase  in  turnover  from  Missile  activity  compared  with  previous  year  (exports 
accounted for 55% of total turnover, which reached 4,550 million francs).  Development 
continued  on  manufactured  products  in  order  to  perfect them.  In  this  activity,  Matra 
Defense had great expectations of the French government's new military policy, hoping it 
would help them achieve a good position in the sector both in France and abroad. 
100 Still regarding Missile activity, Matra Defense seemed to suffer on account of  the drop in 
petrol prices and budget difficulties, constraints which affected its sales potential in the 
middle east. But it counted on opportunities offered by the Asian markets. Plans to draw 
closer to BAe were already underway. 
Regarding the information and control systems, the restructuring of Matra Cap Systemes 
with  the  merger  of Matra  MS2i  and  Cap  Sesa  Defense  ;  the  new  objectives  are  to 
capitalise on know-how and maintain innovative potential both in key technology as  in 
strategic resources such as knowledge and training of  engineers. 
Signing of  a promising contract with the US Air Force. 
Policy of alliance via projects with other groups in the sector ; commercial development 
both in France and abroad. 
Matra Defense  Espace  has  a  100%  stake  in  Fairchild  Space  and  Defense,  hence  the 
contracts signed with the American government and NASA. Despite American military 
budget cuts, Fairchild maintains its level of  activity, particularly since they are working in 
parallel with Boeing (although even here there are variations in activity). Furthermore, for 
the production units located  _in the USA, there is a policy of alliance with other American 
companies in the sector. 
* Matra 1994. 
* Space Branch : 
The directors of  the branch are much more optimistic than the year before, in that MMS is 
one  of the  European front  runners  in the  space  field,  via its  take-over of BAe  Space 
Systems and the "Communications via Satellite and Micro-wave Components" division of 
Ferranti International. 
MMS seems to have been able to cope on the international scene, being awarded several 
projects in the Satellite field (civil and military), and it has a very diverse client range. 
Continuance of  major Earth Observation programmes thanks to government intervention. 
101 Negotiations among European companies and governments over the specification of new 
military satellites, in which MMS would be likely to play an important role. 
Bearing  in  mind  the  competition,  efforts  made  to  improve  competitiveness  were 
continued. 
* Defence Branch : 
The fact that, despite budget cuts, France maintains a military budget that is proportionally 
larger than those of other Western countries, not only benefited Aerospatiale,  but also 
Matra Hautes Technologies. 
Hence  the continuation of the  majority of programmes underway,  however,  in exports 
there was a drop in orders from the Middle East (which did not deter Matra Defense from 
getting hold of some Brazilian market share). 
Matra Cap Systemes seems to have consolidated its position on the international market 
both as architect and integrator of  control, communications and imaging systems. 
Client  satisfaction  in  the  military  sector  ;  diversification  via  the  use  of technology 
developed for the military sector in civil products. To  increase the profitability of Matra 
Cap  Systemes, the  directors  envisage  widening their product range  (particularly  in the 
civil sector) and improving company productivity. 
Negotiation with the company Orbital Sciences Corporation of Virginia, for the sale of 
Fairchild Space and Defense Corporation. Matra Defense Espace would retain only the 
"on-board control systems" of  Fairchild, which would become Fairchild Controls. 
* Matra 1995. 
The  sketchy information outlined in the activity report concerns products manufactured by 
Matra  Marconi  Space,  Matra Defense  and  Matra  Cap  Systemes.  Regarding  the  decisions 
taken by these companies over the year and their situation at the end of the financial year, 
only the following information can be gleaned : 
* Space Branch : 
in 1994, MMS became the leading integrated European company in the Space sector, and 
in 1995 it strengthened its position on the major civil and military space markets. 
102 Information identical to that provided in the 1994 report, with additional details regarding 
the number of  launches in the current year. 
According to the report : "The short and medium term prospects for Matra Marconi Space 
are  very satisfactory,  despite the  increasingly competitive environment surrounding the 
development of  commercial telecommunications. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
constant  efforts  undertaken  over  the  past  few  years  to  increase  the  company's 
competitiveness will be continued and expanded". 
* Defence Branch : 
Drop  in  turnover  due  to  "slowdown  in  certain  short-cycle  export  orders,  partly 
compensated  for  by  more  satisfactory  national  sales  performance".  Overall  :  loss  of 
ground on the international scene. Deferment of certain orders for export, which will not 
take place until 1996. 
Maintenance of  a sustained pace in "Design" activity. 
Widening of  Matra Cap Systemes' range, enabling it to consolidate its market position and 
re-launch an aggressive export policy. 
As regards the evolution of the Defence sector in France and in Europe, the Matra group 
companies seem to be waiting for government decisions to be taken. 
* Matra 1996. 
* Space Branch : 
Sharp increase in both turnover and orders, particularly in the civil telecommunications 
sector (which tends to reassure MMS directors). Continuation of institutional observation 
satellite programmes; good performance from the rocket launcher and human space flight 
activities, despite the failure of  Ariane S's qualification flight. 
MMS  is  European  leader  in  live  television  satellites.  Its  ability  to  provide  complete 
communication systems enabled it to  win several contracts, particularly in Asia and with 
the British Ministry of Defence. 
Upcoming participation of MMS in capital of Arianespace (which is about to increase its 
capital). 
Continuation  of  efforts  to  Improve  competitiveness  (especially  in  civil 
telecommunications where competition is fierce). 
103 Same comment from  directors for the past three years : "The position of Matra Marconi 
Space regarding its two main product lines- Earth Observation and Telecommunications 
- should enable it to  make the most of space market development in the years to come, 
characterised  by  the  rapid  growth  of  the  military  space  sector  and  space 
telecommunications". 
* Defence Branch : 
Marked growth in turnover, in particular due to a few export contracts. 
Important  year  for  the  Missile  sector,  with  the  BAe  alliance  forming  Matra  BAe 
Dynamics.  MBD  becomes  the  leading  European  missile  manufacturer,  and  the  third 
largest in the world ; a wide  range of products which will help it to  maintain,  or even 
improve its market share. 
General  context still  difficult.  MBD  also  has  a  stake  in Euromissile Dynamics  Group 
consortium. 
For  Matra  Cap  Systemes  (now  Matra  Systemes  et  Information),  the  year  was  more 
difficult,  given  its  dependence  on  defence  budgets  and  the  competitive  environment. 
Nonetheless, it continues to make technological progress, in order to stay in the running. 
* Matra 1997. 
* Space Branch : 
Stagnation of turnover deemed to  be  a result of the  current climate and  several  years 
growth. 
6 May 1997 agreement signed between Lagardere and Daimler-Benz, on bringing together 
all activities of Matra Marconi Space and DASA including satellites, rocket launchers and 
orbital  infrastructure  (this  would  rank  the  new company  second  in the  world  in  these 
areas). 
In civil telecommunications : signing in 1997 of a strategic partnership agreement with the 
American  company  Motorola,  to  supply  the  satellite  platforms  required  for  civil 
telecommunications. 
This  augurs  well  for  MMS,  promising  a  high  level  of activity  ;  the  supply  contract 
following  the  agreement is  not to  be  signed until  1998  and will  only  commence when 
project funding is completely finished. 
104 Continuation  of programmes  with  the  British  Ministry  of Defence  and  live  television 
satellites. 
"On  the  Earth  Observation  satellite  institutional  markets,  work  is  progressing  most 
satisfactorily  under  the  management of Matra  Marconi  Space".  Launch of multi-use 
products which have had a certain degree of success on the export market. 
Regarding  the  space  rocket  launcher  sector  :  success  of Ariane  5,  providing  good 
prospects for MMS ; delay in finishing the Ariane 4 project, implying that new orders will 
be placed with the French company. 
Continuation of  efforts made over the past few years to improve competitiveness. 
For the years to come, the directors ofMMS seem to think that the main profitable sectors 
will be the military space and space telecommunications sectors. 
* Defence Branch : 
Very strong upturn in turnover following the return of  several major export contracts. 
"The 1997 financial year was marked by the completion of three strategic stages, and by 
the high number of orders taken,  affecting almost all  the fields  in which the  branch is 
leader". 
"Firstly, 1997 was the first financial year of Matra BAe Dynamics, which confirmed the 
wisdom of merging the activities of BAe and Lagardere from the strategic, industrial and 
commercial points of view. This alliance illustrates the shared desire of Matra and British 
Aerospace to take first pla~e on the world tactical missile market". 
Lagardere takes back the defence activity of  the Compagnie des Signaux brought together 
in its  subsidiary,  CS  Defense.  The  activities  concerned cover the  naval,  territorial  and 
aeronautics sectors.  Thanks to  this  : Lagardere's reputation as  a naval weapons system 
manufacturer is strengthened, in that the range offered is now wider, and in that it is based 
on the combination of skills already possessed by Lagardere and acquired via the take-
over ofCSD.  =>New entity= Matra Defense Equipements & Systemes. 
Matra BAe Dynamics takes a 30% stake in LFK,  a subsidiary of DASA, specialising in 
missiles. 
MBD is now a European leader in air-to-ground missile activity. A new contract is signed 
with  the  British  Ministry  of Defence  (this  time  regarding  Storm  Shadow  missiles). 
Contracts obtained with Brunei and  South Korea, on short-range ground-to-air missiles, 
despite fierce competition (particularly from Thomson). Negotiation with the United Arab 
105 Emirates for  the  sale of air-to-air missiles.  Order from  the  French army to  equip their 
Mirage 2000-5 and Rafale Marine. 
Other contracts : with Australia for missiles, with Kuwait and Great Britain for equipping 
national marine forces. 
Matra  Systemes  et  Information  managed  to  achieve  its  objectives  despite  increased 
competition both in France and abroad.  Redeployment to  the  civil sector by using dual 
technology and to export via improved opening of  geographical zones. 
Final  comment from  Lagardere  group regarding defence activity  : "Whereas American 
companies  have  already  restructured,  the  first  significant consolidation  manoeuvres  in 
Europe  were  carried  out  by  the  Lagardere  group  with  the  creation  of Matra  BAe 
Dynamics and its stake in LFK. On the European stage, the Lagardere group is therefore 
in a leadership position and is a central player in the domain of  missiles". 
Activities of Matra Hautes Technologies 1998. 
The report provided firstly presents the year's consolidated accounts for the Lagardere group. 
The  second  part  presents  a  brief review  of the  accounts  of the  group's  major  branches, 
including Matra Hautes Technologies. 
* For Matra BAe Dynamics : 
Continuation of programmes underway. Regarding sales, the turnover achieved in France 
can be attributed to orders placed during the previous financial year ; in Great Britain it 
would seem that the British government can be thanked for turnover (see the year's major 
orders). In addition, the directors of Matra BAe seem to count on the British government 
to enable these programmes to continue. 
For 1999 : Rapprochement envisaged with Aerospatiale Missiles. 
* For Matra Marconi Space : 
Unfavourable economic context, but MMS still managed to expand its captive American 
market. 
Merger with space activities ofDASA and Finmeccanica. 
Similarly to the other two companies : presentation of company performance and that of 
its  programmes.  MMS  projects  for  1999  : participate  in  more  international  projects  ; 
106 invest in satellite service companies  ; "finalise  agreements between Lagardere I GEC I 
DASA I Finmeccanica". 
* For Matra Systemes et Information : 
1998 = First year spent within the Lagardere group ; company restructured. 
Desire to: 
continue penetration into the export market, 
expand its range in certain product sectors, 
strengthen its position in certain sectors, concentrate on the civil sector. 
In fact, the directors of the company hope to be able to present a "global range" (vast set of 
product ranges, with the aim of becoming indispensable to  the client), "in collaboration with 
the other companies of  the group". 
107 Data Relating to the Space and Defence Activities of the Group 
Matra - Hautes Technologies 
In million FF  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  1991 
Turnover 
Lagardere Group  65 903  56 401  52 579  53 018  53 981  55  102  53  112 
Defence  7 683  6 101  4 010  4 562  5 510  5 465  5 896 
Space  8 465  8 437  6 777  5 992  5 123  5 557  4 817 
Turnover% 
Lagardere Group  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Defence  11.7  10.8  7.6  9  10  10  11 
Space  12.8  15  12.9  11  9.5  10  9 
OperatinR results 
Defence  1 715  817  133  205  323  339  -
S_Q_ace  424  392  381  328  315  275  -
Net Results 
Defence  1 005  569  157  364  384  274  254 
Space  313  245  384  249  231  97  126 
Financial Investment 
Defence  - - - 8  10  88  -
Space  - - - 130  -2  8  -
Tangible and intangible 
Investment 
Defence  - - - 108  152  201  -
S_IJ_ace  - - - 246  97  58  -
108 Matra Hautes Technologies 
In million FF  1996  11997  11998  I  Variation 
Turnover  19 542  20 704  20 975  1.3 
Operating results  1 296  2 113  2 249  6.4 
Financial results  92  165  (29) 
Current results  1 388  2 278  2 220  -2.5 
Activity  results  before  1 169  2 218  2 636 
tax 
Operating Margin  6.6%  10.2%  10.7% 
Self  funding  gross  1 015  1 571  1 516 
margin 
IV. STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION MODELS INVOLVING 
A FRENCH COMPANY 
IV-1.  The co-operation models only concern activity-specific subsidiaries 
There has never been a merger, in the true sense, between European companies of different 
nationalities within the armaments industry. 
To date, only two scenarios have been recorded: 
The out and out take over of a company or one sector of activity of a company. This was 
the case particularly in those countries which had a small armaments industry after the fall 
of the Berlin wall.  At that time the companies of these countries gave up their defence 
activities.  This was the case of Philips in the Netherlands and FN Hertsal in Belgium. 
However,  it was rare  for  large  French German or  British companies  to  give  up  their 
defence  activities  with the  notable  exception of Siemens.  And  even here  it  should  be 
specified that in this case the companies that picked up the German and British branches 
of  Siemens (British Aerospace and Daimler-Benz Aerospace) were companies ofthe same 
nationality. 
None of these mutations can be described as mergers because the company that is taken over 
is purely and simply dissolved into the company that bought it. 
The setting up of  joint ventures when the two parent companies have common sectors of 
activity. 
109 These  companies are  interesting to  study because their very set-up  implies that neither the 
parent companies nor the countries upon which they depend, accept, in principle, to relinquish 
the activity in question or the control over the bi- or multi-national company that is set up. 
Three companies have been analysed thus far  : Matra-Marconi space, Matra-BAe Dynamics 
and Eurocopter. 
It should be noted that the new structure ofMatra-Marconi space since its merger with Alenia 
and Daimler-Benz Aerospace  has  not been studied.  Airbus  has  not  been studied  in  detail 
either, even though it is referred to particularly as regards its decision-making processes. 
Up until now, no major European armaments company has merged with another in a trans-
national context. Indeed, as  the very subject of this study, the matter could be summarised 
thus : in which context and under which conditions could a major trans-national merger take 
place between two European companies ? 
Until now the major European armaments companies have preferred to make parts of their 
sector of  activity into subsidiaries in order to set up joint ventures that are specific to a certain 
specialisation. 
The companies see several advantages to setting up these activity-specific joint ventures: 
They can offer a world-size supplier to  export clients.  Generally speaking by  grouping 
together the aim is to  occupy a leading position on an international level or to  be in a 
position to challenge the leadership of an American company. The three companies which 
have been studied specifically concern missiles, satellites and helicopters. The problem for 
Airbus is the same even though it is an economic interests group and it covers the domain 
of  civil aeronautics. 
They offer economies of scale by eliminating redundancy in management and technical 
teams.  Generally  speaking,  as  many  of the  staff as  possible  is  integrated,  whether  at 
management level, within the marketing teams or of the technical directors. This merger 
of  teams is however limited for two reasons : 
• There is no  legal structure covering these European companies. We are obliged to 
create legal entities that have overall responsibility for them, entities which do not necessarily 
have  their  headquarters  in the  country  where  the  actual  company  is  located.  In  this  way 
Matra/BAe Dynamics BV is a company covered by Dutch law. 
110 •  The  export  control  mechanisms,  problems  relating  to  confidentiality  of the 
technologies used and the absence of uniform European labour legislation make it necessary 
to create national entities that are subsidiaries of  the activity-specific joint ventures. 
This method of grouping means that there is no merger of capital as such. Indeed in this case 
the companies contribute their activity to the joint venture, this joint venture having a number 
of shareholders that is limited to the number of parent companies participating in it. Thus, as 
usually  only  two  companies  are  involved,  there  are  only  two  shareholders.  Therefore  the 
shareholding cannot be diluted and these companies are not listed on the stock exchange. At 
this level the setting up of a joint venture between four countries in the satellite field would be 
interesting to  study in that it would almost mechanically lead to  a dilution of the  financial 
rights of  each partner. 
In the sense that these activity-specific joint ventures group together companies that are liable 
to merge in the future, for example Matra and BAe in the missile sector, Matra and Dasa in 
the satellite sector and Dasa and Aerospatiale also in the missile sector, they could be seen as 
a mere stepping stone.  However, their operating systems should be  studied closely because 
they  constitute,  whatever  may  be  said,  the  current  model  that  represents  th'~  relationship 
between  State  and  industry  that  is  acceptable  for  all  governments.  In  addition,  if these 
companies  exist,  then  by  definition  it  is  because  they  fulfil  the  object[ves  of their 
shareholders, i.e. their parent companies. 
IV-2. Co-operation models are still inspired by sovereignty concerns 
Analysing  the  operating  systems  of activity-specific  joint  ventures  tends  to  prove  quite 
conclusively  that  sovereignty  imperatives  dictate  a  number  of the  rules  which  are  not 
necessarily found in joint ventures in the civil sectors. Two main rules have been identified. 
IV-2-a.  The tendency to equally divide shareholding and management 
Whether  looking  at  Matra!BAe  Dynamics,  Matra  Marconi  space  or  Eurocopter,  the 
shareholdings are relatively equally distributed. 
Ill It is  50/50 in Matra/BAe Dynamics and 51/49 in Matra Marconi space. The shareholding of 
Eurocopter is the least equal because in this company Aerospatiale holds 70% and Daimler-
Benz  Aerospace  30%.  However,  an  intermediary  structure  has  been  created  between 
Eurocopter and the  parent companies.  This  intermediary  structure  consists  of Aerospatiale 
which directly holds 25% of Eurocopter and of Eurocopter Holding of which Aerospatiale is 
only  60%  shareholder  while  Daimler-Benz  Aerospace  holds  the  remaining  40%.  This 
distribution makes it possible to  artificially increase the power of Daimler-Benz Aerospace 
with regard to the real value of  the financial rights of  this shareholder. 
Above all, it can be seen that the management of  the different companies is extremely evenly 
balanced. In each company the distribution of  positions is made equally between nationalities, 
whether  it  be  within  the  control  and  orientation  bodies,  the  Board  of Directors  or  the 
monitoring  committee,  or  within  the  directing  bodies  with  the  management teams  or the 
management  of  Eurocopter.  Even  the  British  demand  that  responsibilities  be  evenly 
distributed in this  way.  However,  at  Matra/BAe  Dynamics this principle has  a time  limit. 
Managerial  equality  has  been  established  for  six  years  only.  Furthermore,  at  British 
Aerospace  it  is  felt  that  this  rule  should  not  prevent  the  "best  man  for  the  job"  being 
appointed. 
At Eurocopter, despite the fact that the shareholding is not evenly shared between Daimler-
Benz Aerospace and Aerospatiale, Daimler-Benz Aerospace has the same number of people 
on the monitoring committee and in management as Aerospatiale. 
In the context of this even distribution, the companies can however make the most of their 
specific areas of expertise. Thus, British companies tend to  demand the position of Finance 
Director within the management structure (as is the case ofMatra BAe Dynamics) in order to 
watch over the financial interests of  their shareholders. 
When asked about the reasons behind the distribution of jobs, the companies
35  tend to claim 
that its is necessary to have a balanced representation for their client countries. At Matra BAe 
35  in the context of  this study, the following people were interviewed: 
Fabrice Bn!gier, Director ofMatra!BAe Dynamics 
Claire Hocquart, Strategy Director of Matra Marconi space 
Bill Giles, Chairman of  British Aerospace France 
Patrice Hummel, Deputy Finance Director of  Aerospatiale 
Gert Runde, the representative of Daimler-Benz Aerospace was not able to be  interviewed, the meeting having 
been postponed several times. 
112 Dynamics, particular point is made of the fact that without pre-specifying the distribution of 
tasks,  (making  British  managers  the  only  interface  with  British  companies  and  French 
managers the  only interface with French companies) in the  event this distribution fell  into 
place almost naturally for reasons of efficiency. The British have a better knowledge of the 
demands of  the British client and ditto for the French. 
Finally, the Chairman of Matra BAe Dynamics considers that the representatives of BAe in 
his  company  take  into  account,  almost naturally,  the  concerns  of the British government, 
particularly in terms of employment. Thus the dichotomy whereby the companies only take 
their  own  interests  into  account,  particularly  the  need  to  gain  value,  at  the  expense  of 
Government interests, is  not true in the United Kingdom.  So the behaviour of the British is 
not as different from that of  the French as one might think. 
It also  seems  that  the  models  of co-operation  with  the  Germans  are  more  difficult  to 
implement as  regards distributing responsibilities than those with the British.  This is partly 
due to the structure adopted, which calls for a Board of  Directors and a monitoring committee. 
This model indeed seems to institutionalise a phenomenon of counter-power, as the directors 
hold identical power. 
The British, for their part, accept the French system where there is only one boss, but seem, in 
general terms, to regret the fact that decisions are made according to a principally hierarchical 
model, when they feel that the system in British companies is more collegial. 
Which brings us to a field that could be described as  "the sociology of decision making" in 
companies where practices differ between countries. 
IV-2-b. Unanimous decision makine 
At  first  glance,  it  could  be  thought  that  this  practice  is  associated  with the  often  equal 
distribution of shareholding or with the fact that these joint ventures only have two blocks of 
shareholders. Indeed there are no small shareholders in these companies and it seems logical 
that the interests of  everyone be taken into account. 
In the event, the subjects that are held up  for  unanimous decision are  limited. Furthermore, 
from one joint venture to another the same general topics are to be found. These include : 
approval ofthe business plan (Matra BAe Dynamics, Eurocopter, Matra Marconi space) 
113 investments above a certain amount (Matra Marconi space) 
bids above a certain amount ( Matra Marconi space) 
major strategic outlines ( Eurocopter) 
strategic agreements with third parties ( Matra BAe Dynamics) 
closing of sites ( Matra Marconi space, Eurocopter) 
And it should be added that as regards the last matter, the French representative ofMatra!BAe 
Dynamics would not dream of being able to close a site in the United Kingdom without the 
agreement of  the British partners. 
Analysis reveals therefore, that the partners in these joint ventures have a truly joint power of 
decision regarding the management of these companies when the decisions are strategic and 
fall  within the  company's  three  spheres  of influence  ;  the  financial,  industrial  and  social 
spheres. 
This  need to  share  common objectives in these three  domains  leads the representatives of 
these companies to consider that : 
It is indispensable for the partners of a joint venture to have the same interests in mind. It is 
particularly important that their investment policy be in line with the policy that another joint 
venture could have. Thus certain people believe that joint ventures between Aerospatiale and 
Daimler-Benz Aerospace in missiles and satellites could not have worked anyway because the 
interests of the two players were different, Daimler-Benz Aerospace favouring satellites and 
Aerospatiale missiles. 
The policy regarding retaining industrial sites inhibits the integration of the company and the 
improvement  of its  productivity.  They  consider  nonetheless  that  this  is  specific  to  the 
industrial sector because civil companies generally disregard the employment interests of the 
country. This particularity being accepted, they consider that it is up to the shareholders and 
the governments to envisage restructuring policies that reconcile as far as possible the need to 
comply with the law of the countries (in this case maintaining high-level jobs and skills in 
each country) and the need to obtain the best possible industrial rationalisation. 
At this level this objective is envisaged with relative optimism in both the Franco-British joint 
ventures, the concrete result being esteemed disappointing in Eurocopter. In a certain way, the 
integration of  Eurocopter thus appears to be a relative failure, industrial rationalisation not yet 
having been possible. 
114 Finally,  it  should be  noted that the  decision-making  systems  in these  companies is  not as 
different as one might have thought from those in the economic interests group Airbus, with 
the difference that there are four partners in Airbus, none holds a majority of financial rights 
and there is even a small shareholder ; the Spanish company, CASA. 
IV-3.  The  reasons behind the  "intergovernmentality" of  decision making in 
joint ventures 
By "intergovernrnentality" we mean the fact that the three joint ventures studied only make 
major decisions with the  agreement of the shareholders of their parent company.  However, 
this "intergovernrnentality" of decision making can be attributed to several factors. Although 
two of these relate to the role of the State in the armaments industry, the third relates to  the 
nature of  these joint ventures. 
IV-3-a.  "intereovernmentality"  associated  with  the  nature  of the  parent 
companies 
Indeed,  it should be remembered that the joint ventures  that exist today in the  armaments 
-
industry merely consist of the joining by two companies of one of their spheres of activity. 
Several of  these companies' characteristics can be attributed to this fact. For example: 
firstly, the essential objective of  these companies is to create, in a given sector, a supplier 
on a world scale. The objective is therefore of a commercial rather than capitalist nature. 
Another expectation is that productivity will gradually and reasonably increase. 
a corollary of  the first characteristic, is that the strategy of  these companies is specified at 
parent-company level,  and the parent company has to  integrate into the context of this 
strategy  as  much as  possible.  The  Board  of Directors  is  therefore  faced  with  strategy 
delegations  from  both  parent  companies,  and  is  expected  to  produce  an  acceptable 
synthesis of  the two strategies. 
finally,  the  fact  that  decisions  taken  within  these  companies  are  "median"  decisions, 
resulting  from  compromises  acceptable  to  both  parent  companies.  However,  the 
limitations of  this exercise, in particular with regard to the operating principles of  Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance, must not be ignored. 
115 Firstly,  this  operating  system  seems  to  be  accepted  providing  the  commercial  advantages 
associated with combining forces  outweigh the disadvantages associated with the  operating 
system, which is not considered to  be the most effective according to the rules of corporate 
governance. 
Secondly, delegating strategy decisions to the joint ventures is not perceived as a problem for 
a company such as British Aerospace, providing the sector of activity of  the joint venture only 
represents  a small part of the  parent company's  activity, which is  the  case  at the  moment 
because  missiles  only  represent  10%  of BAe's  turnover  (non-consolidated  balance  sheet 
before merger with GEC).  In a word,  the  management and the  shareholders of the parent 
companies do  not wish to  become a holding company managing interests in joint ventures 
which would have the effect of distorting the coherence of the overall strategy. The eventual 
objective  is  indeed  to  achieve  single  leadership  of the  merged  companies  rather  than 
leadership  based on establishing  a consensus within the  administrative body, whether of a 
large merged company or of  various joint ventures in which it has shares. 
It can therefore be said that although "intergovemmentality" of decision making exists now, 
Anglo-Saxon directors would like to see it disappear in the future. 
IV-3-b.  "intereovernmentality" associated with the role ofthe State 
The lack of a single client at European level 
All the representatives of  joint ventures have emphasised the fact that having several countries 
as clients, and not a single European client, has forced them to take the all different desires of 
these clients into account. However, how this client-supplier relationship influences decision 
making in the companies has not been clarified, beyond the fact that it was preferable to have 
citizens of  the client country within the management structure. At this level the advantage lies 
in having an in-depth knowledge of  the client's practices and, quite simply, the ability to work 
in their mother tongue. 
In addition, these client countries, which in the case of the United Kingdom and France are 
used to purchasing from their national suppliers, have an enormous influence on the industrial 
116 and technological policy of their suppliers in a field where programs and purchases are rare 
and are investments which are spread out over many years. 
However, it could be thought that these States do not have or will no longer have an influence 
(as individual countries) over the strategy of private companies. As already noted, shrinking 
markets and diversification of  the number of  clients is leading larger companies to enter into a 
monopoly situation which guarantees their sustainability in the armaments sector. However, 
having  several  clients  leads  the  company,  when  it  has  a  commercial  choice  besides 
governments, to naturally favour the largest client. The risk is therefore to eventually see the 
smaller clients have the type of equipment that the largest client would have chosen imposed 
on them. 
Having  arrived  at  this  stage,  it  is  understandable  that  today  the  setting  up  of integrated 
European armaments companies with private capital is  not a major risk if we consider that 
these  armaments companies will  be  solid and  competitive enough to  supply the European 
States.  However,  the  competition has  begun to  see  who  will  determine  the  standard  for 
European  armaments  which depends  on  how they are  meant to  be  used,  which in  turn is 
determined by both foreign policy and security policy. 
The preservation of State interests does not therefore seem to  be about the companies, but 
about the ability of the governments to  influence the determination of common foreign and 
security policy, or, if  this proves impossible, to maintain defence budgets at a sufficiently high 
level in relation to  other European clients so  as to  maintain control over the industrial and 
technological policy of  the supplier. 
"intergovernmentality" associated with employment 
All  the  company representatives  interviewed emphasised that  maintaining high-technology 
jobs in the armaments sector (the same is the case for the civil aeronautics sector) constitutes 
a major  influence of the  State over the  companies.  However,  this  influence  has  a slightly 
negative  effect because it slows  down  the  progress  of productivity of the  armament joint 
ventures. In addition, the primordial element is  whether or not to  maintain design agencies 
and skills  strictly  at  a national  level,  a question which  is  partly  associated  with  solutions 
which  will  be  found  in  the  6-member  working  group  on  the  security  of procurement  as 
covered in the letter of  intent of  6 July 1998. 
117 All  in  all,  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  impact  of the  effects  of "intergovemmentality" 
associated  with  maintaining  employment  levels.  The  answer  to  this  question  varies  in 
accordance with three rules. 
The first rule dictates that the more funding a country dedicates to its defence, the more it will 
be able to influence the employment policy of  the company. 
The second rule is that the discussion and negotiation phase of setting up the companies is 
where  the  States  will have  the  most  power  to  influence  the  employment policy  of trans-
national  companies.  In particular,  a clause  will  no  doubt ensure,  as  in activity-based joint 
ventures or as in Airbus, that in trans-national companies, the State can oppose the closure of 
sites  via the  representative  on  the  Board  of Directors  who  would  represent  the  national 
subsidiaries. However, if it turned out that this principle was too much of a handicap to the 
operation of the companies, in particular their financial operation, it could cause withdrawal 
of  investment, particularly ifthe shareholding is diluted. 
Finally,  the  third  parameter,  it  is  certain that as  this  grouping  together of the  armaments 
industry continues, the less competition there will be, reducing the governments' ability to put 
pressure on the companies. 
IV-3-c. The conditions for smooth operation of  these co-operation models 
These  joint ventures  are  globally  based  on  an  intergovernmental  operating  system,  even 
though the management, technical and even sales teams are integrated. However, it can be 
seen upon examination that in reality this equality in management and decision making relies 
on two conditions : 
1)  that the companies share common interests in the  operation of the  company.  The 
notion of common interests  is  not in itself reliant on an equal distribution of the 
shareholding, but a shared expectation as  regards return on investment. In a word, 
the parent companies must have the same interests to invest in the company. 
2)  the  contributions of each company to  the  joint venture  must be  on a  par.  They 
include: 
technological skills 
size of  national clientele 
export contracts 
118 However,  although  these  contributions  must  be  similar,  they  do  not  need  to  be  strictly 
identical. A sort of "bonus" for the partner that contributes the least exists for two reasons : 
1)  In the armaments industry restructuring movement, the race to increase the overall 
size  of the  company,  and  to  capture  new  markets,  particularly  in  Europe,  is  of 
fundamental  importance.  Therefore it is  the  largest companies that in the  end are 
looking for alliances. This explains why BAe paid a lot of money for GEC Marconi. 
And  it  also  explains  why  an  alliance  between  BAe  and  Dasa  was  difficult  to 
achieve,  but  does  explain  why  this  alliance,  despite  all  the  difficulties  the  two 
companies experienced in coming to an agreement, would be fundamentally more 
strategic than the  alliance between BAe and  GEC.  An alliance between BAe and 
Dasa would  indeed have  enabled  them  to  increase  the  number  of contracts  and 
create  the  largest  European  group  whose  operating  systems  would  have  been 
difficult to dispute by the other partners who would have liked to join the alliance. 
2)  The  principle  of State  sovereignty  and  the  globally  recognised  need  to  create 
Europe,  requires that the  company  of a new State entering into  a trans-European 
alliance must be  accorded a place that is  proportionally greater than that which it 
might  otherwise  have  been  given,  with  regard  to  its  contributions  vis  a vis 
technology and national and export contracts. For Germany, this is increased due to 
the  fact  that  this  country  is  the  strongest  European  economic  power.  Naturally, 
political  personnel  such  as  German  company  directors  tend  to  consider that this 
status of strongest European power gives them the right to  demand what could be 
termed  a  sort  of  "corrective  coefficient"  with  regard  to  the  technological 
contributions, the size of the German market and the German armaments industry's 
export opportunities. They also subscribe to the dynamic perspective that followed 
the  fall  of the  Berlin wall  and  which will  unavoidably  see  this  country  become 
increasingly louder in its international expression. 
In conclusion, it could be said that for the moment, the co-operation models are inspired by a 
perfect  mix,  where  it  is  uncertain  whether  the  principles  of sovereignty  will  temper  the 
economic  principles,  or  whether  the  economic  principles  will  temper  the  principles  of 
sovereignty. 
119 IV-4. Industrial co-operation models 
IV-4-a. Institutional environment of  industrial co-operation in the armaments 
sector 
Armaments  co-operation  programs  constitute  the  oldest  form  of co-operation  between 
European industrial companies in the  field of armaments.  This co-operation met with great 
industrial  and  commercial  success  in the  1960s  and  70s,  for  instance the  Franco-German 
tactical  transport  aircraft,  Transall,  the  Franco-German  missile  family  of the  Euromissile 
economic interests group, and the combat aircraft, Tornado, which brought together Germany, 
Italy and Great Britain within the consortium, Panavia. 
However,  this form  of co-operation has  always been subject to  criticism due to  two  major 
shortcomings : 
These  co-operation  programmes  were  initiated  at  State  level  and,  in  exchange  for  their 
participation, the governments required that their industries receive a workload in proportion 
to the State's financial contribution. It is now widely accepted that this law of "fair return" was 
detrimental to the European industrial fabric. Indeed, the States and their companies tended to 
request  that  the  work  be  shared  in  such  a  way  that  rather  than  distribute  the  tasks  in 
accordance with the recognised industrial skills of the participants, the work be distributed 
with a view to creating skills where they were lacking. This resulted in the development of 
useless over-capacity and competition, a phenomenon that only became clear with the cuts in 
European  defence  budgets  and  massive  downsizing  that  occurred  in  the  early  1990s.  In 
addition, this policy also  increased the risks of technological problems on the programmes, 
causing both delays and excess  costs.  One of the  oft-cited examples is  the electrical flight 
control software for Eurofighter, assigned to  the Germans.  Regarding the  same Eurofighter, 
even the British, staunch supporters of  this plane, smile when they talk about the manufacture 
of the left wing in Great Britain and the right wing in Spain. Of course these incidents are not 
limited to this particular programme. 
Despite  all  these  set backs,  armaments-related  co-operation has  always  been considered a 
lesser  evil  in  Europe.  The  excess  costs  associated  with  inefficient  management  of these 
120 programmes are compensated for  by the widening of series and increased export capacity of 
these programmes thanks to a European label and no unnecessary competition. 
The States, which initiate this co-operation, have tried to remedy its shortcomings. The bulk 
of the discussions were held within European institutional bodies responsible for co-operation 
in the armaments sector. Work was carried out within the WEAU for  several years without 
any decisive conclusions being reached. The European armaments agency provided for in the 
WEU declaration appended to  the Maastricht treaty never materialised.  However, upon the 
initiative of France and Germany, who  wished to  set up a structure to encompass their co-
operation  programmes,  a  joint  armaments  co-operation  organisation,  the  Organsiation 
conjointe de cooperation en matiere d'armament (OCCAR) was created in 1996. 
After much  coming  and going,  the  United  Kingdom and Italy,  the  two  other countries  in 
Europe  with  a  major  armaments  industry  and  that  participate  in  many  co-operation 
programmes, joined the  OCCAR.  Initially it was hoped that the  other European countries 
would adhere to the OCCAR via a sort of agglutination phenomenon, creating a European 
Armaments Agency. The diverging interests between those countries that had an armaments 
industry  and  those  that  did  not  prevented  this  from  happening,  and  it  therefore  became 
necessary to establish a specific treaty to give the OCCAR a legal status, which was done on 
9 September 1998. 
Indeed,  to rectify the economic  and industrial inefficiency  of armaments  co-operation,  the 
OCCAR's main principle was to become the place where co-operation programmes would be 
managed, implying that this organisation could sign contracts with companies on behalf of  the 
countries  participating  in  co-operation  programmes.  This  integration of programmes  was 
accompanied by another rule aimed at remedying the errors of former co-operation activities, 
consisting in applying the principle of  fair return on a multi-year and multi-programme basis. 
An initial analysis reveals, nonetheless, that almost eight years after the signing of the Treaty 
of  Maastricht, the European Armaments Agency still does not exist, and that two years passed 
between the announcement that the OCCAR had been created and its actual consolidation via 
a treaty, and that one year down the line, this treaty has still not been submitted for ratification 
approval  to  the  French parliament.  The  OCCAR definitely  exists,  it  manages  certain  co-
121 operation  programmes,  but  it  still  has  no  specific  instrument at  its  disposal  to  be  able  to 
remedy the shortcomings of  programme-based co-operation. 
In conclusion, and despite all the initiatives which have been taken since the beginning of the 
1990s, it can be concluded that progress in this field has  been minimal or even non-existent 
since the beginning of  the decade. 
IV-4-b. Frequent breakdown of  co-operation in the armaments field 
In  counting  the  total  number of co-operation programmes  that  have  been brought to  life 
during the 1990s, it is clear that their number is not diminishing. On the contrary, given a drop 
in the total number of programmes initiated by France, it can be seen that almost all  major 
programmes are the result of co-operative ventures. Armaments co-operation could therefore 
be assumed to be going well if we left it at that, and did not make a qualitative analysis of  the 
status of  these programmes. 
HELlOS II: 
Definition : optical observation satellite. 
Co-operation : Franco-German co-operative venture set up at the summit of Baden-Baden in 
December 1995, confirmed at the Summits ofNuremberg in December 1996 and P_oitiers in 
June 1997. Spain has expressed a wish to participate. 
Programme  status  in  1999  :  France  is  financing  the  programme  alone.  The  industrial 
structure has been designed to  retain German industry's stake if they provide funding.  The 
failure  to  fund  Helios  II  was  one  of the  reasons  the  satellite  branches  of DASA  and 
Aerospatiale did not combine in 1996. 
122 SYRACUSE III OR TRIMILSATCOM : 
Definition : military communications satellite 
Co-operation : France/Germany/Great Britain 
Programme status: two consortiums led by two project managers, Alcatel Espace and Matra 
Marconi Space were in competition with each other.  The UK decided to withdraw in 1998 
from a programme that was not meeting its operational requirements. Matra Marconi Space 
decided to  make  an offer to  the British government on the basis of a PPP  (private public 
partnership) and is campaigning for the other governments to do the same. 
TIGER HELICOPTER : 
Definition : protection support combat helicopter (France) and anti-tank combat helicopter 
(Germany and France) 
Co-operation : France/Germany. The agreement protocol for launching this programme was 
signed  on  29  May  1984.  Its  development  contract  dates  from  13  November  1987.  The 
industrialisation contracts were signed on 20 June 1997. The frrst joint order for  160 aircraft 
was not placed until two years later, again at the Bourget exhibition in June 1999. 
Programme status : 
There are two  major reasons why this programme has been so  difficult to  get off the 
ground: 
1)  budget difficulties in both countries 
2)  Difficulties in reaching agreement over the  operational specifications of the  helicopter. 
The tasks assigned to the French and German versions are not the same, and the anti-tank 
and anti-aircraft weapons also differ (Hot and Trigat, Mistral and Stinger). 
Although  it is  an  advantage  to  have  a joint Franco-German  company  (Eurocopter)  as  the 
project manager,  there  is  a  strict division  of tasks  between the  two  countries  which  was 
established in a Memorandum of  Understanding before the creation ofEurocopter. 
123 NH 90 HELICOPTER : 
Definition : tactical transport helicopter 
Co-operation: France/Germany/Italy/Netherlands. France : 41.6%, Italy : 28.2%, Germany: 
23.7%, Netherlands : 6.5%.  The memorandum for the design and development dates  from 
25/6/1991. The development contract dates from 1 September 1992. 
Programme status : The programme has experienced many ups and downs associated with 
State funding problems. In 1990, Italy announced that it could not finance all its development 
activities. It was the company Eurocopter that picked up the tab, but orders from the French 
army  will not cover the  funding  and workload requirements.  This part of the  MOU must 
therefore be revised. The Dutch company which was project managing for the Netherlands, 
Fokker, was taken over by DASA, and then went into liquidation. Finally, France has the least 
urgent need for this helicopter and is  delaying orders for the NH90 while trying to reduce 
costs. 
HORIZON FRIGATE : 
Definition: Anti-aircraft Frigate 
Co-operation: France/United Kingdom/Italy. The MOU of 1993 created a joint project office 
(JPO). The JPO runs the technical, contractual and financial aspects of the programme, and 
reports  to  a  tripartite  management  committee.  DCN  international,  GEC  (which  became 
BAe/GEC) and Finmeccanica!Fincantieri are the three Project Managers. 
Programme status : It became clear very rapidly that these three countries had very different 
requirements concerning this frigate. To rationalise the running of the programme, the British 
wanted to  make BAe/GEC sole project manager.  France refused and the British withdrew 
from the programme on 27  April  1999. At the moment, France and Italy are  studying the 
possibility of  continuing the programme alone. 
FAMILY OF FUTURE GROUND-TO-AIR SYSTEMS : 
Definition : air, territorial and naval ground-to-air defence missile systems 
Co-operation : France/Italy  50/50.  The programme  is  managed by the  economic interests 
group, Eurosam made up of equal parts of  Thomson!CSF, Aerospatiale and Alenia/Difesa. 
124 Programme status : this programme is progressing satisfactorily. 
PRINCIPAL ANTI-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM (P  AAMS): 
7 
Definition : system of anti-air missiles intended to equip the Horizon frigate and member of 
the future ground-to-air systems family. 
Co-operation : the PAAMS MOU was signed on 21  March 1993. The company managing 
the project, Europaams, is made up of Eurosam (France/Italy) and UKAMS. In reality, the 
take-over of  UKAMS by Matra BAeDynamics and the Aerospatiale Matra merger meant that 
all  European  missile  manufacturers  were  integrated  into  Europaams.  Europaams  is  66 % 
owned by Eurosam the remaining 33% is held by UKAMS which is 100% owned by Matra 
BAe  Dynamics,  itself a  50%  subsidiary  of Aerospatiale  Matra.  Thus,  it  can be  said that 
everybody's interests come together in this structure. This programme was not harmed by the 
British withdrawal from the Horizon frigate. 
THIRD GENERATION, LONG-RANGE GUIDED ANTI-TANK MISSILE: 
Definition :  a system of  long-range anti-tank weapons intended to equip combat helicopters. 
Co-operation : France 36%, Germany 36%, United Kingdom 28%. The Economic Interests 
Group, Euromissile Dynamics group (EMDG) is project manager. 
Programme status : In 1995 the United Kingdom decided to purchase Apache helicopters 
and withdrew from the programme. The Germans, who wish to  make use of the  anti-tank 
version as soon as possible, will have a version equipped with Hot missiles initially. The five-
year gap between the French and German anti-tank versions of the Tigre is hampering the 
programme. 
THIRD GENERATION, MEDIUM-RANGE GUIDED ANTI-TANK MISSILE : 
Definition : Medium-range anti-tank system. 
Co-operation  : France,  Germany,  United  Kingdom  30%  each,  Netherlands,  Belgium  5% 
each.  Project  manager  is  EMDG  which  consists  of Matra  BAeDynamics,  Aerospatiale 
(missile branch being merged into MBD), and LFK (Germany). 
Programme status : After much procrastination, the British Government wanted the United 
Kingdom  to  continue  its  involvement  in  Trigat-MP.  This  decision  was  made  by  the 
125 politicians. As the UK was the programme's largest client,  its withdrawal would have been 
extremely harmful. 
IMPROVED ROLAND : 
Definition : ground-to-air missiles 
Co-operation  :  the  first  Roland  air  defence  systems  developed  via  Franco-German  co-
operation appeared in 1972. This co-operative venture is run by the economic interests group, 
Euromissile (Aerospatiale/LFK). 
Programme status : Germany withdrew from the improved Roland programme in 1993 
TORPEDO MU-90 : 
Definition : Submarine torpedo. 
Co-operation: France 50%, Italy 50% (24% Thomson-Marconi sonar and 26% DCN), 50% 
Alenia Difesa. 
Programme status: industrialisation underway. 
COBRA ARTILLERY RADAR: 
Definition : artillery radar 
Co-operation : 40% Germany, 40% France, 20% United Kingdom. A company governed by 
German law, Euro-Art was set up to manage the programme covering Racal (UK), Lockheed-
Martin (USA), DASA (RF A), Thomson-CSF (FR). 
Programme status : the programme has just been integrated into the OCCAR. 
BREVEL 0BSERV  ATION DRONE : 
Definition : battlefield observation drone. 
Co-operation  : Franco-German  within  Eurodrone,  economic  interests  group  made  up  of 
Matra-BAe Dynamics and STN Atlas. 
Programme status : In both France and Germany the programme is no longer a priority and 
has ground to a halt. 
126 In  conclusion,  of these  thirteen  programmes,  four  have  had  one  of their  main  partners 
withdraw,  causing one to  shut down,  two to  continue on a national  basis and the last,  the 
Horizon frigate, to be reviewed. 
A fifth programme, the Brevel one,  is operating at such a slow pace it seems almost non-
existent. 
The two anti-tank programs are  still not in the clear. The two helicopter programmes have 
been delayed considerably and the participants' attitudes have altered since the outset. 
The last four programmes are progressing satisfactorily for the moment. 
Thus the assessment is hardly favourable, giving rise to the question of why there have been 
too many breakdowns and major ups and downs in the course of  these programmes. 
IV-4-c. Analysis ofthe breakdown in armaments co-operation. 
These breakdowns seem to be caused by several factors : 
A)  The adverse effect of  too much state influence in armament co-operative ventures. 
Since the early 1960s, all armaments co-operation has been based on the principle that each 
State  should  be  assigned  a  workload proportional  to  the  percentage  it contributes  to  the 
programme funding.  This means that from the outset, each State must specify not only the 
amount of money it wishes to dedicate to the research and development of the programme, 
but also the quantity of equipment it plans on ordering. Obviously the greater this proportion 
is, the higher the workload. The industrial structure that will shape the programme throughout 
its life time will depend considerably on this initial distribution. 
However, the most important phenomenon that affected defence budgets in the  1990s will 
have been their reduction,  furthermore  a  reduction that often occurred outside the  budget 
framework initially established. France, Germany, Italy and Spain in particular suffered from 
these military budget cuts in the middle of the financial year, which acutely affected the co-
operation programmes. 
127 As  regards  France  and  Germany,  it  can  be  said  that their  co-operation programmes  were 
strongly affected by these budgetary factors. They are responsible for the indefinite shut-down 
of the Helios II programme. They are also one of the reasons behind the many knocks that so 
severely affected the NH90 and Tigre helicopter programmes. 
In addition, the structure of  these programmes is arranged such that financing problems at the 
top  mean  a  complete  restructuring  of the  industrial  distribution  cannot  be  avoided,  often 
demanding long negotiations. 
Finally,  a  general  mistrust  developed  among  the  partners,  who  accused  each  other  of 
increasing their planned orders when signing the  MOU,  so  as  to  acquire  an advantageous 
proportion of  the work. 
The fact that these programmes were called into question throughout the 1990s is certainly 
due  to  budgetary difficulties.  However, the very design of these  co-operative ventures  laid 
them open to this potential risk. 
B)  The lack of agreement between European military leaders on operational specifications for 
equipment. 
It is evident that very often disagreement over operational design was at the bottom of the 
difficulties  encountered  in  armaments  co-operation.  It  is  not  simple  to  analyse  these 
difficulties, because their causes are multiple and it is hard to give one more importance over 
another.  In enumerating the causes of these breakdowns, and without trying to quantify the 
responsibility of  each, the following can be found : 
1)  Disparate concepts of  operational functions at a European level, 
2)  Lack of  co-ordinated equipment renewal deadlines, 
3)  Lack of  desire to develop common "basic" specifications for equipment, 
4)  Procurement procedures  disparate,  reinforcing  divergence  on  operational  specifications 
rather than eliminating it. 
At this level, obviously it is unfortunate that the political decisions were not followed up on 
the  initiative  of these  programmes.  A  few  of these  programmes  escheated  because  the 
government was not able to provide the necessary impetus to revive them. Often, differences 
regarding operational specifications could have been overcome if the  government had been 
more firm in asking the military leaders to reach an agreement. 
128 The enormous differences in procurement methods in each country (in France in particular, 
the General Armaments Directorate is used to  specifying and qualifying its weapons systems 
down to the smallest detail) in themselves are not conducive to  finding common ground, let 
alone when there are such divergent points of view. 
C)  Extremely Unwieldy Co-operation Structures. 
Armaments co-operation also  suffers from  extremely unwieldy operating structures.  In the 
extreme cases, everything is doubled-up in bilateral co-operative ventures, from the body that 
directs the programme and buys the equipment to the industrial project manager. 
The  example  of the  Horizon  frigate  also  shows  that  there  is  no  point  in  setting  up  an 
integrated programme management structure if it merely  consists of people with different 
points of  view but no means to settle disputes. 
The  lack of a single  industrial  project manager is  also  a major  disadvantage because the 
rivalries liable to develop throughout the life time of  the project are institutionalised. 
The creation of economic interests groups made up of the different companies involved in a 
programme is insufficient to mitigate this problem. Without any decision making power, the 
economic interests groups are not companies in themselves, and their directors are obliged to 
refer to the parent companies if disputes arise. This wastes time, admitting that these disputes 
can be resolved. 
The lack of  true integration, both at state and industry level, generally tends to exacerbate the 
difficulties  because  disputes  become  conflicts  of power  between  states  or  economic 
competition between companies. In negotiations, the side that seems to have given in to the 
other will be considered to be a loser even if  the programme is saved. 
These difficulties associated with the unwieldy and poorly-adapted armaments co-operation 
structures are an extremely important factor in determining the landscape of armaments co-
operation. 
129 In particular, we can predict that the OCCAR will not be  able to  fulfil its supposed role if it 
functions  from  the  outset  as  an  inter-state  organisation  and  not  an  integrated  European 
organisation. 
In particular, it would appear necessary, before beginning to  launch any programme via  the 
OCCAR, to ensure that the military leaders have developed joint operational specifications for 
the programmes to be implemented, or at least that the OCCAR is only managing the parts of 
these programmes where agreement has been reached. 
It would  also  appear to  be  necessary  that the  OCCAR member countries harmonise  their 
procurement and programme operating procedures beforehand, or risk encountering the same 
problems, that the joint operating rules of  this organisation will not be able to resolve. 
IV-4-d. Remedvin[t breakdowns in armaments co-operation. 
Over recent times, it has been observed that a certain amount of almost identical equipment 
has or is about to come into service in several European armies without this equipment having 
been the subject of  a formal armaments co-operative venture. 
The major example is the "Storm-Shadow/Scalp" stand-off missile of  Matra BAe Dynamics. 
Initially, this missile was developed for the French Air Force, which wanted a missile that 
<:ould be launched from a safe distance equipped with anti-runway sub-munitions. From the 
Apache missile developed by Matra-Defense, the French company undertook design studies 
on behalf of  the DGA to make it into a veritable cruise missile, the "Scalp". 
It was at this time that Matra-Defense was to combine its missile sector with BAe to give birth 
to Matra BAe Dynamics. The new company immediately won the British tender for a stand-
off missile by offering a new version of  the Scalp, the "Storm-Shadow". 
As the order was so large, costs were reduced and Matra BAe Dynamics was able to make an 
offer  to  the  DGA  to  reduce  the  cost  of the  Scalp  by  following  the  Storm-shadow 
specifications. It is the same sort of missile that, in 1999, has just been adopted by the Italian 
Airforce, theoretically giving rise to a co-operative venture, the capital distribution of  which is 
not yet formalised, with Alenia Difesa. 
130 It can therefore be seen that in these cases it has been the companies that have initiated a form 
of co-operation in the armaments sector. The equipment delivered to  the three armed forces 
will not be completely identical, but three countries will have shared joint development costs, 
paying only for their own specific developments themselves. As for the industrial distribution 
problem,  it  is  solved  within  the  company  itself,  thus  avoiding  all  power  struggles  and 
competition disputes between companies,  even if,  as  seen above,  a certain form  of "inter-
statism" reigns within these companies regarding industrial property and employment issues. 
It is likely that this is the form of co-operation that could exist in the air-to-air missile field if 
the Meteor is chosen by the British in the BVRAAM tender. 
It  can therefore  be  said that in these  examples the  companies have overcome state-related 
obstacles to armaments co-operation by getting the different countries to choose identical or at 
least largely identical equipment both in terms of design and choice of  technology. Therefore, 
there is no longer any need for an inter-state structure to manage the programme, nor for an ad 
hoc  industrial  structure,  as  the  cross-border  companies  already  possess  the  necessary 
framework for conflict resolution. 
Of course, the sine qua non condition for such a form of armaments co-operation to exist is 
the existence of  a pan-European company. 
Although cross-border companies make it possible to  overcome difficulties associated "Yith 
the  structure  of armaments  co-operative  ventures,  the  development  of programmes  in  a 
public/private founding (PPF) or in a private founding initiative (PFI) could help to overcome 
difficulties associated with the lack of  agreement over operational specifications. 
If  this were the case, the industrial companies would take the initiative of  developing a system 
or providing a service which would not be bought by the states, but merely rented by them. 
Initially, the PFI was mainly confined to the service domain. At the beginning, certain states 
wanted to  outsource functions not essential to their sovereignty, and which they considered 
would be better fulfilled by private initiative than public administration. The United Kingdom 
in particular encouraged this phenomenon, asking the private sector to provide helicopter pilot 
training for the ministry of  defence. 
Initially limited to environmental and logistics functions associated with the armed forces, the 
PFI mechanism is perhaps  suitable to  be  extended to  military  systems themselves,  on the 
131 condition that these  systems  meet  a wide  enough  common need  or that they  have  a civil 
purpose. 
At the current time, Matra Marconi Space is proposing the PFI mechanism for developing the 
military telecommunications satellite, Trimilsatcom ; the armaments co-operative venture that 
was intended for its construction broke down. 
The principle of the PFI would be the construction of a civil and military satellite, which the 
states  would  pay  to  use,  with  differing  priority  of access.  Basic  specifications  would  be 
established, but each state would be able to  ask for particular services or specifications that 
they would pay to have developed. 
It is  still too  soon to  say how the  PFis may develop.  For the moment, they are  limited to 
service  contracts  and no  examples yet  exist of real  armaments programmes  initiated by  a 
company which several states would pay to use. It is a future opportunity that should not be 
neglected, but it is by no means certain that all the states would make use of it in the same 
way,  particularly since  it  is  part of a philosophy aiming at  reducing the perimeter of state 
intervention. 
132 CHAPTER 4 :Italy 
I. THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN ITALY 
Since the end of the  cold war,  European defence industries have been brought face  to  face 
with some major difficulties, forcing them to take drastic restructuring measures. In Italy, the 
situation  for  armaments  companies  has  been  aggravated  by  certain  particularities  of the 
country36  :  a political system in the  midst of transformation, causing,  among other things, 
intense focus  on internal politics ; general lack of interest among politicians for armaments 
issues  ; the  lack  of a  "real"  industrial  defence  policy  ; extremely unwieldy  and  complex 
acquisition procedures ; a lack of co-ordination between the defence industry and the armed 
forces ; a restricted and unbalanced defence budget ; and very restrictive export regulations. 
It is true that the Italian industry has succeeded, despite its structural handicaps, in developing 
(and in maintaining) some cutting-edge technology. In the aeronautics sector in particular, this 
success is due, above all, to a long tradition of  participation in international programs : via the 
production  under  licence  of Anglo-Saxon  systems  (F86K,  F/TF-104),  the  Italian  industry 
gradually  acquired  sufficient  technological  capacity  to  lead  (small)  programmes  on  an 
international scale (G-91), and then bi-lateral programmes (Italian-Brazilian collaboration in 
the  AMX programme),  and  finally  participation in  the two  European  combat aircraft,  the 
Tornado  and  Eurofighter.
37  But  the  country's  industrial  foundation  has  never  been 
independent and,  in several fields,  Italian companies are  found lacking in comparison with 
their international competitors. These weaknesses are due on the one hand to the low level of 
funding  dedicated to  R&D  by the  State and  the  companies,  and  on the other, to  the  long-
standing fragmentation of  the sector. 
Over  the  past  few  years,  Italian  industry  has,  however,  entered  a  maJor  restructuring, 
consolidation and rationalisation phase. Between 1989 and 1994 this led to the suppression of 
20,000 jobs. In 1995, the  defence  industry employed  100,000 people, two  thirds of which 
36  For the continuation see Maurizio Cremasco, "The Italian Defence Industry : Issues and Prospects", ESAN-
Projekt  "Arms  Production  and  Cooperation",  Paper No.  11,  SWP  Ebenhausen,  1997.  Reinhilde  Weidacher, 
"Italy's Role within the European Defence Market", FOA, Find-Programme, Stockholm, 1998. 
37  More than half of Italy's  military programmes are  run in  co-operation.  The national director of armaments 
currently manages more than 70 international co-operation projects. In the eleven largest programmes, France is 
the main partner of the Italians (73% of collaboration programmes), ahead of Germany (55%) and the United 
133 directly.  25,000 people were  employed by the  State's arsenals (which only produced 5% of 
armaments requirements). The armaments sector overall thus represented 0.7% of industrial 
employment as against 5.8% in 1983. 
Italian industry is  traditionally dominated by public  groups.  There  are  barely half a dozen 
large private companies. The rest of industry consists of multiple SMEs, networked around 
the territorial armaments and defence electronics sectors. 
The private sector essentially centres around the giant, Fiat. From its birth, at the beginning of 
the  twentieth century,  Fiat has  invested  in the  armaments  sector.  However,  their military 
sector now represents less than 3.8% of  the total turnover. The group's defence activities are 
represented by Fiat Avio  and  Iveco  Military Vehicles  Division (IMVD).  Since it acquired 
Alfa Romeo A  vio in 1996, Fiat A  vio is the only Italian manufacturer of aircraft engines which 
participates, among other things, in the design and manufacture of  the EF 2000 engine. Happy 
with the role of sub-contractor, the Agnelli family does not consider it necessary for Fiat to 
enter into  any  groups  with European  or American partners.  However,  IMVD  has  made  a 
commitment with Finmeccanica, to development projects for tactical and logistical vehicles. 
Another player in the private sphere is Aermacchi, 75% owned by the Foresion family, via the 
holding  company  Aeronautica  Macchi  Holc!ing  Group.  Since  SIAI-Marchetti  was  bought 
from  Alenia in  1997,  Aermacchi holds  a monopoly  in  Italy in the  manufacturing of light 
training and attack aircraft. The company is also an important sub-contractor and supplier for 
many  European  aeronautics  companies.  Other  private  players  are  Elettronica,  a  defence 
electronics  company,  53%  owned  by  the  Fratalocchi  family,  and  Beretta,  well-renowned 
producer  of small  weapons  and  Intermarine,  a  company  of the  Ferruzzi  group  which 
constructs small surface ships. 
The  State  holding  company,  IRI  (Istituto  per  la  Ricostruzione  Industriale)  is  the  main 
entrepreneur  of the  armaments  sector  in  Italy.  IRI  was  created  in  1933  to  deal  with  the 
consequences  of  the  1929  crisis.  Its  creation  was  not  directly  associated  with  any 
interventionist  desires  of fascist  ideology,  but rather with  a  reorganisation of the  banking 
system, intended to do away with the German model of mixed banking, to enable the banks to 
Kingdom (27%). British dominance can be noted in the aeronautics sector, off-set by a tradition of  collaboration 
134 withdraw from  their industrial  commitments.  In  193 7,  the  IRI  changed status,  becoming a 
standing institute. In the absence of private investors,  it could not give up  its shares in the 
public  companies.  Renewed  in the  1950s and  60s  in  the  context of the programmazionne 
(such as the ENI), the IRI  became a virtual framework,  leaving the public companies under 
the holding company considerable autonomy in developing their own strategies. In 1991, the 
IRI  was  shareholder in  a thousand companies,  and directly controlled 380 of these in very 
different  fields  (steelworks,  banks,  communication,  naval  construction,  aeronautics  and 
defence).  The  defence  activities  of the  IRI  were  divided  into  two  sub-holding companies, 
Fincantieri and Finmeccanica.
38 
Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani S.p.A is the largest Italian manufacturer of commercial and 
military ships. The current company was firstly founded in 1959 as a holding company for the 
naval  construction  sector  within  the  IRI  group.  Then,  in 1984,  it  was  converted  into  an 
operational company under its current name, directing two distinct divisions, one dedicated to 
the  design and manufacture of commercial  ships  and the  other to  the  manufacture of war 
ships, destined for the Italian marine forces and export.  A third division, specialising in the 
design and manufacture of diesel engines was recently transformed into a separate company 
of the  group.  Fincantieri  belongs  to  the  State  but  operates  as  a  commercial  enterprise  : 
although it is  a public company, the  company  is  not subject to  the conventional personnel 
management  rules  of the  public  sector.  It  uses  methods  similar  to  those  of commercial 
enterprise law to reduce or increase its workforce. Having suppressed a quarter of  its positions 
in seven years, Fincantieri now employs around 9,500 people. The company controls several 
naval construction sites across the whole of Italy. Fincantieri's war ship construction division 
has its headquarters at Genoa, and controls the naval construction sites of Muggiano and Riva 
Trigoso, located to the north of  the Mediterranean coast. 
The  IRI's  aeronautics  and  defence  activities  are  grouped  under Finmeccanica.  This  public 
holding company was created in 1948 and today is the second largest Italian company behind 
Fiat. Finmeccanica became the  "national champion" of the Italian defence industry between 
1989 and 1995 during this sector's first major restructuring phase. In 1989, the IRI decided to 
transfer the electronics activities of Stet to  Finmeccanica. One year later, two Finmeccanica 
with the French in the missiles sector and with the Germans in the field of  territorial armaments. 
38  See "L'avenir de  l'industrie publique italienne face aux enjeux du grand marche europeen", directed by Jean 
Fran9ois Daguzan, Crest, Paris, 1995. 
135 companies, Selenia and Aeritalia, respectively national leaders in the defence electronics and 
aeronautics  sectors,  merged,  giving  birth to  Alenia.  In  addition,  Finrneccanica acquired  a 
major stake  in  several  companies liable to  be  dismantled (25%  in  Ferranti Italia,  Fiar and 
Aermacchi, 31% in Rinaldo Piaggio, 47% in Elettronica). In 1995, Finrneccanica had taken 
over all  the  defence activities  of the  EFIM  (Ente  Partecipazioni e Finanziamenti Industria 
Manufatturiera)  which until  then  had  held  the  main armaments  companies  (Augusta,  Oto 
Melara, etc.). Added to this was Whitehead, bought by Fiat at the same time. Thus, two thirds 
of  the Italian defence industry were concentrated under Finrneccanica's roof. 
Holding the main groups, the Italian State was the instigator of most of this restructuring. At 
least at the  beginning,  action taken by  the  different governments  was  motivated rather by 
social and political constraints, not by strategic and industrial considerations. The main role of 
public  (defence)  companies  was  to  create  and  safeguard jobs via state-held  capital  when 
private capital defaulted. This was  also the case of Finrneccanica.  Lacking a real industrial 
policy on armaments, the holding company's structure evolved gradually, without any specific 
objectives. The result was the duplication of  commercial and administrative structures, as well 
as the birth of a vast set of widely different activities. Finrneccanica's management objectives 
were also more socio-economic than strategic. The direct consequences were high investment 
not only in industry, but in R&D, financed by subsidies or injections of capital, which put the 
company in considerable debt. 
II. FINMECCANICA- A GROUP IN THE MIDST OF TRANSFORMATION 
11-1.  The planned end of  the 1Rl 
To  understand  the  current  situation  of Finrneccanica,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to  the 
upheavals that the entire Italian public sector in general, and the IRI in particular, have been 
through since the  beginning of the  1990s.  Until  now,  the  public  sector had dominated the 
Italian economy, and its financial influence over the State was considerable. In 1991, five of 
the  seven  largest  companies  in  the  country  were  public  groups  and  the  percentage  of 
employment in this  sector was  the  highest in Europe.  At  the  same time,  public companies 
absorbed  more  than  40%  of bank  credit.  Finally,  the  lack  of budgetary  control  by  the 
136 companies and the State gradually drove a wedge between industrial decision making and 
economic rationality. 
39 
The economic and monetary crisis of 1992 crushed this system. The decisive event was the 
collapse of the holding company, EFIM, whose level of debt rose to the phenomenal sum of 
8,500 billion Lira. The Italian State was forced to dismantle the conglomerate, taking over its 
debt and placing the companies of the EFIM under the wing of other holding companies. As 
mentioned  above,  the  armaments  companies were  all  grouped together under the  roof of 
Finmeccanica, belonging to the IRI group. 
Worse still, straight after the liquidation of  the EFIM, the Italian government was also obliged 
to  give in to pressure applied by the European Commission to dissolve the IRI. Indeed, the 
Commissioner of Competition,  Mr.  Van Miert,  had  imposed,  as  a  condition  to  granting 
subsidies  in  1993,  that the  IRI  drastically  reduce  its  debt  and that the  enterprises of the 
holding company break their ties with the Italian State. After several years of procrastination, 
political  resistance  and  arm wrestling  between the  European Commission and the  Italian 
State, the decision was made to dismantle the IRI before 30 June 2000. 
This process is now well underway. Until 1997, the IRI sold shares for a total of 65  trillion 
lira, and withdrew from 490 companies. From 1995 to 1997, the holding company brought its 
debt down from 55.54 trillion lira to 2.67 trillion. In summer 1999, it will sell its shares in the 
airports of Rome (ADR), Alitalia and the highway company, Autostrade. It will then be the 
turn ofCofiri, the bank ofthe IRI group, to be privatised. In November 1998, the Chairman of 
the IRI, Mr Gros-Pietro, reconfirmed his determination to meet the June 2000 objective.
40 
Governments have been spurred into privatising public enterprises by the dual pressure of  the 
monetary and financial crisis on the one hand, and EU regulations regarding deregulation and 
competitiveness on the other. "The State had to exchange its entrepreneurial status for that of 
regulator, the objective being, besides to the economy on its feet and raise cash, to encourage 
individual  shareholders  and  liberalise  the  financial  market  by  creating  new  institutional 
investors". 
41 
39 "L'avenir de l'industrie publique italienne ... ", p. 52. 
40 See Ulrike Sauer, "Abschied von einem Wirtschafts-Monstrum", SUddeutsche Zeitung, 10.11.1998. 
41  "L'avenir de l'industrie publique italienne ... ", p. 52. 
137 11-2.  The  new,  privatised  Finmeccanica  -financial or  industrial  holding 
company? 
The consequences of these events were of fundamental importance for Finrneccanica. Barely 
turned national armaments champion, the  group found  itself obliged to  privatise, a process 
which included two major restructuring efforts. During the 1990s, two distinct stages could be 
noted,  guided  by  two  opposing  approaches.  Firstly,  the  vice-Chairman,  Fabiano  Fabiani 
wanted to integrate all  similar activities into one group, in order to  create technological and 
commercial  synergy,  rationalise  the  administration  and  to  accelerate  the  decision-making 
process.  His  objective was  to  maintain Finrneccanica as  a large, privatised and  diversified 
entity.  Therefore  in  1992  Finrneccanica  incorporated  Alenia,  Ansaldo  and  Elsag  Baily, 
changing from a financial into an industrial holding company. In December 1996, the 100% 
owned defence and aeronautics subsidiaries (Agusta, Alenia Spazio, Oto Melara, etc.) were 
also  integrated.  In  this  way,  these  legally  independent  companies  became  divisions  of 
Finrneccanica. 
This policy of integration was reversed in May 1997 with the resignation of Fabiano Fabiani. 
From his successor, Alberto Lina's point of view, Finrneccanica could not be privatised as it 
stood.  Firstly,  the  unusual  organisational  structure of the  group  had made  it the  company  _ 
accounts distinctly ambiguous, because the divisions consisted of companies whose activities 
were  not  clearly  separated.  Secondly,  the  previous  policy  of growth  by  acquisition  and 
absorption  had  led  to  so  much  debt  and  diversity  of activities  that  consolidation  and 
refocusing on the basic activities became inevitable. 
Furthermore, the divisions dealing with the basic activities did not have the critical mass to be 
able to stand alone in their sectors of activity. For them, integration into international groups 
was the only solution. 
The  conclusion  of this  analysis  was  the  (re )transformation  of the  group  into  a  financial 
holding, and the gradual transformation of  the divisions into subsidiaries. It was the only way 
to  give  up  the  less  important  activities  and  establish  joint  companies  with  international 
138 partners in the basic activities. The new management therefore divided the Group's activities 
into three categories : 
•  Core interests, represented by the aeronautics and defence divisions. These activities were 
not to be sold, but integrated into international joint venture ; 
•  Activities in the automation field.  Considered to be non-core businesses, these were to be 
sold; 
•  The energy and transportation fields, hanging halfway between the above two categories. 
The objective for them was to improve profitability in order to find an industrial partner 
that would be prepared either to team up with the companies concerned in the context of  a 
joint venture, or to buy them. 
Thus the restructuring plan presented by Mr Lina when he was appointed in April 1997 was 
as follows: 
•  To  reorganise the  group  into  9 independent divisions  : aeronautics,  space,  helicopters, 
defence,  transport, energy, process automation, service automation, industrial automation 
•  To strengthen market position by forming joint ventures; 
•  To straighten out the capital structure of Finmeccanica by selling non-strategic businesses 
at a price that would bring in 3,000 billion Lira; 
•  To reduce net debt (accounts payable and receivable) to zero in 1999; 
•  To increase capital by 2,000 billion Lira. This increase consisted of 1) capital regrouping 
(93  new shares for 100 old ones), 2) issuing 5 new shares for 4 old ones, 3) issuing share 
subscription bonds ; 
•  To  reach equilibrium in 1999, with drastic reduction of general management and fixed 
costs, control of  cash flow and working capital in each division ; 
•  To implement rigorous management methods. The management of the holding company, 
characterised thus far as  "a total mess"
42
,  was reformed in line with liberal management 
principles ; 
•  To develop a plan and governmental directives for privatising Finmeccanica. 
Today, progress on this restructuring plan is already well advanced. 
42 Ibid, p. 63. 
139 •  In 1998, Finmeccanica gave up more than 20 non-core businesses for around 300 billion 
Lira; 
•  For 1,300 billion Lira and with a write-off of 1,000 billion, Finmeccanica sold its stake in 
Elsag Bailey to  ABB.  This sale  contributed considerably to  reducing debts from  7,673 
billion Lira at the end of 1997 to 3,324 billion by the end of 1998 ; 
•  The activities of Ansaldo Trasporti and Breda Construzioni Ferroviarie were integrated, 
Ansaldo Energia was restructured ; 
•  The  structure  of the  group  was  further  simplified,  condensing  it  into  s1x  divisions 
aerospace, helicopters, defence, energy, transport,  industrial automation. 
Key figures of  Finmeccanica SpA 
1994  1995  1996  1997 
Turnover  12117  12844  13883  15282 
Exports  54%  56%  65%  65% 
Employees  59041  56661  60012  61240 
R&D  1263  1173  1297  1426 
Self financing  782  747  746  n,c 
Debt  4411  4878  5113  7245 
Net Profits  52  40  -540  -2350 
Key figures by division 
Turnover  Net Profits  R&D  Employees 
1998  1997  1998  1997  1998  1997  1998  1997 
Aeronautics  2160  2299  270  166  174  178  9078  9997 
Space  1029  998  101  61  213  172  2795  2664 
Helicopters  1179  1015  137  54  268  240  5177  5225 
Defence  2327  2351  104  119  580  621  9719  9913 
Energy  1949  3015  -202  -228  28  23  7238  7922 
Transports  2206  1983  64  25  57  59  6946  7093 
Industrial Automation  644  661  -69  5  19  12  3525  3577 
Service Automation  711  648  43  25  34  32  2573  2264 
Total  12205  12970  448  227  1373  1337  47051  48655 
140 11-3.  The strategy of  alliances 
In the defence and aerospace fields, Finmeccanica's policy is guided by the desire to integrate 
the  different  divisions  of the  group  into  international  entities.  In  1998,  this  policy  was 
crowned with several successes : 
•  In April 1998, Finmeccanica and the British group GKN signed an agreement regarding 
the  merger  of their  helicopter  divisions,  Agusta  and  Westland.  These  two  divisions 
already collaborate within EH  Industries and have  complementary product ranges.  The 
new entity would be fourth in the world, based on their 1997 turnover. 
•  In July 1998, GEC Marconi and Alenia Difesa signed a final agreement to create a 50/50 
joint subsidiary in the field of territorial and naval radar, air traffic control, C3I systems, 
missiles, simulators and training systems. The agreement also allows for the establishment 
of mutual  stakes  in  the  field  of weapons  systems  and  armoured  vehicles  as  well  as 
avionics, with : - a 25 to 40% stake by Marconi in the avionics division of  Alenia Difesa ; 
- a 25  to 40% stake by Alenia Difesa/Otobreda in a new Marconi entity, combining the 
territorial activities of  Marconi MarineNSEL and Marconi Control Systems. This alliance 
should lead to an equal-share joint company in the defence electronics field, called Alenia 
Marconi Systems (AMS), an avionics company under the control of  Marconi Avionics, of 
which Alenia Difesa Avionics would become a subsidiary ; as well as a territorial systems 
company under the control of  Alenia Difesa/Otobreda of which Marconi's territorial arms 
entity would be come a subsidiary. 
•  In October 1998, Agusta and the  American company, Bell announced the creation of a 
joint venture (Bell Agusta Aerospace Corporation, BAAC) to develop the civil BA609 tilt 
rotor and that of  the AB139 medium helicopter. 
•  In December 1998, Finmeccanica, Matra, GEC Marconi and Dasa signed an agreement to 
integrate  their  space  interests.  Following  this  agreement,  Alenia  Aerospazio,  Matra 
Marconi Space and Dasa Dornier Satellitensysteme are going to form one single European 
entity, Astrium. 
Airbus  remams  one  of the  great  unknowns  in  Finmeccanica's  alliance  strategy.  For  the 
moment, Alenia is only a sub-contractor for Airbus and makes a section of the fuselage for 
141 A321-100 and A 321-200. In light of the indisputable success of the European consortium, 
Finmeccanica's  directors  would  desperately  like  to  see  Alenia  become  more  involved  in 
Airbus. This should happen when the switch is made from "Economic Interests Group" status 
to that of SCE. However, there are still plenty of obstacles to be overcome, in particular the 
fact  that  Alenia  is  one  of Boeing's  major  sub-contractors,  working  particularly  on  the 
Boeing 717. 
The arrangements announced in 1998 have also had a few hurdles to overcome : while the 
Agusta/Westland and Astrium agreements were concluded with nothing more than the "usual" 
delays, the agreement between Alenia Difesa and Marconi was seriously called into question 
by the integration of  the latter into BAe. The planned mutual stakes in avionics and territorial 
weapons now seems to have been abandoned completely ; AMS has indeed existed since the 
beginning of  the year, but its future is still far from guaranteed. 
The difficulties encountered in the agreement with Marconi demonstrate that Finmeccanica is 
not prepared to accept unequal partnerships. For its "strong" activities, only a 50/50 formula 
can be considered (which was called into question by the unexpected "growth" of the British 
partner).  In  sectors  where  such  a  balance  cannot  be  reached  with  only  two  partners, 
Finmeccanica is trying to integrate its divisions into multilateral joint ventures (enabling the 
minority partner to benefit from variable majorities). 
11-4. Shareholding Structure 
In 1994/95, Finmeccanica made an initial increase of capital to the tune of 1,688 billion Lira. 
The objective was to reduce debt and finance the acquisition of  companies of  the EFIM. Thus, 
the EFIM's creditor banks, all public at the time, became shareholders in Finmeccanica, taking 
a stake in the company in return for the credit they had given to the EFIM. It was a 30% stake 
approximately,  held  by,  among  others,  the  banks  San  Paolo  (6.54%),  Comit (3.66%)  and 
B.N.L. (3.37%). Around 13% was held by private investors and the IRI retained a 63% stake. 
Today the capital is being increased once again by the issuing of subscription bonds. The IRI 
still has a 61.6% stake (including COFIRI's share) ; at the end of the financial year, this stake 
should drop to 52% (excluding COFIRI). According to  Finmeccanica management, the IRI's 
share  will  drop  by  half again  by  the  end  of the  year.  Banks  which  took  a  stake  in 
142 Finmeccanica immediately after the EFIM was dissolved, have been privatised and practically 
all  of them  have  sold  their  shares.  Today  only  4.2%  of the  capital  is  held  by  Italian 
institutional  investors,  9.1%  by  foreign  institutional  investors  and  the  rest  by  small 
shareholders.  Therefore  there  are  no  more  major  Italian  investors  (apart  from  the  IRI,  of 
course), the largest non-public shareholder is the American Fidelity fund with 3.7%. 
Once  the  privatisation  process  is  complete,  the  State  will  retain  a  25  to  30%  stake  in 
Finmeccanica,  to  be  held  by  the  treasury  once  the  IRI  disappears.  Therefore  it  will  not 
actually be completely privatised, even if the IRI's plans envisage that institutional investors, 
particularly  foreign  ones,  will  hold the  largest  stake.  This  private  shareholding  would  be 
scattered, with a share threshold of  around 5%. 
In this context it is important to know that Finmeccanica is looking exclusively for financial 
investors, not industrial investors to take a share in its capital. This excludes, for instance, all 
exchange of shares with another national champion.  Finmeccanica thus wishes to remain a 
national group with a public reference shareholder. In this concept mergers play an important 
role, but they remain limited to activities. 
11-5.  The consequences for the group's governance 
Of course, all these transformations are radically changing the governance of Finmeccanica. 
As  an SpA company, Finmeccanica has a Board of Directors at its head, responsible for  all 
the group's activities. This board is made up of 12 members, appointed for three-year terms. 
The leader is not the Chairperson, but the Vice-Chairperson, who is also the Chief Executive 
Officer.  The  board  is  supported  by  eight  chairpersons  responsible  for  the  group's  central 
services. 
For the moment, the majority of  the directors are appointed by the IRI. In the future, this will 
have to  change in that other shareholders will acquire stakes and the IRI will be dissolved. 
Nonetheless, following privatisation the government will have at least one representative on 
the board, delegated either by treasury or the ministry of  defence. 
143 Not having shareholder rights, the employees are not represented in Finmeccanica's governing 
bodies. Even the works councils only exist at division and subsidiary levels and there is not 
systematic and institutionalised co-ordination between the councils of the different divisions. 
If the group's management wishes to  deal with employee issues affecting the company as  a 
whole, it therefore turns directly to the union leaders. 
The ties between Finmeccanica and each division are personalised by the istitore, that is to 
say the director delegated by Finmeccanica. Responsible for the division, there is only a small 
team  available  to  work with  this  delegate,  because  the  "real"  authority  lay  directly  with 
Finmeccanica management right up until 1997. 
The transfer of power from Mr.  Fabiani to  Mr.  Lina has not altered management structure ; 
however,  the  way  management  operates  has  changed  considerably.  Within  the  board  of 
directors,  the directors have received increased shareholding rights, transforming the board 
into  a collective body.  The  istitore has received more responsibility for  strategic decisions 
concerning his  sector,  but,  on the  other hand,  financial  control  of his  activities  has  been 
tightened.  Under  Mr.  Fabiani,  the  divisions  did  not  operate  as  profit  centres  and  only 
presented their results once every six months. Today, the accounts for the different divisions 
are kept strictly separate and each month the istitore must present his figures to the board of 
directors. Other important central services such as Strategy, External Relations, Support and 
Marketing are also set up by Finmeccanica. 
Finmeccanica is responsible for negotiations concerning the integration of divisions into joint 
ventures. A prerequisite for such integration is for the divisions to become subsidiaries. The 
naval systems, radar and missile system divisions were transformed into one company, Alenia 
Systems  SpA,  which was  then integrated into  AMS.  Agusta and  Alenia Spazio  are  in the 
process  of becoming  SpA  companies  ;  only  the  aeronautics,  avionics  and  territorial 
armaments sectors are still divisions. 
Once integrated into joint ventures, relations between the former divisions and Finmeccanica 
will,  of course,  change.  Although the  regulations  governing  these  relations  are  yet  to  be 
defined it is  already clear that Finmeccanica does  not intend to become a simple financial 
holding company. It does not want to delegate all its decision-making power to the subsidiary 
144 directors,  nor  does  it  wish  to  merely  monitor  the  financial  results.  On  the  contrary,  its 
objective is to retain strategic influence within the new international entities. 
To  play this  role,  Finrneccanica aspires,  on the  one  hand,  to  having  sufficient  say  in the 
management bodies of the joint ventures. Naturally this will depend on the stake it has in the 
structure and does explain why it is making such an effort to seek balanced solutions. On the 
other hand, Finrneccanica wishes to increase its own analysis capacities to ensure its ability to 
effectively control the policies of  joint subsidiaries. 
Such a policy requires a certain number of highly qualified directors, which Finrneccanica 
would seem to be having trouble finding.  This problem can be explained by looking at the 
group's history. Finrneccanica's involvement in the majority of the defence sectors has been 
too  short  for  it  to  have  trained  enough  experienced  executives.  Those  who  work  in the 
different divisions,  for  their part identify more with "their"  company than with the group. 
They are even less inclined to work for Finrneccanica now that it is making draconian job cuts 
(in one year alone, the number of  employees has fallen from 750 to less than 200). 
III. THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
In Italy, the State has traditionally been the main player in the defence industry. Until now, it 
has acted above all as an entrepreneur. With the dismantling of  the IRI and the privatisation of 
Finrneccanica, its weight will, of  course, diminish. The question is whether, and in what way, 
the State will manage to retain its influence over what is known as a strategic industry. 
1/1-J. The State as Client 
Despite  a  nominal  increase  of around  3,500  Lira  since  1989,  strictly  military  spending 
(junzione difesa) has in actual fact dropped by more than 16% in Italy over the past ten years. 
This discrepancy is due to the significant devaluation undergone by the Lira at the beginning 
of  the 1990s. 
145 Italian military spending in billion Lira (current) 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Maintenance  4357  3814  3118  3197  2766  2429  2481  2975  3492  4155 
Investments  4852  4425  3839  4269  3684  3344  3385  4117  4771  5099 
Total  5387  4807  4221  3577  4150  3765  3863  4585  5034  5439 
Investments* 
R&D  495  610  721  1072  918  915  904  1142  1279  944 
Funzione  17977  17929  18304  17768  18136  18480  18389  21901  21767  21734 
Difesa** 
Total Budget  22905  23154  24466  24517  25560  26167  25677  31235  31060  30988 
Source :Ministry of  Defence, according to information from Michele Nones, 1999 
*  including the infrastructure 
**  without  "temporary"  pensions  ; the  increase  in  1996  is  due  to  reforms  in  the  retirement  system  and 
social cover of  the Carabinieri. 
Funzione Difesa in billion Lira (constant/rom 1989) 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Funzione Difesa  17977  18214  17203  17449  15520  15221  14377  16472  16097  15795 
Source : Michele Nones,  1999 
Starting  out  at  a  fairly  low  level,  the  reductions  were  therefore  significant  and  were 
aggravated by a (long-standing) poor distribution of  funds intended for personnel training and 
investment. 
Functional proportion of Italian military spending as a percentage 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Investments  30.0  27.9  23.1  24.4  22.9  20.4  21.0  20.9  23.1  25.0 
Training  28.1  29.2  28.6  27.7  28.2  29.8  30.1  24.5  23.5  27.7 
Personnel  41.9  42.9  48.3  47.9  48.9  49.8  48.9  54.6  53.4  47.3 
Source: Ministry of Defence, according to information from Michele Nones,  1999 
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48.3 The  current level of investment (less than 5,000 billion Lira)  is  still  deemed by industrial 
companies  to  be  insufficient.  They  feel  that  international  competitiveness  requires  annual 
spending of  around 8,000 billion Lira. 
Budget cuts and the low level of investment have  been aggravated by the  lack of a "real" 
long-term  procurement  policy,  as  well  as  by  the  lack  of integration  within  procurement 
bodies.  The  latest  White  Paper dates  from  1985.  It  was  updated  by "additional  notes  for 
provisions in Defence matters" (Note aggiuntive allo stato di previsione per la difesa) which 
do  not, however,  include any long-term planning. The armed forces  independently outlined 
their own investment programme, leading to doubling up on jobs and cost increases. Another 
characteristic  trait  of the  Italian  system  is  that  there  is  no  actual  government  agency  or 
armaments directorate for military equipment procurement. It is the technical-administrative 
branch of the Ministry of Defence, directed by the  Secretary General/National Armaments 
Director (SG/NAD) who is responsible for awarding contracts and managing programmes. 
For a while now, we have, however, been able to observe attempts to rationalise procurement 
procedures. The recent "law on executive reform" (Legge sui Vertici,  dd.l. n.1157,  Riforma 
dei  Vertici Militari) is considered to be an important step towards applying the "new defence 
model" aimed at adapting the military sector to the new strategic situation. The law proposes 
governmental  re-organisation,  including  a new role  for  the  SG/NAD.  The  latter will  now 
answer to the minister for administrative responsibilities and to the head of the armed forces 
for technical and operational responsibilities. The task of  the SG/NAD will be to integrate the 
activities of the bodies concerned by co-ordinating the work of the managing directors and 
drawing up proposals for industrial planning. In addition, the position of SG/NAD and that of 
one of  the two vice-SGs will be able to be held by civilians. 
43 
111-2.  The State as Sponsor 
As a sponsor, the Italian State also plays a modest role.  For Finmeccanica for example, the 
government permanently suspended subsidies (jondi di dotazione) in 1991. Today, three types 
of  financial aid exist : 
43  See Reinhilde  Weidacher, "Italy's Role  within the European Defence Market",  p.  21  ; "New Horizons For 
Italian Defence Procurement", in: Military Technology, 311997, p. 93-99. 
147 •  In the context of Law 237-93, the ministry of technology contributes around 100 billion 
Lira per year to help defence companies rationalise and restructure. This sum is intended 
for the industry as a whole, Finmeccanica receives around 60% of  it. 
•  In  the  context  of Law  808-85  (aeronautics  law),  the  government  supports  R&D  in 
aeronautics companies relating to  specific programmes, using reimbursable funds  (once 
the product exceeds the break-even point). The ministry of  industry thus contributed 1,150 
billion Lira in  1994-1996 and 2553  billion Lira in  1997-2000  ; Finmeccanica received 
grosso modo half of this (725 and 1285 billion Lira respectively) ; the other half went to 
Fiat A  vio, Aermacchi and Elettronica. 
•  Law 46-88 is also specifically directed at aeronautics companies. The ministry of  research 
supports the (basic) R&T by contributing up to 50% of  the cost of  a research project. This 
is  non-reimbursable assistance, but the total sum is  very modest (10-15  billion Lira per 
year). 
Given the budgetary constraints, it is unlikely that public spending for the defence industry 
will increase significantly in the coming years. As client and sponsor, the State will not have a 
very important role to  play.  Therefore, it will be as  a regulator and shareholder that it will 
retain its influence over the industry. 
111-3.  The State as Regulator 
In Italy, the State does not hold a Golden Share in the defence companies. Referring to Article 
25  of the  national  law on  protecting  competition,  the  government  can,  however,  prevent 
foreign  companies  from  taking  over  Italian  companies,  on  the  condition  that  the  same 
legislation exists in their country of  origin. 
Two laws passed in 1994 have even greater impact on the current restructuring efforts : Law 
474-94 enables the government to maintain a certain degree of control over companies in the 
midst of privatisation (either via a specific share or some other mechanism). Law 332-94 for 
its  part,  gives  the  State  the  possibility  of inserting  clauses  into  these  companies'  statutes 
granting the treasury ministry special powers. These prerogatives can allow for,  among other 
things,  vetoing  rights  regarding  the  entry  of an  "important"  shareholder,  the  signing  of 
shareholder pacts, the dissolving of the company as  well as  the right to  appoint at least one 
board member. 
148 Thus, the government has effective means for controlling privatisation efforts and maintaining 
overseeing  rights  in  the  industry  once  the  process  has  been  completed.  In  the  case  of 
Finmeccanica, the State will probably use these prerogatives to retain a right of  veto regarding 
status change, appointment of the CEO and the  acquisition of more than 5% of the capital. 
However, other issues remain as yet unresolved : how to prevent, for example, an industrial 
investor from taking a stake in Finmeccanica after the majority of  the shares have been put on 
the market? 
111-4.  The State as Shareholder 
As we have seen, the privatisation of Finmeccanica does not mean that the public power will 
be completely withdrawn from the group's capital. Via the treasury ministry, the State will, on 
the contrary, remain the reference shareholder of the holding company. With a planned 25 to 
30% stake, its strategic influence will be even more significant in that the other shareholders 
will only be financial investors each with no more than a 5% stake. 
Planning to have this type of shareholder structure clearly shows that the government wishes 
to  retain  influence  over Finmeccanica.  However,  it does  not mean that it  will  constantly 
interfere in the management of the group : the State's aim seems to be more strategic, i.e. to 
safeguard technological capacity and retain a certain political role in setting up an industrial 
basis  for  European defence.  From the  financial  and economic point of view however,  the 
government  has  already  been  an  "invisible"  shareholder  these  past  few  years,  and  this 
discretion  will  no  doubt  continue.  The  Italian  state  today  has  neither  the  means  nor  the 
ambition to return to the role of entrepreneur that it held before. This proves its desire to see 
the  external  financing  of Finmeccanica come  from  the  capital  markets  and  attract foreign 
institutional investors, which, with a majority stake, albeit scattered, will limit the role of the 
public shareholder. In addition, the aeronautics and defence activities of  Finmeccanica will, at 
the end of  the transformation, all be integrated into international joint ventures. The influence 
that the Italian State could wield over the operational units will therefore only be indirect -
via the  holding company - and will  be  counterbalanced by the  other international partners 
within the joint companies. 
149 CHAPTER 5 : United Kingdom 
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UK DEFENCE SECTOR 
Because the UK defence industry is virtually all in private hands, most corporate governance 
issues in the defence sector are the same as those applying to businesses in the economy as a 
whole. 
Corporate governance received little attention in the  UK until the late  1980s when interest 
was  promoted  by  'creative accounting,  spectacular business  failures,  the  apparent  ease  of 
unscrupulous directors in expropriating other directors' funds, the limited role of auditors, the 
claimed weak link between executive remuneration and company performance, and the roles 
played by the market for corporate control and institutional investors in generating apparently 
excessive short-term perspectives to the detriment of general economic performance' .
44  The 
most  influential  document  in  corporate  governance  became  the  Code  of Best Practice  on 
Corporate  Governance  issued  in  1992  by  the  Cadbury  Committee  set  up  by  the  Stock 
Exchange,  the  accountancy profession and the  Financial  Reporting Council,  although that 
code dealt only with the financial  aspects of governance. 
45  In general  in the UK,  although 
there is  obviously a body of company law, corporate governance is largely a matter of self-
regulation rather than legal obligation.
46 
Corporate governance debates in the UK are based on the British tradition of  the theory of  the 
firm,  which makes profit maximisation the  only objective of a business and which makes 
shareholders'  welfare  'the  paramount  consideration'
47
.  However,  corporate  governance 
agenda is broadly defined and contemporary topics of concern include the long-term strategic 
targets of an organisation, the interests of employees, the needs of the environment and the 
local community, relations with customers and suppliers, as well as compliance with relevant 
law. A central element in contemporary corporate governance thinking is that a company has 
responsibilities to all its stakeholders, including its suppliers, customers, employees and local 
44  K.Keasey  &  M.Wright,  'Introduction .. .'  in  K.Keasey  &  M.Wright  (eds),  Corporate  Governance  : 
Responsibilities, Risk and Remuneration' London, Wiley, 1997, p.1 
45 The Committee was chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury and the report is reproduced as an appendix in S.Sheikh & 
W.Rees, Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, London, Cavendish, 1995, pp395-400. 
46  An  issue  discussed  by  P.Stiles,  'Corporate  Governance  and  Ethics'  in  P.W.F.Davies,  Current  Issues  in 
Business Ethics, London, Routledge, 1997, pp.47-8. 
150 community. Thus Sheikh & Rees observe that: 'the role of corporate governance is to ensure 
that directors  are  subject to  their  duties,  obligations  and  responsibilities  to  act  in  the  best 
interests of their company, to  give direction and to  remain accountable to their shareholders 
and other beneficiaries for their actions' .
48  Such observations obviously do  not explain how 
conflicts among stakeholder interests are to be managed. The focus of  corporate governance is 
the board of  directors that have formal responsibility for the governance of  their company, but 
who can exercise their functions through a wide range of  possible involvement in the day-to-
day running of the firm.
49  Doubts about the effectiveness of boards, even with a significant 
element  of  non-executive  members  present,  has  led  to  suggestions  that  owners  i.e. 
shareholders should be active in overseeing companies. 
Two  elements  worth  highlighting  in  a  defence  context  are  the  role  of owners  and  their 
relationships with directors and managers, and the ethical dimension of  governance. 
The role of owners 
A major issue in corporate  governance concerns the  relationships and responsibilities of a 
firm's owners and managers. In Britain, the weight of institutional shareholders is very heavy 
with financial institutions (especially pension and insurance funds) holding more than 60% of 
UK equity. Equity holdings by individuals had fallen to less than 18% by 1993
50
• Institutional 
shareholders, however,  have traditionally been reluctant to  become overtly involved in the 
running of the companies in which they have holdings. The economics-based explanation of 
this is that shareholders devoting resources to overseeing the companies in which they have a 
share provide a free service to other shareholders that do not devote such resources. There is 
thus a temptation to 'free ride' facing owners, to leave the management oversight role to other 
shareholders  and  to  judge  performance  solely  on  the  basis  oftort-term  financial 
performance.  By keeping their holdings to 5% or less of  a firm's stock,  ey can indicate their 
displeasure at how a company is going by simply selling their shares.  e Cadbury Report, 
however, wanted the institutions to adopt a supervisory role over the company management 
on behalf of  small shareholders. 
47 S.Shaikh & S.K.Chatterjee, in Shaikh & Rees, op.cit., p.8. 
48 Shaikh & Rees, op.cit., p.v. 
49  See  P.Stiles  'Corporate  Governance  and  Ethics'  in  P.W.F.Davies  (ed),  Current  Issue  in  Business  Ethics, 
London, Routledge, 1997, p.40. 
5°  Keasey &  Wright, op.cit., p.24. 
151 This has not happened in any formal  way and institutions are often reluctant, for instance, to 
use  their  voting  rights  at  annual  general  meetings.  However,  there  are  signs  that  the 
institutions, with most closely co-located within 'the square mile' of  the City of  London, have 
many informal contacts with each other. They share information and also exercise influence 
through their equal informal contacts with their clients. The overall influence is thus hidden 
and not insignificant.
51  Certainly major defence companies, like civilian firms,  stay in close 
contact with their major shareholders and other sources of  capital including banks. 
The ethical dimension 
Corporate governance in its modem manifestations stresses a company's responsibilities to all 
stakeholders in its activities and to the environment. It thus has an ethical dimension. 
However,  in  order  to  capture  the  synergies  m  BAe's  extensive  capabilities  across  its 
previously rather insulated sections, in  1994 the top level management of BAe introduced a 
values programme, entitled Benchmarking BAe, as a central change management element in 
the company. Five values were articulated, promoted and their establishment monitored. 
The five values were: 
Customers 
People 
We  will  delight  our  customers,  both  internal  and  external,  by  understanding  and 
exceeding their expectations. 
All BAe people will be encouraged to realist their full potential as valued members of 
the BAe team. 
Partnership 
We  will  strive  constantly  to  be  our  customers'  preferred  supplier  ;  our  suppliers' 
preferred customer ; a respected partner in our alliances ; and a source of  pride to our 
government and local communities. 
Innovation and technology 
We  will encourage a hunger for new ideas, new technology and ways of working, to  secure 
sustained competitive advantage for our company. 
51  See H.Short & K.Keasey,' Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance'  in Keasey & Wright, op,cit., 
pp.23-60 for a discussion on this area. 
!52 Performance 
We  will set targets to  be the best, continually measuring, challenging and improving 
the way we do things both as individuals and as members of  our teams. 52 
The  emphasis  on customer service  is  something that has  been adopted by  British defence 
industry as a grouping, through the Code of Conduct of  the Defence Industries Council. 
Clearly these approaches involve all  customers having a similar moral status  : they are all 
entitled  to  be  delighted.  However,  this  raises  the  ethical  question  of whether  all  BAe 
customers should be treated equally since some of the  governments involved have attitudes 
and policies towards the rights of citizens that are very different from those found in the UK. 
Moreover,  some of their procurement practices, involving extensive commission payments, 
present difficult ethical  questions  for  a company  seeking to  be  'a source of pride'  for  its 
government and local community. 
The  response of BAe,  and that of other UK defence  companies, tends to  be  to  entrust the 
ethical responsibility for their activities to  the British government, particularly in the export 
area.  BAe has led the  argument that the company does  and should leave  ethical and other 
policy  considerations  to  the  government,  and  that  the  company  fully  respects  the 
government's choices.  It  is  the  government that  is  elected  by  the  people  to  regulate  the 
activities  of firms  such as  BAe  and  it would not be  appropriate  for  the  company to  have 
different policies on arms exports, in particular, to that advocated by the British Government. 
This  line  has  not  won  over the  Campaign  Against  the  Arms  Trade,  that has  persistently 
opposed BAe exports. By buying BAe shares, its representatives have acquired the right to 
attend  annual  general  meetings.  At  such  meetings  they  have  exercised  their  right  to  ask 
questions and have on occasions sought seriously to disrupt proceedings. 
The Benchmark BAe exercise is  an effort to  establish corporate values in order to  improve 
corporate financial and technological performance, not to establish a moral foundation for its 
own  sake.  Nevertheless,  Benchmark BAe has  clear corporate  governance  implications.  Its 
reconciliation  with  reportedly  common  practices  in  the  arms  export  area  may  not  be 
straightforward. 
52  Sir Richard Evans and Colin Price, Vertical Take-off: the inside story of  British Aerospace's comeback from 
crisis to world class, london, Brealey, 1999, p.58. 
153 II. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
INTHEUK 
The  British  Government's  relationship  with  defence  businesses  in  the  UK  has  three 
dimensions, each of  which is discussed in this paper to provide a comprehensive overview. 
The government seeks to regulate defence industry ; 
It acts as a customer for defence industry ; and 
It acts as a sponsor for defence industry. 
The three dimensions are distinctive and each has its own significance. When the pressures 
they  generate  clash,  complex  situations  are  generated  in  which  eventual  government 
behaviour can be  difficult to  predict. However, the government aspires to  produce coherent 
policy that generates a successful British defence industry. The UK definition of success for 
defence  industry  mainly  means  the  businesses  being  cost-effective  suppliers  to  the  UK 
Ministry of  Defence (MoD) and winning contracts in global defence markets. There was little 
concern in the 1980s and 1990s with defence industry as a technological dynamo providing a 
driving force for civil manufacturing. 
11-1.  The government as regulator of  defence industry 
II-1-a. Rejection of  control by ownership 
Of central importance is that the government is not willing to control industry by owning it. 
The  Labour governments after  1963  increased the  incidence of state ownership of  defence 
businesses but, soon after Mrs Thatcher came to  power in  1979, the  government began an 
almost  comprehensive sell-off of government owned defence  industrial  assets  as  part of a 
wider  programme  of privatisation..  Where  possible  companies  were  sold  through  shares 
issued  on  the  stock market,  as  happened  with  British Aerospace  (BAe)  and  Rolls  Royce. 
British Shipbuilders was broken up and some yards sold in management buy-outs (e.g. Swan 
154 Hunter). Royal Ordnance, the former state arsenal, could not have been sold to the public but 
was auctioned off  to existing companies with BAe offering the highest price. 
The British Government has sought a degree of control over some privatised firms by limiting 
foreign  share ownership in them.  This limitation has  been contested by the two  companies 
concerned, BAe and Rolls Royce, since reducing the number of potential investors in a firm 
has the effect of holding down the share price.  The ceiling on foreign ownership has been 
steadily raised and now stands at 49%.  In addition, the British Government keeps a 'golden 
share'  in  these  firms  that  in  principle  allows  a  government  veto  on  corporate  action.  In 
practice, however, the golden share power is not publicly known ever to have been exercised. 
After  privatisation,  defence  businesses  enjoyed  differing  fortunes.  In  shipbuilding,  GEC 
gradually gained dominance, buying Yarrow and VSEL businesses while Swan Hunter and 
Cammell Laird (which had been previously bought by VSEL) failed to win enough work to 
survive as  warship builders. BAe slowly integrated RO  into its main defence business with 
some RO plants, including Enfield and (shortly) Bishopton being closed in the process. 
Of Britain's  naval  dockyards,  the  government  closed  Chatham  when  it  was  still  under 
government ownership. The two surviving dockyards at Devonport and Rosyth were initially 
let out, after a competition, to commercial management and were for a while what is known in 
the  USA  as  Gocos  (government-owned,  company-operated).  However,  in  the  1990s  the 
government went further and sold the sites to their operating companies. The main remaining 
Gocos are the Atomic Weapons Establishments at Aldermaston and Burghfield that are run 
principally by Hunting Engineering. 
The  British  belief is  that  organisations  operating  with  in  the  private  sector  with  a  profit 
motive, especially when they are subject to  competition, normally perform better than state 
owned businesses. Private companies have both incentives to perform and  are normally better 
at raising capital.  Thus state ownership,  while providing control in a limited sense,  cannot 
easily stimulate the effective behaviour desired of  defence business. 
The Labour Government in power since 1997 has continued and even reinforced the policies 
of the previous regime. In addition to the privatisation of manufacturing, private sector firms 
are being increasingly considered to undertake service tasks previously fulfilled by the armed 
155 forces  themselves.  The  Conservatives'  initiative  called  'Competing for  Quality',  in  which 
private  companies  were  asked  to  bid  against  the  existing  government  service  provider to 
discover the cheapest source for such matters as catering in messes and facilities maintenance, 
has  been  continued.  The  Government  is  looking  at  industry  taking  over  from  the  armed 
services in many aspects of third line maintenance. Public Private Partnerships, in which  a 
company contracts to  provide specified levels of service over designated time periods, are 
being  explored  for  tasks  very  close  to  combat  operations.  These  include  the  supply  of 
capability for the transporting of  tanks, for air-to-air re-fuelling for the RAF, and for Roll-on, 
Roll-off  (RoRo)  sea transport.  There  is  no  agreed  limit within which the privatisation of 
defence will be contained. 
Still with regard to ownership, recent Conservative and British governments appear to have 
been relatively relaxed about foreign companies buying British defence businesses. Thomson-
CSF has become a major investor by buying all or a major part of the Redifusion and Link 
Miles simulator businesses, Pilkington Optronics, and Thorn's defence electronics businesses. 
After Lucas merged with the US firm, Varity, chiefly because of  common interests in the civil 
automotive sector, there was no British objection in 1999 when TRW of  the US bought Lucas 
Varity. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon have defence manufacturing plants in the UK. After 
failing to win the Astor contract for an airborne ground surveillance system, Racal may well 
sell its defence businesses and Thomson-CSF and Raytheon could well be prominent bidders. 
11-1-b. Positive control mechanisms 
While rejecting ownership of defence businesses as a means of shaping their behaviour, the 
UK government uses other means of  restricting what defence businesses can do. 
In  particular  it  controls  their  exports  by  requmng  them  to  obtain  Ministry  of Defence 
permission for the release of  classified information. Thus firms cannot market their equipment 
by releasing its performance characteristics without a government release. Before a sale can 
be  completed,  i.e.  before a delivery can be  made,  a company must have an export license 
obtained from the Department of  Trade & Industry. 
The UK government sees arms exports as vital to sustaining UK defence industrial businesses 
(see  below)  and  thus  the  UK  arms  export  regime  is  relatively  liberal.  However,  the 
156 Government  does  now  allow  sales  to  states  that  are  subject to  UN  or  EU  embargoes.  In 
addition, the Labour Government on coming to power in 1997 asserted that it would pursue 
an  ethical  foreign  policy  that  would  be  reflected  in  its  arms  export  policy.  This  initially 
resulted in a slowdown in the speed taken to proceed export licence applications as officials 
passed upwards cases of concern. However, the UK maintained the existing target for exports 
(orders  worth  L5  billion  a year)  and  by  the  middle  of 1999  little  was  being heard  about 
increased  arms  export restraint.  The  UK  is  a party to  the  EU  Code  of Conduct  on  arms 
exports. It is taking part in the working party on arms export policy in the framework of the 
Letter of Intent of July  1998,  signed by six European states,  on measures  to  facilitate  the 
restructuring of  defence businesses in Europe. 
The  other  important area of defence  industrial  control  is  the  UK national  system  for  the 
classification of information and  its  release only to  those with the appropriate UK security 
clearances.  Thus,  even  transnational  firms  such  as  Matra-BAe  Dynamics  have  to  create 
mechanisms  so  that  information  specified  for  UK  eyes-only  is  not  seen  by  non-British 
personnel. 
There is no formal position on exceptions to security clearance arrangements.  However the 
UK has taken part in many collaborative projects where much information has been pooled. 
Also,  the  appointment  of  an  Australian,  Malcolm  Mackintosh,  as  _Chief  of  Defence 
Procurement earlier in the 1990s suggests that citizens of some Commonwealth states may be 
able to  obtain de  facto  UK clearances. The UK is  also taking part in the working group on 
security of  information set up under the July 1998 Letter of  Intent noted above. 
11-2.  The government as a customer of  defence industry 
As  a customer, the  British government has  felt  since  the  early  1980s that the  best way to 
secure 'value for money' from the defence equipment budget is to  award contracts wherever 
possible against competitive tenders. Even when the Labour government came to power and 
introduced  its  Smart  Procurement  Initiative  (SPI),  it  kept  competition  as  the  basis  of its 
procurement policy. 
157 The British Government has felt that, as a result of being subjected to competitive pressures, 
British defence industry has become more efficient and  competitive in global markets. It is 
this claimed consequence of competition policy that makes the phrase 'tough love' a useful 
summary of UK official policy towards its defence industry. The UK government as a whole 
wants its defence industry to  survive and prosper, but believes that the best way to  achieve 
this is to locate that industry in a constantly challenging, event threatening environment. 
The stress on competition has evolved significantly since the early 1980s in three important 
respects. 
First, British companies pressed to minimise their costs were increasingly ready to incorporate 
developed  foreign  sub-systems  in their  bids,  rather  than  offering  British-only  bids  where 
additional technology would have needed to be developed. An example from the end of the 
1980s illustrates this clearly. 
In the second place, in the light of industrial consolidation in the UK and of the failure of 
important  firms  such  as  Swan  Hunter  and  Ferranti,  the  scope  for  UK-only  competition 
steadily diminished. The proposed merger of BAe and GEC Marconi will reduce that scope 
still further as  it had been common for both to bid for contracts. As a consequence, the UK 
government has shown an increasing willingness to consider foreign bidders for UK contracts, 
most  notably  from  the  US  and  continental  Europe.  The  UK  sought  without  success  to 
persuade a US-led consortium to bid for its aircraft carrier requirement, although Thomson-
CSF has emerged as ready to lead a competing consortium against the BAe-GEC bid. It is a 
reasonable  forecast  that,  for  many  contracts,  the  British  government  will  prefer to  see  a 
foreign bid, most obviously from the US, to match against what BAe-GEC offer. In 1999 this 
is happening, for instance, with the BAe-led Meteor competing against Raytheon's improved 
AMRAAM for the Eurofighter' s future Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile requirement. 
In  areas  where  UK  capabilities  have  not  been  developed,  the  government  has  run 
competitions  where  all  bids  have  been  led  by  foreign  firms.  The  UK  Astor  and  attack 
helicopter requirements, for instance, involved three US-led consortia in the first instance and 
a US versus a Franco-German product in the second case. 
158 The  third  area of modification  regarding  competition  concerns  the  government  interest  in 
'partner' relationships between customers and suppliers. 
In  the  Levene  era  after  1983  the  Government  rejected  'cosy'  relationships  between  the 
government  and  defence  companies,  perceiving  that  such  relationships  reduced  the 
companies'  incentives for  efficiency and  innovation.  Competition was  stressed  as  the  way 
forward and, with the government implicitly accepting minimum cost as the normal definition 
of value for money, industry was seen largely as the adversary of government. The more that 
industry took in profit, the less government had to spend on other equipment. 
By the mid-1990s this view contrasted with many supplier-customer relationships in the civil 
sector.  In many parts of manufacturing, customers viewed their suppliers as  their 'partners' 
because the attractiveness of the customers' own products depended so  much on suppliers' 
good performance. Customers had found that, if they wanted high quality, often just-in-time 
supply, they had to work closely with their suppliers. By the second half of  the 1990s the UK 
MoD  was  exploring  the  extent  to  which  it  should  be  re-evaluating  its  relationships  with 
suppliers and a dialogue began with the Confederation of British Industry. The result was a 
1998  agreed  document  on  'partnering'  and  a  sense  under  the  SPI  that  the  MoD  would 
normally  seek  to  cooperate  closely  with  suppliers  for  their  mutual  benefit  after  the 
competitive  phase  was  over.  This  meant  after  a prime  contractor had  been selected for  a 
project. In addition, the MoD was exploring cooperation with industry in the very early stages 
of a project so as to gain industry's insights into feasibility, solutions to capability needs and 
trade-offs among time,  cost and performance within a requirement.  However, it was  doing 
this in a tentative manner, less vigorously than British industry had apparently hoped given its 
input into the Strategic Defence Review before July 1998. 
The British Government undoubtedly weighs the particular benefits in terms of employment, 
foreign exchange savings, and technological advance from using British industry for defence 
contracts.  After the  1991  Gulf War and even the Falklands conflict, there is  also awareness 
that a national firm may be more responsive in times of crisis or war than a foreign supplier. 
The  British government thus has often exercised national preference in competitions, most 
clearly  when  it  opted  for  the  Challenger  2  tank  and  over-ruled  the  RAF  with  regard  to 
transport helicopters. The RAF wanted an all-Chinook fleet whereas the government insisted 
that a mixed fleet also including EH.l 01 s should be ordered.  However, it will not normally 
159 pay a large premium in terms of  price, time or performance for a British product and of  course 
industry cannot know if  it will pay any premium at all in a specific case. 
In the negotiations over the OCCAR Treaty, Britain rejected a positive statement in favour of 
European preference,  but accepted the  implicit preference  in  the  treaty that bids  from  all 
WEAG states would be considered on an equal basis in OCCAR states. However, the treaty 
also states that bids from other states can also be considered provided those other states grant 
reciprocal access to their defence markets. These terms can be seen as recognition that the UK 
wants to be free to consider US bids, but that the US needs to reduce its own protectionism. 
When Britain opts for a major foreign product, such as the A  WACs purchase from  Boeing, 
the Government has a policy of encouraging the supplier to place orders in the US, either on 
that project or others, to offset the jobs and technology costs of  buying a foreign product. The 
Government has expressed its policy in the following terms. 
MoD requests Industrial Participation (IP) proposals from all offshore contractors bidding for 
requirements  valued at £10  million or above.  Any  UK contractors expecting their bids  to 
contain £10 million or above worth of  foreign content are also invited to submit IP proposals. 
Work to be included in IP proposals must satisfy the following criteria : 
Be defence work undertaken in the UK and placed with recognised defene contractors ; 
Be new work placed as a consequence of  the contract for the MoD programme ; 
Have as  high a technology content as  possible (at least commensurate with the work placed 
offshore); 
Be placed by competition. MoD does not pay a premium for IP 
53
. 
The  government refusal to  pay a premium for  offset work was  underlined by negotiations 
with the MoD, BAe and Denel of South Africa after the UK awarded a propellant contract to 
the South African firm. The latter was interesting in exploring placing part of  the work for the 
contract with RO but the British government refused to pay any price increase resulting from 
offset arrangements  5
4
.  In  general,  the  UK does  not appear to  enforce  its policy with great 
53 MoD Contracts Bulletin 3 June 1998 
54  House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC),  Fifth Report, "Security of Supply and the Future of the 
Royal Ordnance Factory Bishopton, London, The Stationery Office, 26 May 1999, p.vi. 
160 rigour and appears to reluctant to penalise a foreign company which fails to  live up to offset 
'commitments'. The latter are anyway not legally binding. 
Linked  to  a readiness  to  contemplate  foreign  bids  is  a reluctance  to  define  in  public,  and 
probably in private, the areas where it is  deemed vital that a British territory-based capacity 
for development and production be sustained.  Dating from an internal study in the 1980s, the 
Government accepts that it should maintain a UK capacity in those technologies/capabilities 
that cannot bought from  foreign suppliers. The list of such technologies/capabilities is short 
and classified. In practice, the British government appears committed to  a capacity to  build 
nuclear weapons  and nuclear submarines,  although  it has  abandoned the  capacity to  build 
ballistic missiles. In  1999 it seems likely that the  Government will  allow BAe to  close the 
Bishopton ammunition propellant plant and to  become reliant on foreign  suppliers, from  a 
BAe subsidiary in the Netherlands and South Africa in the first place. In general, given the 
limited  possibilities  for  effective  UK-only  competitive  tendering  in  many  areas,  the 
government is  reluctant to reveal precisely where it would like to  keep a UK capability for 
fear of weakening MoD bargaining power over relevant contracts. As the House of Common 
Defence  Committee  put  it,  "we  appreciate  that  there  is  a  case  for  not  openly  declaring 
particular capabilities as strategically important when there is insufficient competition to bear 
down on prices"
55
. 
The Government's broad statement on strategic capabilities demonstrates awareness of  a wide 
range of factors  but leaves the  government with much freedom of choice in any particular 
circumstance.  In  1998  the  Government told the House of Commons Defence and Trade & 
Industry Committees that it had addressed 
the extent to  which key industrial  capabilities should be  sought to  be  retained.  The criteria 
against which the  desirability of retaining defence  industrial capability can be  assesses are 
defence -based, rather than encompassing wider industrial or economic objectives. The are 
intended to ensure that the UK retains a capacity to : 
meet  operational  requirements,  unique  national  commitments,  and  maintain 
indigenous technologies ; 
support  existing  and  future  systems,  security  industry  support  for  military 
operations, and to regenerate critical equipment ; 
161 contribute, from within a restructured European industry, to collaboration; 
avoid the creation of  a monopoly or over-dependency by a company or country ; 
promote defence exports. 
How  these  strategic  considerations  will  affect  particular  assessments  will  depend  on  the 
prevailing circumstances and costs, and not on any preconceived assessment of  any individual 
capability as "important" or "strategic". The latter approach would seriously undermine the 
MoD's ability to run effective competitions and achieve value-for-money.  56 
Partly as a result of  the Bishopton debates, in 1999 the MoD is exploring whether it can reach 
a partnering arrangement with BAe/RO. The aim is to see if longer term understandings can 
be  put  in  place  that  enable  the  UK  to  obtain  sustained  value  for  money  in  munitions 
procurement while at the same time  giving the  company the confidence to  make long-term 
investments and perhaps enter into joint relationships with other firms. 
The overall outcome of the government's twin policies of privatisation and competition is a 
British defence industrial sector that depends on winning contracts at home and abroad for its 
survival and which can raise capital only insofar as it looks viable to banks, pension funds and 
other investors. Companies in such circumstances are always wishing to see their share prices 
rise and need to  present to  shareholders a satisfactory return on capital. A return of around 
eight  per  cent  is  the  established  target.  Company  boards  feel  obligated  to  maximise 
shareholder value, which means cutting costs whenever possible. Companies also must have a 
longer terms strategy for survival and profit maximisation. Such a strategy can also include a 
decision to abandon the defence sector in order to concentrate on other civil areas. Thorn EMI 
and  most prominently GEC  have recently adopted this  course.  GEC  appears to have been 
motivated  by awareness that the  US  would not allow it both to  build its  North American 
investments  successfully and  to  develop  closer relations  with Thomson-CSF  of France 
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• 
Given  that defence  was  appreciated by  GEC  as  a shrinking  global  market,  and that  GEC 
would  probably  pay  for  further  integration  with  Thomson-CSF,  it  decided  to  maximise 
shareholder value  by putting its  defence  businesses  up  for  auction.  BAe prevailed against 
competition from Thomson and Lockheed Martin. 
55  HCDC, 1999, op.cit., p.xx. 
56  House  of Commons  Defence  and  Trade  &  Industry  Committees,  Eighth  Report,  "Aspects  of Defence 
Procurement and Industrial Policy", HC675, London, The Stationery Office, 1998, p.40. 
57 See Deputy Secretary of  Defense John Hamre's speech of20 November 1998 in which he revealed that the US 
considered France to be a Category C security risk country.  The UK was classified as Grade A. 
162 Although  Britain's  defence  industrial  base  is  a  significant  part,  perhaps  1  0%  of UK 
manufacturing,  most  of the  firms  involved  have  defence  as  a  significant  but  secondary 
element in their activities.  To  illustrate, military engines are less important for  Rolls Royce 
than commercial gas turbines. For GKN, Smiths and Lucas Varity the automobile industry is 
more  significant  than  defence.  Defence  including  tank  manufacture  is  less  important  for 
Vickers than general engineering and medical products. Of the major players, only BAe has 
really opted to emphasise defence as  a core business.  This structure means that many firms 
have  the  option of selling  their  defence  businesses  and  using  the  revenue  to  fund  other 
expansion. This is essentially the choice made by the GEC board. 
11-3.  The UK Government as sponsor of  defence industry 
The government sponsors defence industry in the UK in two main areas - paying for research 
and  development  costs  in  advance  of production  and  delivery,  and  in  mutli-dimensional 
support for export efforts. 
As far as R&D is concerned, the Government contracts to pay agreed R&D costs of a project 
incurred by companies in advance of production and delivery. In the commercial sector this 
does not normally occur and so the practice can be considered as industrial sponsorship. The 
government seeks, but does not always succeed, to link such payments to defined progress on 
a project. 
However, some qualifications need to be made in this area. 
First, in the competitive phase companies are drawn to spend more than the government has 
provided in order to improve their chances of winning the final contract. The government is 
reluctant to use open-ended cost-plus contracts, even for high risk development work. Second, 
the government does not pay directly for the costs incurred by a company incurred in bidding 
for a contract.  A company losing a contract is not reimbursed for its bidding costs. The result 
of  these factors can be that, in a protracted competition, a company can conclude that it can no 
longer afford the total  cost of bidding.  This essentially happened to  Racal  before  a prime 
contractor for the Bowman contract was selected. Racal arranged with its rival that their bids 
163 would  be  merged.  The  MoD  found  itself facing,  not  two  competing  bidders,  but  a  single 
consortium called Archer. 
Second,  the  government  is  looking  to  reduce  its  own  capital  contributions  to  defence 
capability and is exploring how companies themselves might be induced to find the funding. 
This appears more feasible in those areas of limited technological risk in which development 
costs can be modest and predictable. In mid-1999 the UK government is looking to procure 
capability in armoured vehicle transportation, satellite communications, roll-on/roll-off ferries 
and air-to-air refuelling through Public Private Partnerships. In such arrangements, companies 
own  the  equipment  and  provide  specified  levels  of service  in  exchange  for  rates  of pay 
dependent largely on usage. The government contracts for a normal, minimal usage rate and 
the  company  agrees  to  make  available  enhanced  services  in terms  of crisis  and  war.  The 
advantages of such arrangements include the  government not needing to  burden the public 
sector borrowing  requirement with a  large  capital  outlay,  and  the  freedom  of the  service 
provider to use the equipment in civil markets when it is not needed by UK forces. 
The  government can also be  seen as  a sponsor of UK industry in that it normally allows a 
business to  make free  use of IPR funded by any government R&D money received by that 
firm.  The UK government does, however, seek to insist that the Government also has access 
to that IPR to use as the government wishes. 
This leads to the government's role as a sponsor of defence exports by British industry. The 
most obvious manifestation of this sponsorship is the  government's funding of the Defence 
Export Services Organisation (DESO) to the sum of  about L25 million a year. 
DESO gathers export market intelligence in close collaboration with UK diplomatic missions 
and helps British firms  to  sell their products around the world.  DESO's efforts signal to  a 
potential buyer that a sale would have the endorsement of  the British Government. DESO also 
works  with  firms  to  secure  financing  for  sales,  often  involving  the  government's  Export 
Credit and Guarantee service, which underwrites loans. DESO will also work to arrange high-
level British political support for a sale, perhaps involving a ministerial visit or a visit to the 
UK  by  a  potential  purchaser.  DESO  will  also  work  with  the  UK  services  to  arrange 
demonstrations of UK equipment. Of significance, DESO treats firms with manufacturing in 
the UK, such as Thomson's subsidiaries, as 'British' companies. 
164 Thus the British Government both subjects UK defence industry to intense competition at the 
same time as  giving it real  help with exports.  Again the  'tough love'  label appears clearly 
apposite. 
Conclusion 
The British government's model of 'tough love' with regard to its defence industries can be 
clearly articulated. However, that model appears to be in a process of change as the UK MoD 
explores partnering possibilities under Smart Procurement, as remnants of British preference 
are abandoned in favour of an OCCAR framework or even a NATO-wide understanding, as 
the British character of defence businesses in the  UK is  further eroded, and as  appreciation 
grows of  the military as well as economic value of  defence industries. 
165 CHAPTER 6 : Sweden 
Introduction and Summary 
For much of the Cold War, Sweden was well served by its security policy, which included a 
strong defence industrial dimension. By the 1990s, however, that security policy was coming 
under  great  pressure  from  economic  and  technological  factors.  The  ending  of  the 
confrontation between the USSR and the  West,  and then the  collapse of the  Soviet Union, 
provided a useful pretext for the revision of a struggling approach to  security.  The revision 
process is well underway but it is not easy to perceive how exactly how it will conclude, since 
the  country has  adopted a course of incremental change rather than move to  a radical  but 
sustainable new position. 
This  paper  looks  at  the  tradition  of Sweden's  Cold  War  security  policy  as  an  important 
element  influencing  the  country's  defence  industrial  sector.  Then  a  sketch  of Sweden's 
defence industry at the end of  the Cold War precedes a survey of  the changing security policy 
and  its  impact  on  industry  regarding  the  narrowing  of national  areas  of  capability, 
participation in collaborative projects, and industrial restructuring.  Corporate governance  is 
then discussed in terms of the management/oversight role of the owners of Swedish defence 
industry.  Finally,  Sweden's  future  defence  spending  levels,  technological  priorities  and 
defence export capabilities are highlighted as  important factors that will shape the future of 
the country's defence businesses. 
I.  SWEDEN'S  COLD  WAR  SECURITY  POLICY  AND  IDSTORICAL  OF  SWEDISH 
DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
During  the  Cold  War,  Sweden  recognised  the  dangers  to  its  territorial  integrity  and 
independence from a Soviet Union that, in the event of war with the West, would have sought 
to  overrun  and/or  destroyed  the  whole  of Western  Europe  within  a  period  of days.  The 
Swedish response sought to be both non-provocative but vigorous. 
166 Its  non-provocative  character  was  based  first  on  Sweden's  refusal  to  join  NATO,  an 
organisation clearly directed against the USSR, and also the European Economic Community. 
Sweden  also  rejected  nuclear  weapons  as  part  of any  national  deterrent  effort.  Sweden 
presented itself as neutral or non-aligned in the East-West struggle. 
Yet Sweden's national defence effort was also vigorous, involving universal conscription (a 
'nation in arms'), modem military equipment and significant defence spending. As a means of 
underlining its non-aligned stance and its determination to  defend itself,  Sweden developed 
and  produced  most  of its  defence  equipment  including  surface  combat  vessels,  diesel 
submarines, tanks and other armoured vehicles and combat aircraft
58
. It was reluctant to buy 
major  systems  from  the  West  (and  did  not  import  Soviet  equipment  ).  It  declined 
involvement in the collaborative development and production programmes that proliferated in 
Europe from the late  1960s onwards. It also was reluctant to  export its  defence equipment, 
especially to areas of tension, as part of a foreign policy that discouraged the use of force by 
any party. 
This policy had viability for several reasons : 
a)  Sweden had only a limited border with the USSR and  it was  difficult to  imagine that 
Moscow would attack Sweden except as part of a wider assault on NATO states including 
Norway and Denmark. Given NATO~s responsibilities in areas adjacent to  Sweden, and 
Sweden's cultural association with the  West and  its  values,  it would also  have  been a 
major  gamble  for  the  USSR to  have  assumed  that  it  could  have  attacked  Sweden  in 
isolation without a NATO reaction.  In short,  Sweden enjoyed the  benefits of NATO's 
existence without having to pay any subscriptions to the organisation. 
b)  Sweden was  a wealthy, sophisticated, industrialised state that was capable of near self-
sufficiency in modem arms.  As  one  Swedish authority  has  written  : 'from a  Swedish 
perspective, non-alignment and  neutrality can only be  a viable solution if the nation is 
reasonably self-sufficient in arms production'. 
59 
c)  It was compatible with the Swedish rejection of war as an instrument of policy that dated 
back  to  the  beginning  of the  eighteenth  century.  Sweden  has  not  fought  a  war  since 
58 The author understands that Sweden's enthusiasm for self-sufficiency in combat aircraft production dates from 
the late  1930s when the country had ordered Hurricanes from  Britain. When the Second World War broke out, 
the UK government diverted all Hurricane production to the RAF, leaving Sweden in the lurch. That stimulated 
the establishment of  the Swedish combat aircraft industry. 
167 Napoleon's time and by 1945 the Swedish body politic had turned away from using armed 
forces for any purpose other than self-defence. 
Even during the Cold War, however, the policy was exposed to some stress. 
a)  Although Sweden professed itself neutral, and although it predominantly had a socialist 
government that maintained a general social security system, its values associated it much 
more closely with the West than the USSR. It felt no  sense of threat from NATO states 
but did from Moscow. 
b)  Its  policy  of national  defence  industrial  self-sufficiency  was  increasingly  difficult  to 
sustain given the rising fixed costs of equipment. Sweden's highly restrictive arms export 
policy meant that Sweden could rarely recoup fixed development costs through sales to 
third parties. 
c)  Sweden  certainly  perceived  itself as  prospering  through  participation  in the  European 
economy.  It wanted access to  as  many aspects  of the European Community market as 
possible and its benefits from the European Free Trade Association appeared less and less 
adequate in the 1980s. 
Sweden's defence industry 
In  1986  , the  15  leading  defence  producers founded  the  Association of Swedish Defence 
Industries (FIF) to promote matters of  mutual interest. Today, the FIF members employ a total 
of 24,000  people  of whom  around  15,000  are  directly  involved  in the  development  and 
production of  defence materiel. The total sales of  the member companies in 1997 amounted to 
S.Kr31  billion,  of which  S.Kr  15.5  billion  represented  defence  equipment.  Of defence 
equipment sales, Sweden accounted for approximately S.Kr  13 billion and the export markets 
... for approximately S.Kr 3. 7 billion. 
60 
Like many NATO states during much of the  Cold War,  Sweden had a largely state-owned 
company (Celsius) producing the guns and ammunition fundamental for national defence. For 
the most part, however, the Swedish government looked to privately-owned businesses in the 
country to supply its defence needs. 
59  Madeleine Sandstrom, Sweden's Changing Defence Industry,  Ebenhausen,  Stiftung fuer  Wissenschaft und 
Politik, AP-3021, 1997, p.l6. 
60 'Northern Lights', Jane's Defense Weekly 23  December 1998. 
168 The Swedish defence market, however, was too small to sustain competing firms in the same 
market sector.  The  government therefore accepted the  emergence of national champions in 
different sectors and looked to build close relationships with them in order to obtain value for 
money from defence spending. 
At the  close  of the  1990s,  the  main Swedish companies,  and  their main areas  of defence 
concern, were : 
I)  Celsius, in which the state owns 60% of the voting rights and 25% of the capital. 
The owner of 
Bofors  :  manufacturer  of anti-armour  weapons,  ammunition  and  artillery 
torpedoes and mines 
CelsiusTech : manufacturer of electronic devices including warning systems, fire 
control  systems  and  night sights,  air  defence  equipment and  mine  hunting  and 
clearing equipment ; 
Kochums  :  builder  of  conventional  submarines,  coastal  vessels,  corvettes, 
minehunters and bridging equipment 
Celsius FFV  Aerotech : aircraft test systems, support and upgrades 
2)  Saab  : combat aircraft,  electronic warfare equipment, anti  ship missiles and The 
owner of 
Volvo Aero Corporation :jet engines 
Ericcson  Microwave  Systems  ;  defence  electronics  including  radars  and 
communications equipment. 
Ericsson Saab Avionics : airborne computers and related systems, and armoured 
vehicle electronics. Ericsson is the full  or part-owner of electronics businesses in 
Denmark and Norway. 
Hagglunds  : military armoured and all-terrain vehicles.  Hagglund has a vehicles 
company, Hagglund Moelv in Norway. 
Among these firms, Ericcson and Celsius have significant non-defence interests. Ericcson is a 
major player on the global telecommunications front.  Saab abandoned the civil aircraft sector 
in 1998, deciding not to pursue the next generation of  its regional aircraft. 
169 II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY 
From the late 1980s Sweden's traditional security policy of non-alignment coupled with self-
sufficiency  in  armaments  production,  began  to  be  abandoned.  The  policy  became 
economically  less  feasible  and  politically  less  appropriate.  Membership  of the  European 
Union and signing the Maatricht Treaty of 1991 were significant steps away from a pure non-
aligned position. 
In related defence equipment areas, some landmark events signalling change were : 
- The dilution of  the national capability in major defence systems. 
Sweden followed the Viggen fighter with another Swedish national product, the Gripen. The 
Gripen's  development was  completed  and  204  aircraft  are  being  made  for  Sweden.  but 
Sweden accepted considerable foreign help with its development. Its engine was American, as 
were the Viggen's, and BAe and GEC were among those contributing help to the airframe 
design and the fly-by-wire system. Saab kept design and systems integration capabilities but 
Sweden accepted that a significant part of  the aircraft would be foreign. In 199 Saab accepted 
a strategic  link with BAe to  help  with the  marketing  of the  Gripen,  that had capabilities 
between BAe's own  Hawk and  Eurofighter aircraft.  BAe  took  a  35%  share  in Saab  as  a 
tangible financial link bonding the two companies. 
According to  the  Swedish FOA official Madeleine Sandstrom,  'official figures  indicate that 
JAS  Gripen  includes  foreign  subsystems  up  to  40%.  According  to  unofficial  figures,  few 
systems developed and manufactured in Sweden have less than 50% foreign content'. 
61 
Sweden abandoned national tank development aspirations in 1994 when it agreed to buy 120 
Leopard 2s from Germany. The tarik is being built by Hagglunds under licence in Sweden so 
production facilities would be sustained. 
Embracinv collaborative projects with NATO members 
Sweden moved into collaborative defence developments on a significant scale, not just with 
Nordic  neighbours  but  also  with  other  aligned  European  states.  Sweden's  first  formal 
170 endorsement of collaboration was  in  1983  when  it signed  an  agreement  with Norway  on 
cooperation covering all stages of the procurement cycle. This agreement resulted in the joint 
development and production ofthe ARTHUR artillery-locating radar. In 1994 the four Nordic 
defence ministers agreed to form a Nordic market for defence technology.  By 1999 : 
Sweden was  participating  as  an  observer  in  the  Western  European Armaments 
Group, had a Partnership for Peace programme with NATO that included relations 
with  the  NATO  Industrial  Advisory  Group,  and  was  a  full  member  of the 
European Union. 
Sweden had signed MoUs  on arms collaboration first  with Nordic states (1994) 
and then with France, Germany and the UK.  The  1996-7 defence bill mandated 
procurement authorities to seek collaborative solutions for new systems. 
Kochums  was  working  with  DCN  of  France  on  technologies  conventional 
submarines under an agreement signed in August 1998. There is also a project of 
merger between factor  and HDW of Germany.  If merger  goes-on the  company 
would be the first constructor of submarine in the world 
Kochums was  developing the  collaborative Viking submarine with Norway and 
Denmark. 
Bofors was working with Giat on the 155 BONUS smart artillery ammunition. 
Ericsson was working with Thomson on a new airborne surveillance radar. 
Hagglunds was working with Patria of Finland on the AMOS  120mm armoured 
mortar. 
Saab Dynamics was working with LFK/DASA on the KEPD  150 version of the 
Taurus air-to-surface missile. Celsius has a 33% share in this project; 
Saab Dynamics was the largest sub-contractor on the collaborative IRIS-T  short-
range air-to-air missile led by BGT  /Diehl. 
Sweden  was  looking  at  a  collaborative  procurement  of a  common  transport 
helicopter with Denmark, Finland and Norway. 
61  M.Sandstrom, Sweden's Changing Defence Industry, Ebenhausen, Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und Politik, AP-
3021, 1997, p.10. 
171 III.  INDUSTRIAL  RESTRUCTURING  AND  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  IN  THE 
SWEDISH DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
111-1. Industrial restructuring 
The  government and  companies  accepted  that the  national  character of Sweden's defence 
businesses needed to be compromised. 
In 1995 Celsius bought a 15% share in Raufoss ofNorway, which remains 50.3% owned by 
the  Norwegian  government.  In  1998  Celsius  began  forming  an  ammunition joint venture 
called Nammo with Patria of Finland and Raufoss of Norway ; Nammo is  based in Norway 
with Raufoss holding a 45% share.  Celsius interest in buying up Kongsberg of Norway has 
not, however, led, to a purchase. 
At the same time, Celsius and Patria agreed to form Nexplo, a powder and explosives jv in 
which Celsius would have a 60% share. 
In 1997 Alvis of the UK was allowed to buy Haaglunds, the armoured vehicle manufacturer 
whose All-Terrain Vehicles are being bought by the UK and Germany. 
In April  1999  Hagglunds set up  a joint company with Patria of Finland to  represent both 
companies  in  armoured  vehicle  procurements  in  the  Nordic  region.  Alvis  will  explore 
collaboration with Patria regarding the rest of  the world. 
In  1999  Celsius  formed  a joint venture  with  Grintek of South  Africa  to  cover electronic 
warfare. Celsius has a 49% per cent share in the company. 
As noted, a BAe 35% investment in Saab Aerospace was accepted. 
Sweden joined five European members of NATO in signing the Letter of Intent in July 1998 
on measures to facilitate the restructuring of Europe's defence industry, thus signalling that it 
was ready to contemplate its businesses integrated into wider European structures. 
Reorientine defence policy 
Although the  end  of the  Cold  War resulted  in  smaller  Swedish forces,  it is  slowly being 
accepted that Sweden should build a greater capability for force deployment, as the proposed 
plan for  the 2000-2004 period reflects
62
.  This implies greater spending on surveillance and 
command and control systems, among others. 
62  'Over  the  past  decade  the  Swedish  army  has  been  cut  from  24  manoeuvre  brigades  to  13.  Under 
Gen.Wictorin's force-structure proposal, the  heart of the  field army would fall  to  16  rapid-reaction battalions, 
172 111-2.  Corporate governance 
The control of Swedish defence companies is complex. The government owns 61.7% of the 
voting rights of Celsius through its Class A shares.  However, it owns only a quarter of the 
total  shares  and  it  has  agreed  to  restrict  its  votes  to  one  quarter  so  long  as  Swedish 
shareholders have a controlling interest in the company. In March 1999 non-Swedes held 29% 
of total shares. In practice, Celsius' top management increasingly feel  commercial pressures 
and the impact of defence  industrial restructuring in the  US  and Europe.  Hence profit has 
achieved a more central role.  In 1997 Celsius appointed Lars Josefsson from the  privately-
owned  Ericcson  and  he  announced  an  intention  to  focus  the  company's  expertise  more 
narrowly and to rise defence margins from around two per cent to eight per cent
63
. However, 
the defence business area continued to  struggle in the first half of 1999 with the government 
postponing orders and the company admitting to spare capacity in many areas
64
. 
BAe has bought 35% of  the voting rights in Saab. However 20% of  the equity and 36% of  the 
voting rights are owned by the local Investor investment group.  Saab report that 38% of its 
shares  are  owned in  the  UK,  17%  in the  US  and  2  per  cent  in the  rest of the  world. 
65 
Investor, chaired by Peter Wallenberg, is the main investment arm of the Wallenberg family 
business empire and controls pension and mutual funds. In addition to the Investor holding in 
Saab, the Wallenberg Foundation owns 8.8% of  the total shares and 5.7 per cent of  the votes. 
Marcus Wallenberg, the Deputy Chief Executive of  Investor AB is vice-chairman of Saab AB 
(and  Ericsson),  among  many  other  posts.  Reportedly,  Saab's  capacity  to  propose  wide-
ranging offsets to South Africa as part of  the Grip en offer was assisted by what other Investor 
companies could offer. 
66  Investor sold Hagglunds as part of a reduction in engineering focus 
and an effort to concentrate on medical equipment. 
which could be grouped into four brigades for operations if required', in 'Army cuts go too far' Jane's Defense 
Weekly 16 June 1999. 
63  'Celsius looks to catch the defence consolidation wave', Financial Times 27 August 1999. 
64 Interim Report available through Celsius homepage 'http ://www.celsius.se'. 
65  Saab  homepage  'http  ://www.saab.se'  ; also  'Gripen sales  to  SwAF  help  Saab  revenues  to  soar', Jane's 
Defence Weekly 26 August 1998 
66 'Saab offers South Africa $4b offset deal' Jane's Defence Weekly 21  January 1999. 
173 Ericsson, 53% of whose 50,000 employees are outside Sweden, is a wide-ranging electronics 
and telecommunications group within the Wallenberg sphere of influence. Investor AB owns 
22.2% of shares and the Wallenberg family a further  16.5%. However, 30% of Saab shares 
are owned in the US and altogether Swedish owners account for just half the shares. 
This pattern of shareholding means that the  major Swedish owners of the country's major 
defence business own large proportions of the companies that could not easily be sold on the 
open market.  There  is  a  contrast  with the  UK where  the  major  shareholding  institutions 
holding mutual, insurance and pension funds do not like to hold more than 5% of  the shares in 
a  company.  The  Swedish  major  owners,  in  particular  the  government,  Investor,  the 
Wallen  berg  Foundation and  Skandia,  own large  percentages of shareholdings and  are  thus 
committed  to  the  effective  management  and  success  of their  investments.  Unlike  British 
institutions, the major Swedish institutions cannot afford to walk away from their investments 
by  selling their shares on the open market. Not surprisingly, the major investors often hold 
places on the boards of  defence companies, as the positions of  Marcus Wallenberg illustrated. 
Regarding the ethical dimension, Swedish firms have been tightly constrained in their export 
activities  by  the  government.  However,  Sweden  is  a  major  trading  nation  with  long 
experience,  so  when trading opportunities  do  arise,  Swedish companies are  tempted to  do 
what is necessary to win. As the claims of brj.bery associated with the 1986 sale of artillery to 
India signal, Swedish firms do not appear immune to temptations to pay commission in order 
to win sales. 
IV. FACTORS SHAPING THE FUTURE 
IV-1. Swedish defence spending 
The  future  of Sweden's defence  industry will  depend  significantly on the  level of defence 
spending that the  government adopts.  In the  1990s the  government  did not allow defence 
spending to  grow with inflation and the  consequence was that desired projects suffered.  A 
five-year plan to cover spending in the 2000-2004 period was still evolving in 1999. 
174 In  1999  the  latest  casualty  was,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  Swedish  participation in  the 
development of the  Matra-BAe -led Meteor medium-range air-to  air-missile.  The  Swedish 
armed forces announced in the summer that there was no  money available for this project's 
development, although it could be bought later as  a developed item.  It had been envisaged 
that Sweden would take about 12-15% of  the programme with Saab Dynamics developing the 
fuze  and  Ericcson  working  on  data  links.  It  remains  possible  that  Sweden's  political 
leadership will find  the  needed funding.
67  It's the  same problem with the missile stand-off 
Taurus  which is  a co-operation with LFK-DASA.  There are  also  threats  over the  national 
Bofors BAMSE surface-to-air missile.  The burden of the Gripen on the procurement budget 
is great, with Gripen contracts accounting for 60% of Swedish government defence contracts 
with  industry by  1999.
68  When  spending  is  announced for  the  2000  period onwards,  it is 
possible but not certain that funding for all these projects will be found. 
However, the Swedish procurement agency, the FMV, is under pressure to optimise the value 
obtained from the defence budget and to facilitate the restructuring of Swedish forces towards 
greater  force  projection  capabilities.  It  does  not  feel  an  overriding  duty  to  protect  non-
competitive Swedish defence firms and the government may opt for more imported systems. 
In 1998  British consultants hired by the Swedish government urged FMV to save money by 
considering more foreign equipment. 
69 
IV.2 Sweden's technological priorities 
There is recognition that Sweden can not afford a comprehensive defence industry, but still 
wishes to keep a capability in five areas 'of vital and strategic interest for Sweden in case of 
crisis  or  even  war  conditions' .
70  These  are  :  electronic  warfare  ;  stealth  technology  ; 
aeronautical  technology,  underwater technology,  and  C3I  technology.  This  list  appears  to 
have evolved somewhat since  1995
71  and it is  likely that, for war fighting reasons,  Sweden 
will also want to keep fairly comprehensive maintenance capabilities. 
67  'Sweden's armed forces close purse strings on Meteor' 
68  'Swedish budget not expected to meet priorities', Jane's Defence Weekly 10 March 1999 
69 'Sweden mulls cuts in defence spending', Financial Times 7 November 1998. 
70 Lars Vigert ofFMV, in 'Northern Lights', Jane's Defense Weekly, 23  December 1998. 
71  Sondstrum op.cit., p.23. 
175 IV-3. Defence exports 
Sweden's defence businesses need to  serve more than the Swedish market to  survive. In the 
past Sweden has  pursued a restrictive  arms  export policy,  but is  today  looking to  achieve 
common  ground  with  other  European  states  that  have  long  held  more  relaxed  positions. 
Sweden as a member of the EU is  a signatory of the EU  Code of Conduct on arms exports 
and,  as  noted has signed the  1998 Loi which includes recognition of the need for European 
states with integrated defence businesses to have a common arms export policy. 
Sweden has high hopes for the Gripen which, with BAe assisting with marketing, has been 
selected by South Africa. South Africa will take 28 aircraft. The Gripen is competing fiercely 
against American and other European combat aircraft for selection by the Polish air force and 
Saab has (reportedly) offered to loan the aircraft for five years if  it is selected. 
72 
However, Sweden's readiness to supply to areas of  tension and conflict, and thus to change its 
previous policy, could well be tested by an Indian request for a licence to manufacture more 
of  the artillery pieces that it bought from Bofors in 1986.
73 
Conclusion 
Sweden has  embarked upon a process  of incremental  security  change  without being clear 
about  the  parameters  of change.  On  the  security  policy  front,  it  has  moved  away  from 
neutrality, accepted the desirability of a European common foreign and security policy, and is 
re-orienting its armed forces away from a purely defensive role. However, it is not clear that 
Sweden will be a full player in the emerging European security and defence identity and has 
concerns, for  instance, about the proposed absorption of the WEU into the EU.  Unbounded 
change is apparent also in the related defence industrial sphere. The Government, as are some 
companies, is tom between the priority to  be  given to  Swedish sub-system capabilities, that 
could make  a company attractive in  international projects  and that could be  valuable  in a 
wartime situation where there was a need for 'surge production'. The alternative course is to 
sustain systems design and  integration skills to  preserve  the  image  of national  armaments 
72  'Sweden offers loan of  Gripen squadron ....  ' Flight lnternationa/22-1 July 1999. 
73  'Swedish ire over howitzer move' Financial Times 27 July 1999. 
176 capability, even though extensive use has to be made of overseas sub-system providers. The 
Swedish government endorses ideas that European defence industry should be restructured on 
trans-national lines and that the days of Swedish self-sufficiency are  over. It welcomes the 
foreign defence investments, especially in the Nordic area, of Ericcson among others, and it 
has allowed Hagglunds' sale to a British company. Yet Saab remains under Swedish control 
and the state has kept its controlling interest in Celsius. This seems largely to ensure that the 
company  remains  in Swedish hands.  In  simple terms,  Saab  seems  likely to  flourish  if the 
Gripen sells and the BAe link in general brings work. Ericsson's fate will hinge more on its 
civilian than its defence success. Much of  the Celsius Group will struggle to achieve scale and 
further reductions can be expected there. 
The  fundamental  point is  that,  with  Sweden having  abandoned  self-sufficiency  in defence 
production, no clear limits on the degree of foreign dependence have been set. As Madeleine 
Sandstrom wrote, 'In a time of  reduced military threat, the political will to financially support 
a defence industry characterised by strong dependence on imported systems is diminishing'. 
74 
74  M.Sandstrom, The Changing Swedish Defence Industry, Ebenhausen, Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und Politik, 
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177 Conclusion 
I.  THE  TRIUMPH  OF  ANGLO-SAXON  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  UNDER  THE 
EFFECT OF GLOBALISATION. 
There is no point in describing or wishing for a world that doesn't exist to serve as the basis 
for this study's recommendations.  The objective of this conclusion is to describe the existing 
situation  and  to  envisage  how  industrial  co-operation  models  between  European  anns 
companies could be organised. 
The  first  clear  tendency  demonstrated  by  this  study  is  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  model  of 
corporate governance is becoming established as the anns industry norm in the same way as it 
is  firmly  established internationally in industry generally.  Thus,  there  is  a "globalisation" 
effect that applies to the industry - or at least to  its economics.  Increasingly, the principal 
objective  of the  anns companies  is  to  create  value  for  their  share-holders.  It is  by  this 
yardstick of created value that the competitiveness and the global value of these companies 
are assessed. 
This phenomenon is all the more important since it has been very rapid.  It only really started 
in  this  sector  in  the  1990s  and  it  has  been  a  general  trend.  The  evolution  in  France  is 
proportionally  at  least as  fast  as  the United Kingdom  (UK).  None of the  European States 
concerned have had time to adapt to the resulting transformation of  the relationship with their 
suppliers. The States have been late in reacting to the change in the private sector, and for the 
most part it is this gap that explains the sluggish restructuring of  the anns industry. 
Two examples will suffice to describe the importance of  this change. 
In 1992 in the UK, the privatised company BAE was on the brink of the abyss.  The strategy 
of  diversification into the private sector had failed and the company was making heavy losses. 
These losses were even more striking since they were the result of a five year strategy that no-
one in the organisation had questioned. 
Seven years later, BAE has refocused on the military sector. In numerous defence fields in the 
UK, BAE enjoys a monopoly.  It is possible to imagine that this monopoly will soon become 
Europe-wide  as  in the  missile  market through  Matra/BAE  Dynamics.  The  profitability  is 
more than 10%.  The directors are remunerated essentially through stock options.  Even whilst 
acknowledging  that  industrial  preoccupations  are  part  of the  BAE  strategy,  the  quarterly 
178 accounts  are  closely  scrutinised.  At  the  time  of the  merger  with  GEC,  the  focus  of the 
communications in the UK was the creation of value, and whenever BAE concludes a merger, 
they systematically request the Finance Director's post. 
In France before the  legislative elections of 1997, the  socialists,  at the time in opposition, 
envisaged  the  merger  of their  two  large  public  arms  organisations:  Aerospatiale  and 
Thomson-CSF.  In  response  to  the  interrogation  of the  unions,  Lionel  Jospin,  the  first 
secretary of  the socialist party, replied that Thomson-CSF would never be privatised. 
Two years later, and despite the fact that the State had not yet totally withdrawn all interests 
in  these  companies,  Thomson-CSF  and  Aerospatiale  were  privatised,  notably  through 
alliances with private companies in the defence sector : Matra and Alcatel.  After the merger 
with DASA, the share of the State in EADS was no more than 15%.  The share-holders, said 
to  be the point of reference, have a large share in defining the  strategy of the consolidated 
group.  In order to  remain  competitive,  and  particularly having  been  floated  on the  stock 
market,  these  companies were  obliged to  modify their economic practices in line  with the 
competition.  In France, it seems obvious that if the State is to remain a share-holder, it will 
only  assume  a  residual  role  to  its  strategic  interests,  and  not  interfere  in  the  company's 
industrial strategy. 
Of  course it can be argued that these models are not strictly identical, particularly in the share-
hQlding structure.  In the UK the dilution of share-holding is the most striking.  In Germany, 
share-holding is moderately diluted with banks holding the predominant share.  In France the 
practice of a hard core share-holding means that there is a relatively small number of share-
holders.  In  general  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  the  arms  companies  that  are 
companies in their own right, and affiliates where the share-holding is grouped. 
These differences in share-holding of consolidated companies influence the right to vote and 
the decision-making processes.  However, this does not have any real influence on the factors 
that motivate company strategy.  And in addition, the culture of  value creation as a motivating 
factor for French company strategy is only a recent phenomenon since these companies have 
only been privatised recently. 
So  as  to  create the strongest link between directors and share-holders, the model where the 
destiny of  the directors is linked to the results of  their companies is now becoming established 
across Europe. 
179 One can certainly criticise this model.  However, it is necessary to  acknowledge that in this 
case  this  criticism would  go  beyond the  scope  of this  study  since  it  addresses  the  entire 
international capitalist model that globalisation is introducing.  The essential of  this study is to 
see how this evolution has influenced the restructuring of  the European arms industry. 
II)  THE  WEAKENING  OF  TRADITIONAL  STATE  POWER  OVER  THE  ARMS 
INDUSTRY 
The second conclusion that can be taken from this study is the world-wide weakening of State 
power over the  defence industry,  whilst there is  a risk of imbalance of the State-Company 
relationship in favour of  the company. 
a)  The weakening of State power:  the  progressive  and inevitable  retreat of public 
share-holders 
One can speak of  weakening of State power in the sense that a withdrawal from public share-
holding by the State can be witnessed in countries where it wasn't already the case: France, 
Spain, Italy.  It is clear that the fact of the State being a share-holder, often with the majority 
and sometimes unique holding, permits it to define the company strategy and thus to serve its 
own interests. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  necessary  to  qualify  this  analysis  for  many  reasons,  smce  there  are 
"nuances" whose consequences are often at the origin of  privatisation. 
In Italy it seems clear that  there was a kind of fictional "State as Defence Entrepreneur''.  The 
scale of the public sector, the existence of a large number of intermediaries between the State 
and the companies (for example, there are two levels of decision makers between the affiliates 
ofFinrneccanica and the State) have meant that the State had little to do with the definition of 
company  strategy.  It  only  intervened  in  the  event  of a  major  decision  with  diplomatic 
consequences and repercussions on the arms  supply policy of Italy.  For example,  Alenia 
Difesa after the merger of BAE and GEC, which was dealt with directly by the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of Industry. 
In France,  the  opposite  is  true,  where  a kind  of fictional  "Omnipotent State"  existed with 
regards to the definition of public arms company strategy, so that the boards of directors had 
180 little information at their disposal and no  desire to  act on these strategies.  In pushing this 
reasoning to  the  extreme,  we  can assert that the  State  only  intervenes in the choice of the 
Finance  Director,  and  this  is  what  gave  rise  to  the  myth  of State  omnipotence  in  public 
companies.  The intervention of the State to  re-capitalise the companies or to limit the range 
or effects of  a planned redundancy scheme had the same effect. 
The power of  the Spanish State in its arms industry is somewhere between the French and the 
Italian examples. 
In the second place, it is  necessary to  recognise that State  share-holding had the  effect of 
preventing the creation of standard company culture: improving productivity and competition. 
This situation only became a problem when the reduction of budget appropriation made a rise 
in costs of military materials intolerable compared to  foreign competitors.  Finally, the idea 
became entrenched in all countries that it was necessary to separate the tasks of the company 
and the State, since the State could play an antinomic role within the company. 
It is the State's role to be both client and regulator of arms production; it also should define 
the conditions necessary to assure the security of  its own supplies so as to defend its sovereign 
interests. 
The  company's  role  should  be  to  strike  a  balance  between  its  profitability  and  the 
maintenance of satisfactory social harmony.  With respect to this  last point, it is  generally 
considered that it is the State's job to define the general legislative context oflabour law, but 
that it could only be an employer in a competitive sector of industry if it does not act in a 
manner that contradicts the company interests. 
The main risk of weakening State power is  due to the fact that today no-one can guarantee 
security of supplies since the maintenance of activity in a company is dependent on its level 
of  profitability.  There is thus pressure exerted on the State as client to guarantee either global 
company profitability or the profitability of  the activities for which supply security is deemed 
absolutely necessary.  The paradox of the situation in a client/supplier relationship is that the 
State can have an interest in creating monopolies and in maintaining attractive profit margins 
for  its  supplier.  It is by this rather indirect way that it can continue to influence company 
strategy. 
181 b) The risk of introducing an imbalanced State/Company partnership 
The State could be placed in a position of  weakness in relation to industry under the combined 
pressure of  three factors that each taken individually would not perhaps be damaging. 
In retreating behind their role of State as client, the national arms departments have refocused 
on the  function of simple purchaser.  If it is  certainly possible to  contractually specify the 
quality of materials in requiring certain performances, it becomes difficult as  a purchaser to 
assess the cost of this knowing that the offer is limited - maybe even unique -- and that the 
choice of supplier is not independent of  political considerations. 
This difficulty, in the name of  preserving competition in the arms industry so as to maintain a 
European industrial and technological base for defence, is rendered even more arduous if the 
supplier acquires a monopoly that could become Europe-wide. 
To  these two factors  comes a third linked to  current particularities of co-operation in arms 
matters.  The difficulty of the major European States to agree on a unique operational need, 
the  difficulty  of national  arms  departments  to  adopt  rules  regarding  compatible  contract 
approval  procedures,  the  difficulty  of the  States  to  finance  together  and in a concomitant 
manner certain programmes, favour the development of  compromise solutions even within the 
European companies.  The intention here is not to criticise this practice, since it can remedy 
the deficiencies of  public authorities in arms co-operation matters, but simply to acknowledge 
that this state of affairs  continues to  destabilise the relationship between the State and the 
industry in the industry's favour. 
Faced  with these  three  risks  of imbalance  affecting  the  State/industry  client/supplier,  the 
British are attempting to  bring a solution via the Smart procurement initiative.  The general 
idea is to associate the client and the supplier so as to collectively define the balance between 
the cost and the performance of  the material.  It is still too early to draw any conclusions from 
this initiative that presupposes three conditions for success : 
•  the assurance that the mechanism will maintain the possibility for the company to achieve 
profits in line with the share-holders' wishes, 
•  the client's capacity to have access within the company to all the elements that contribute 
to  calculating the profit margin, to  be able to  contest this if needs be, and to  be able to 
negotiate value for money without compromising the necessity for the company to return 
a profit 
182 •  the general adoption of such a work method at a European level (e.g. the difference of  cost 
negotiation between States provoked delays in the signing of  the order ofNH 90). 
The  paradox  of this  situation  is  that  to  compensate  for  the  weakening  of the  State's 
relationship with the supplier as  a client, the British will no  doubt be obliged to  implement 
instruments of State control in private enterprise where they are fearful to see liberalism as we 
traditionally understand  it.  The  success  of such  a procedure  will  be  depend on the  joint 
perception by the two actors of the common interests and so  keep an open  communication 
between them.  It is  equally necessary to  be  suspicious  of pernicious effects of too  much 
bureaucratic control that would have the effect of delaying the programmes despite the fact 
that  Smart Procurement,  by  including  a  constituent destined to  limit the  number of State 
decisions and giving extended powers to the programme managers, aims precisely to limit the 
weight of  bureaucracy. 
III)  INDUSTRIAL  AND  STRATEGIC  MODELS  OF  CO-OPERATION  ARE  MADE  ON 
ENCOMIC RULES 
The restructuring of  the European Arms industry is, today, no longer a myth.  We can already 
draw some conclusions from company consolidations that have already taken place. 
To begin with, it is the companies that are leading the restructuring of the arms industry and 
according to their own criteria. 
The  first  criteria is  that  all  structural  alliances,  that  follow  from  the  purchase  of another 
company, a merger of companies or by the constitution of a sector joint venture, create value 
in  the  company.  This  creation  of value  consists  of improving  the  profit  margin  of the 
company.  For this, three principal factors affect the results of  this objective: 
•  permit structural cost savings  in the new company due to the merger, 
•  increase the technological capacities to endeavour to attain a dominant position in one or 
many sectors, 
•  reduce the number of  competitors in the market. 
Through analysis of these three factors,  the priorities of the companies in these mergers can 
be deduced. 
183 Firstly, a  structural alliance via a  merger will always be preferable to  a  simple joint 
venture and for the following two reasons: 
1)  Joint venture offers less capacity for structural cost saving than a company merger.  The 
split  of the  share-holding  is  done  on  a  50/50  basis  and  the  decisions  taken  must  be 
unanimous. 
2)  The  share-holders of the mother companies balk at  seeing multiple joint ventures with 
other companies.  The affiliates' results are less transparent, also the power of control is 
unclear since it is delegated to the directors of the mother company who become members 
of board of directors of the joint venture.  Also, multiple joint ventures -- apart from the 
fact that they tend to transform the mother companies into simple holding companies --
may find their affiliates pursuing contradictory strategies. 
Secondly,  national consolidations  are easier  and,  in  a  way,  create  more value  than 
European consolidations : 
1)  Easier, since the split of power within the new company is  simpler to  define than in a 
transnational  merger.  Naturally,  no  dispute  linked  to  State  interests  would  occur  in 
negotiations between companies of the  same country.  So  it is not true to say that BAE 
preferred GEC rather than DASA or that Aerospatiale preferred MATRA to DASA or to 
another European partner.  Simply, at a given moment when the opportunity presented 
itself, it seemed much simpler and faster to merge companies of  the same country. 
2)  Until there  is  free  circulation of military technologies  in Europe,  the  creation of value 
resulting in a merger of transnational companies will be inferior to that resulting from the 
merger of companies of the  same  country.  To  this,  can be  added that structural cost-
savings are also easier and faster to attain in the case of  national mergers. 
Thirdly joint ventures are easier to negotiate than transnational company mergers 
Joint ventures are  in general concluded with a 50/50 split of the share-holding and decision 
making which suits both the State power and the power of  the mother company directors.  The 
set-up of New BAE dynamics manages to maintain a certain equality of rights even though, 
henceforth,  there  are  three  partners  :  Alenia,  BAE  and  EADS.  Assuming  integration  of 
184 general management, sales teams and technical teams when technology transfer is  possible, 
the joint venture is an easy solution to put into place, even if  the rationalisation that it offers is 
inferior  to  other  solutions.  It is  significant to  see  that the  alliance  between DASA and 
Aerospatiale-MATRA was made on the basis of an equal split of power and share-holding. 
Measured in terms of turnover, Aerospatiale-MA  TRA was superior to D ASA.  Repositioned 
in the  global  context of the  power of the  two  countries  and  their  role  in the  European 
construction, the French company and the German company were considered to be on equal 
footing.  In all cases, this 50/50 split, just like the strict sharing of posts, proves that much 
more than a capitalist merger, this is an intergovernmental model that has been implemented 
with the merit of  not misrepresenting the economic reality too greatly. 
From there we can draw a  certain number of conclusions about the current situation and 
evolution of  the restructuring of  the arms industry. 
First sub  conclusion  :  the  constitution  of EADC,  such  as  wished  by  the  heads  of 
European government on the 9th December 1997, was impossible to fulfil. 
It is  not the  objective in itself that was impossible to  achieve but the merger mechanism 
envisaged. 
In asking  the  large  European aeronautic  and  defence  companies  to  merge  in one  single 
operation, difficulties tended to be maximised.  It was necessary to resolve at the same time in 
the new company : 
•  the question of evaluating the contributions as well as the question of the split of share-
holding and power, 
•  the question of  security of  supplies for the States. 
These questions, already extremely difficult to treat in negotiations between companies of  two 
different countries, became impossible with three  companies and all  the more so  with six 
companies.  The fact that the States signed the letter of intention of 6th July 1998, accepting 
to work on the constitution of EADC in their area of expertise, did not fundamentally change 
the problem. 
In any case,  even the fact that the  large European aeronautic  and defence companies had 
accepted to work on this and had, by the end of spring 1998, nearly completed the exploration 
185 of the  ways  and  means  of such  a  merger,  tends  to  prove  that  their  objectives  could  be 
compatible with the States. 
Second Sub  conclusion  : globalisation  leads  to  consolidations in  line with the  political 
declaration of  9th December 1997. 
One of  the lessons of  the study is that the most favourable situation for an arms organisation is 
to have the monopoly in the biggest possible market.  From now on it is perfectly clear that it 
is as much the stock market as the Pentagon that has pushed the restructuring of  the American 
arms industry and that it was the American government that fixed the limits in prohibiting the 
merger between Lockheed-Martin and Northrop Grumann. 
In Europe, the arms companies could have the same interests, and it is certain that the plan to 
construct a defence identity for Europe that will establish it as a force in the international arms 
industry,  could  be  a  favourable  result  of the  consolidations  of the  arms  industry.  The 
construction  of a  common  defence  identity  that  respects  the  different  nations,  tends  to 
guarantee the survival of the directors of the different companies called upon to restructure. 
In the case of  transatlantic merger, a viable economic alternative to European consolidations, 
all mergers would necessarily take the form of an absorption of a company by another, and 
thus in the current situation, of  one European company by an American company, so with less 
guar~tee of survival for the European directors. 
Doubtless  it  is  this  reason that the  objectives  of the  European arms  companies  and  their 
directors  are  compatible with those  of a  good  number of European  States.  Even so,  the 
motivations behind these objectives can't be considered strictly identical in the sense that the 
company  directors,  like  the  share-holders,  have  above  all  the  duty  to  maximise  company 
profits  before  obeying political  considerations  with regards  to  the  relative  strength of the 
States. These motivational differences equally explain the adopted set-ups can be different to 
those advocated by the States, as we saw with the failure of EADC. 
Third  sub  conclusion  : in  principle, the logic of capitalist consolidations  prevents  the 
companies of small countries from being able to obtain a directive role. 
One  of the principal difficulties  of restructuring  the  European arms  industry  is  due  to  the 
necessity to  reconcile the  objectives of the  States with the  economic rules that govern the 
company mergers.  Yet the States, in a domain that directly affects their sovereignty, tend to 
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govern the companies tend on the contrary to favour the rule of the democratic majority, that 
is,  he  with the  most economic  "weight"  makes  the  decisions.  It is  once  again  this  that 
explains that the transnational mergers are difficult while mergers are easy between national 
companies and that joint ventures maintain a fictional equality of  rights. 
Moreover, this difficulty means that in theory the only capitalist mergers that could be  easy 
would be those between two companies of identical weight from two countries of identical 
weight.  That is to a great extent what we have seen with the rapprochement of Aerospatiale-
MATRA and DASA.  Even when these conditions are  more or less met,  and perhaps even 
because of it, negotiations can prove to be difficult. The French have always considered that 
they are the main technology providers, this being so, they couldn't share the power with the 
Germans.  Inversely, the  Germans whose defence industry in general calls upon the global 
force of  the country in its terms of reference, proving that the rules that govern it are not just 
economic, consider that the global economic weight of their country justifies sharing power. 
In another domain the British always consider that the value of  their companies is superior to 
the value of  French companies whose profits are very much smaller. 
Between "small countries" and "big countries" the problem takes another dimension in the 
sense that the relative force is much more obvious.  For example, no-one would contest the 
superior weight of Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace with respect to CASA or to New BAE with 
respect to Finmeccanica. 
Faced with this situation the reaction of the directors of the small European companies is to 
rely on two factors that can help reduce the natural disadvantage due to these relative forces : 
First factor : their companies are the natural suppliers of their State.  Politically as  much as 
commercially  the  large  companies  of the  three  principal  European  armament  countries 
(France, UK and Germany) woo the companies of  the small countries because they need them 
in order to acquire the critical size that they are looking for in the European market, and to 
conquer this market that escapes them. 
Second factor : the companies of small countries are relied upon by their State as client, albeit 
in a variable fashion, and this reinforces their negotiation position at a European level. 
In  this  global  panorama,  the  strategy  of the  small  European  armament  countries  vanes 
according to their own particularities and the weight of  their country in European politics. 
187 First possible reaction : maintenance of power of joint decision making (co-decision) due 
to legal-economic artifice 
In Italy, Finmeccanica has consolidated within the company all aeronautic, space and naval 
industry, some land industry and a large majority of its defence electronics.  The possibility of 
this company concluding a big alliance at the European level cannot be excluded.  However, 
the  general conduct of their discussions regarding the restructuring of the  industry tends to 
prove that the Italians always want the power of co-decision in the alliances that it concludes. 
This limits thus the possibilities of  a vast capitalistic consolidation with Finmeccanica. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of trade  joint  ventures  concluded  by  the  affiliates  of 
Finmeccanica is increasing despite the preoccupation of  the Italians to obtain the guarantee of 
power of co-decision.  This is the case in the bilateral joint venture in the helicopter industry 
with Agusta and Westland, and in defence electronics with GEC and Alenia Marconi systems. 
When the consolidation involves more than two companies, the legal-economic set-ups of  the 
joint venture are more detailed but they always aim to guarantee the power of co-decision to 
the Italians.  Let's cite two particular cases : 
•  Astrium in the satellite industry with MATRA, BAE/GEC and DASA, 
•  the  new missile  company resulting from  the  merger of BAE and  GEC.  In effect,  the 
missile division from Alenia-Marconi system will be given to MATRAIBAE Dynamics. 
In this new company the Italians will be share-holders equal with the British, these two 
together  being  share-holders  equal to  EADS.  The  outcome  is  thus  a  system  of co-
decision in stages where the Italians share the power on the first  rung with the British 
before sharing it communally with the British opposite the French.  This system of stages 
permits, at  least in theory, to  respect the sovereignty of the  share-holding of a country 
even if  this represents a minor share of  the total activity (in short, the Italians hold 25% of 
the company, whilst BAE and EADS hold 37.5% each). 
Second possible reaction : simply, the sale of certain industrial sectors 
The maintenance of the power of co-decision is  only negotiable if the activity considered is 
technologically advanced and has sustained State financing.  Small countries tend to carry out 
an  inventory of their skills in matters of armament and  of their financial  capacities for the 
coming years, and thus choose between domains that they will continue to finance - notably in 
188 the form of R&D funds - and some sectors that they abandon.  This seems to be the process 
implicitly conducted by the Spanish government and the Swedish government. 
This analysis brings to light that in the absence of financing, the States are ready to abandon 
their production capacities as long as the buyer guarantees the maintenance of the production 
sites and an acceptable plan of action.  Such was the case of Spain in the land arms industry 
with Santa Barbara and no  doubt in the future  Sweden will follow suit with Celsius.  In the 
two cases, it must be noted that the State is a share-holder of  these companies. 
Third  possible  reaction  partial  capitalistic  alliances  leading  to  simple  commercial 
agreements 
This happened in the alliance between BAE and Saab. Originally, it was possible to imagine 
that the co-operation between the two companies would go  further than a simple acquisition 
of  a 35% stake in Saab by BAE. In fact it is not certain that is the case. 
The stake-holding of  BAE in Saab left the control of  the company with the Wallenburg group. 
Any  capitalistic  merger that would  go  further  would naturally  give  power to  BAE.  The 
Swedish considered that they really were skilled in this domain and wished thus to keep the 
control of their company as the president of Saab, Bengt Halse, told the French press on 20th 
May 1999.  He indicated at this time that the mergers in progress in France and in the UK had 
created two large pillars of European aeronautics that were too powerful for Saab to find its 
place
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Today the situation, though imperfect, is  satisfactory between the two allies since, far  from 
being mutual competition in the export market, they each reinforce each other's proposition in 
the  case that the other is  better placed for the job.  Thus the  Gripen seems a less onerous 
alternative than the Eurofighter and more exportable in certain markets. 
Fourth possible reaction : capitalistic alliance but in what conditions? 
The capitalistic alliance between DASA and CASA is interesting in more than one way since 
it was the first example of an alliance of this type between European companies before the 
creation of EADS.  However, it  is difficult to analyse precisely this alliance since neither the 
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189 legal-economic set-up nor the industrial agreements were completed before the constitution of 
EADS. 
At first glance it is obvious that the Spanish accepted an unbalanced capitalistic alliance that 
was more in favour of Germany.  But this was not a surprise.  The acceptance of a model that 
moves away from the defence sovereignty of  the States can be explained in several fashions. 
•  In the first place, Spain has the  smallest armament industry amongst the six, and it was 
difficult to be able to  claim the power of co-decision for CASA, even with alliances by 
joint venture.  As for a simple acquisition of a stake in CASA, it offered few advantages 
neither for CASA , nor for the new stakeholder. 
•  In the second place, it is certain that within CASA, the Spanish are interested mainly in 
military transport and they tried to protect their expertise and their industrial sites in this 
domain  through  industrial  agreements.  This  made  for  a  successful  conclusion of the 
accord dependent on potential industrial agreements, as  much for the civil Airbus as for 
military  transport  planes.  Without  doubt  this  question  needs  to  be  resolved  in  the 
negotiations between EADS and CASA. 
Fourth  sub  conclusion  :  only  the  big  States  still  have  the  means  to  protect  their 
armament industry and by other means than public share-holders. 
The withdrawal of  public share-holders in the arms industry is today an accepted fact, and its 
application  is  simply  a  question of time  in  France,  as  in  Italy,  Spain and  Sweden.  It  is 
particularly  linked  to  the  state  of the  market  in  which  the  public  sector  companies  are 
evolving as  well as  the electoral considerations linked to employment (as in the case of the 
naval construction sector and land arms in France). 
This withdrawal occurred under the pressure of three factors : 
•  a general redefinition of  the role of  the State in European countries, 
•  the requirement to improve the industrial sector's productivity, 
•  the necessity of  transnational, and European consolidations in particular. 
Moreover,  for  reasons of sovereignty  linked to  supply  security,  none  of the  six  European 
States have withdrawn interest in their arms industries and all  look for ways and means to 
keep control. 
190 The  principle  of the  Golden  Share  is  in  general  little  liked  in  financial  circles  and  so  by 
potential investors, since it can create a State-imposed brake on the free disposal of stocks and 
shares by the share holders. 
A precise country-by-country study would clarify that the  meaning of the  Golden Share  is 
different from one country to another. 
The  Golden Share does  not exist in Germany no  doubt because this country only recently 
unified,  and  a modem arms  industry as  a  component of the  State power is  only a recent 
phenomenon in this  country.  There  is  still  reticence  in Germany regarding  the  "military 
share" without even the existence of the Golden Share that would have precisely an inverse 
reaction to that wished in the German arms industry. 
In Sweden or Spain, this is not a taboo question, but the weakness of  the industry, particularly 
in Europe, does not justify discouraging foreign investors from  a sector that is  not in itself 
determinant for Spanish sovereignty. 
In Italy, the inverse is true, the Golden Share could be a mechanism favoured by the public 
authorities,  because  it  is  a  sector  that  is  important  as  much  in  terms  of technological 
acquisition as in the exercising of sovereignty for the Italian State, even if it appears fragile 
faced with foreign competition. 
The French situation is atypical since it mixes cultural elements with objective judgement. 
Culturally, there is a tradition of a strong State, particularly in the International scene, that has 
difficulty accommodating a total privatisation of this sector.  This cultural element is clearly 
demonstrated  by  the  constitutional  administration's  decision  in  1986  on  privatisation 
regulations.  At the  same  time,  the  isolation  of the  companies  in  this  sector  due  to  their 
nationalism, has rendered the French industry fragile.  This fragility is currently fading due to 
the national restructuring lead by the French State in parallel with a progressive retreat of its 
share-holding.  This  does  not prevent the  French  State  being well equipped to  defend  its 
industry, in its two roles as client and source of  R&D funds. 
At this level a parallel with British industry can be made.  After a notional test period of  about 
ten years, the British State is ready to  abandon its Golden Share in companies.  In fact, the 
companies  appear  sufficiently  solid  that  any  attempted  take-over  bid  from  the  outside  or 
massive retraction of  the investors justifying a transfer of assets or a major reorientation of  the 
strategy of  these companies, seem out of the question.  To resume, the British Government is 
no longer partisan to the Golden Share for the simple reason that today, it is an instrument that 
is of no use to it for the control of  British arms companies. 
191 The Golden Share does not have the  theoretic virtue that was lent to  it with regard to  State 
rights  over the  arms  industry.  On  the  contrary,  its  nature  is  dependent  on  the  individual 
country  making  it difficult to  establish  a common European policy  in  this  area.  So  it  is 
particularly interesting to examine the means put in place by the strong States to protect their 
arms industries other than public share-holding and the Golden Share. 
In the UK, it can be  demonstrated that the policy of the State as  client has played a doubly 
favourable role for the British arms industry. 
In  the  first  place,  the  country  has  had  the  best  success  in  reforming  the  arms  purchase 
procedures  and has  managed the  reduction of equipment resources  in  such  a manner that 
today,  comparing the  same equipment, the British armies are supplied more rapidly and in 
higher numbers than the French armies. 
In the second place, this rationalisation of  the purchase procedure has equally had an effect on 
the trade joint venture programmes in that, even if  there is no European standard for materials, 
the materials chosen by the British, or at least the major technological options, will tend to 
become the  standard in the  other European countries for  obvious  reasons  of cost (case  of 
Storm-Shadow/Scalp  stand-off missiles,  BVRAAM/Meteor  air-air  missiles,  and  possibly 
future military telecommunication satellites). 
The strong State as client tends to naturally favour its own arms industry and thus to reinforce 
it with respect to the competition.  It also tends to impose standards for  mat~rials at a national 
level. 
More subtle is without doubt the technological Golden Share created in the name of national 
legislation  of technical  document  classification  that  is  akin  to  the  policy  of security  of 
supplies.  If a very strict policy is applied in this domain, it is perfectly possible to protect the 
national expertise even within transnational companies and whatever the degree of  integration 
in these companies.  This protection constitutes a natural security net should there be a rupture 
of the  transnational  company,  permitting  at  the  same  time  to  reconstitute  the  national 
expertise in short, reactive time-frames and even to attain a favourable competitive position. 
One can thus speak of  the technological Golden Share. 
Yet at this level the industrial partners of the UK,  are  generally in agreement in finding the 
rules decreed by the British ministry of defence extremely severe, even in the absence of a 
transatlantic agreement in the technological domain in  question.  The policy lead by France 
also remains at this very restrictive level. 
192 However, a practice that limits the positive effects of transnational consolidations, including 
in  terms  of rationalisation  the  production  costs,  should  be  questioned.  This  situation 
negatively influences the profits of the companies, perpetuates duplication of European R&D 
costs whilst defence budgets are tight.  It is not certain that the results of the letter of intention 
of  6th July 1998 come up to expectations. 
In  conclusion,  we  note  that today the  unique  policy that  the  States  have  to  protect their 
strategic  independence  in  preserving  their  arms  industry,  consists  in  putting  these  arms 
companies in a favourable economic situation that, for a client, is a paradoxical situation. 
It  is  a policy  that can  only  be  practised  by the  biggest  countries  for  whom  the  defence 
budgets are the highest.  It is a policy that could see the arms industries carrying out political 
blackmail so  as  to  draw the  benefits of this political preoccupation.  It is  this concern that 
explains  today  why  the  French  Arms  Directorate  (DGA)  wants  to  maintain  competition 
between French or European suppliers  as  much  as  possible,  or  create  cost reductions  that 
seem in some ways more imposed than negotiated.  It is this same concern that explains that 
the British government tried to implement a partnership with industry so as to retain control of 
the costs without necessarily harming the economic interests of  industry. 
As for the technological Golden Share, even if  it is efficient, it is expensive and could favour 
a kind of "salami"  strategy  by the  Americans.  The  Americans,  through multiple bilateral 
commercial  industrial  agreements  and  the  transfer  of  technology  within  otherwise 
impenetrable  European  countries,  could  be  tempted  to  secure  the  loyalty  of individual 
countries in each domain, divide the interests of  the Europeans and extend their influence over 
the whole of Europe.  Was this not the objective of the message delivered by the American 
secretary of State Hamre to the European industrials at the time of the dinner on 25th October 
1999? 
193 RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. THE STATES' ROLE 
Today it is clear that it is not the States that lead the restructuring of  the arms industry, neither 
in principle, nor in method, but they can contribute to creating a favourable environment for it 
by playing the role of regulator and client.  Currently it appears that the greater implication of 
the countries that have an arms industry, and thus who have a role to play in this restructuring, 
had a tendency to  shift the  institutional debate  away  from  the  construction of a European 
Union of arms or of the WEAG, to the more restricted context of LOI with six countries and 
OCCAR (Joint Organisation in Arms Co-operation) with four countries.  However, a closer 
look  at  LOI  and  OCCAR tends  to  prove  that  any  potential  progress  relies  on universal 
measures that are not linked to the position of any individual country and so these measures 
can be applied to the fifteen countries. 
The main problem that the arms industry encounters is to evolve in an arena that is not legally 
unified, with clients who do  not necessarily have the same needs at the same time and with 
purchase  rules  that  differ  from  one  country  to  another.  This  situation  is  a  source  of 
complication, of additional cost, and sometimes delays as we can see with the co-operation in 
matters of  armament by programme initiated by the States. 
If the States want to facilitate the restructuring they should primarily favour the constitution 
of European transnational companies, a domain where they can easily act due to  their power 
of  regulation. 
A)  The measures to be taken as the State as regulator. 
The most important and urgent measures are to be taken in favour of  transnational companies. 
1)  The necessity to liberalise the transfer of technology within transnational companies 
The first measures concern the transfer of technology and expertise within these companies. 
From  the  moment  that  two  companies  have  overcome  State  reticence  in  matters  of 
194 sovereignty,  it  seems that the objective  should be the  free  circulation of the technological 
ownership within the transnational companies and not the inverse, as found today. 
Such  a  measure  would  have  three  beneficial  effects  over  the  restructuring  of the  arms 
industry: 
a)  To structurally limit the duplication of  R&D costs between the countries, 
b)  To  limit the  cost of arms  in permitting  a  better  integration of technology  within  the 
companies and thus productivity gains.  Being more competitive, these companies would 
improve their results and this would act as a pledge of  pursuit of  the activity which in turn 
would be a guarantee of  preservation ofthe States' interests. 
c)  To avoid the creating European over-capacity as we have seen with the practice of "fair 
returns". 
However this liberalisation of  the rights of  ownership and the transfer of  technology must take 
into  consideration  a  perverse  effect  :  the  risk  of seeing  certain  States  renounce  their 
responsibility  in  terms  of R&D  to  their  neighbours.  This  liberalisation  also  assumes  a 
harmonisation of  the export control regulations. 
How to avoid creating positive discrimination for the countries not financing R&D? 
Today it seems risky,  since we are in a transition period, to  be able to ensure that all  the 
coun"t!:ies buy the same products at the same time or even that they finance studies of  R&D at 
the  same time.  The risk of liberalisation of the transfer of technological expertise within 
transnational companies is to see certain countries systematically buy off-the-shelf European 
products so as to pay the lowest price for them.  In the end there is a risk of R&D financing 
running  dry  in  Europe  since  each  will  have  the  interest  of buying  cheaper  off-the-shelf 
products developed with the funding of  just a few countries and in benefiting of  the transfer of 
technology via transnational companies. 
So as to avoid this drift, we can imagine a mechanism relying on different rules in accordance 
with the conditions in which the States are going to buy the materials from the transnational 
companies. 
Each European country that buys material off-the-shelf conceived by a European transnational 
company where that country is  represented, would participate in the R&D financing of the 
programme.  This share is given to the State or States that have financed the initial R&D at 
the outset.  Ifthe country wants to finance an evolution of  the programme, it would be exempt 
195 from giving this share of R&D knowing that it had supplied the transnational company with 
research funds. 
Every European country that buys the same material off-the-shelf but for whom the company 
is not a member of the transnational company, would pay the price of the material fixed by 
the company that is selling it.  In this case the eventual transfer of  technology should not give 
rise to a subsequent constitution of competitive manufacturing capacity.  Civil compensations 
or  the  transfer  of production  lines  should  be  left  to  the  free  choice  of the  transnational 
company. 
It is  necessary that the  implementation of these  mechanisms  be  centralised so  as  to  avoid 
unnecessary  red-tape,  thus  the  application  of these  rules  should  be  done  within  the 
transnational companies that will become increasingly integrated European entities in the near 
future. 
2) The necessity to achieve export  harmonisation 
In the absolute, the harmonisation of arms export policies of the members of the European 
Union,  in its procedures as  well as  in its export authorisation criteria, is  a necessity in the 
context of a common policy.  The States must address this task rapidly in order to achieve it 
as soon as possible. 
Until this has been attained, it is necessary to put in place a transitory mechanism that will not 
handicap  the  transnational  companies  and  that  will  not  create  economic  discrimination 
between the national entities of  the transnational companies. 
One can imagine that in the context of these transnational companies, the application of the 
Debre-Schmitt agreement, created by the French and the Germans, that leaves export control 
to  the  exporting  countries.  Any  other  mechanism  leading  to  the  imposition  of export 
legislation in the different countries would have no political justification and inversely would 
handicap  the  European  arms  industry.  In  the  context  of good  conduct,  the  consultation 
procedure  foreseen  should  be  led,  from  the  initial  stages  of the  exportation,  between the 
countries represented in the transnational companies so  as to engage a dialogue between the 
countries responsible for the conception of  materials to be exported. 
It is also necessary to ensure that during this transition phase the States for whom the export 
legislation is the strictest do not suffer discriminatory industrial and economic consequences. 
It is  thus necessary that  in transnational  companies,  exports  are  imputed to  each company 
proportionally  corresponding  to  the  industrial  and  economic  distribution  resulting  from 
196 internal activity so  as not to modify the economic and industrial equilibrium of the company 
due to more supple export legislation in certain countries. 
B) The measures to be taken as the State as client. 
1)  The necessity to unify the procedures of materials purchase 
One of  the difficulties that the companies encounter in their restructuring comes from the fact 
that they are doing battle with States for whom the procedures for running the programmes 
are  not unified  and  for  whom the  contract approval  procedures  are  not identical.  This 
imposes a specific problem for the co-operation programmes obliging the technical teams to 
increase the number of meetings or stages of approval of the programmes.  In the best case, 
such  an  addition  of administrative  procedures,  delays  the  co-operation  programmes  and 
entails additional costs in terms of  personnel and travel expenses that puts a strain on the State 
and company budgets.  In the worst case, this situation can lead to the pure and simple failure 
of  such programmes. 
It is thus imperative that OCCAR from the outset carries out a qualitative leap in integrating 
totally  the  programme  management  and  purchase  procedures  that  would  become  totally 
independent of the  National Armaments  Directorate.  It is  thus  necessary  to  spell  out the 
procedures  and  the  common  documents  within  OCCAR  for  the  running  of the  arms 
programmes and to  put in place programme teams  that would have  full  authority over the 
management of co-operation programmes.  It is  also  necessary to  unify  contract approval 
procedures. 
Of course the established rules within OCCAR, as much in terms of running the programmes 
as purchase procedures, would be in time taken over in each country. 
It seems up to the countries, particularly those with an arms industry, to lead the negotiation 
with  this  ambitious  objective  at  the  risk  of limiting  the  beneficial  effects  of industrial 
restructuring. 
2) The necessity to limit the negative effects of monopoly situations 
Europe  finds  itself  faced  with  a  dilemma  in  the  arms  domain.  The  big  continental 
manufacturers of arms  systems evolve  in a market that is  too narrow and in the  face  with 
American competition that is too big to be able to do battle with equal forces.  The temptation 
197 is thus enormous to  establish a monopoly in the  European market so  as  to  guarantee share-
holders high benefits. 
The European States are  not interested in seeing their companies weaken and they want to 
maintain  an  industrial  and  technological  defence  base  that would  bolster  up  a Europe  of 
defence.  At the same time a monopoly can be embarrassing  for these States. 
An economic  embarrassment in  the  sense  that there  would  be  a  great temptation  for  the 
company  in  a  monopoly  situation  to  impose  its  technological  and  strategic  choices  and 
particularly its costs and profit margin. 
A political embarrassment in the sense that a company with a monopoly in Europe would 
symbolise  the  closing  of the  European  market.  This  would  sanctify  the  creation  of a 
European  fortress  faced  with  an  existing  American  fortress  and  may  lead  to  tension  in 
transatlantic relations, that even France does not wish. 
In the UK, one of the aspects of Smart procurement seems to  have taken into consideration 
this risk so  as  to  limit the negative  effects of monopoly by optimising the management of 
arms programmes.  This remains, however, a solution that does not endeavour to structure the 
supply, and is limited in view of  the size of  the questions posed.  At this level the question is 
posed to know if  the States can let European industry lead its restructuring or is it necessary to 
fix  the limits for  either political reasons,  or economic reasons linked to the respect of free 
competition, as is the case of non defence companies.  From the moment that Europe decides 
to fix restructuring legislation, even for reasons reflecting the "common right"  (to respect free 
competition) or traditional reasons (to exercise a role of regulator in the arms domain) Europe 
will then lead an industrial policy in armament as is the case today in the USA. 
One  of the  solutions  could  be  to  encourage  the  European  companies,  depending  on their 
circumstances, either to  co-operate, to  have  a relationship of programme manager with the 
equipment manufacturer, or to be in competition. 
This situation could be envisaged if one considers that there are no real frontiers between the 
jobs  of combat  vehicle  manufacturers  (military  tanks,  ships  and  planes),  arms  systems 
manufacturers  and  equipment  manufacturers.  Thus  it  is  possible  that  two  European 
transnational  groups  will  emerge  :  combat  vehicle/arms  systems  manufacturers,  and 
equipment/arms systems manufacturers, and that could according to circumstances function 
according  to  the  three  modes  as  discussed  above.  It would  even  be  possible  to  create 
capitalistic links between these two groups without going as  far as  a merger, and that could 
reinforce and simply avoid the issues of  BAE and GEC being asked to renounce their merger. 
198 These two groups could work together perfectly in partnership with American companies on 
invitations to  tender,  the  American partner being the  leader in the USA and the  European 
company  being  leader in  Europe.  For example,  this  can  be  seen  in the  call  to  tender of 
BVRAAM where MBD allied to Boeing to reinforce its offer to the British.  It is equally the 
case  between Raytheon and  Thomson-CSF  on ACCS.  This  mechanism doesn't solidify a 
transatlantic  rivalry  of benefit  to  no-one,  thus  maintaining  competition  in  Europe  and 
guaranteeing financial interests and control of companies.  A system of flexible transatlantic 
co-operation would also  allow,  in  a later phase,  a calm  consideration of the technological 
transfer question,  supply  security and the  harmonisation of sensitive  arms  and technology 
exports.  These are presently subject to enormous differences. 
II) IN THE DOMAIN OF COMPANIES 
The  attitudes of the  different  States that wish to  conserve a certain autonomy in the  arms 
domain and the weakness of the small countries' arms industries, prevent capitalistic mergers 
in accordance with the classic method encountered in other industrial domains.  In this sector 
it  is  not possible  to  assist in a take-over bid or  for  a company to  take  control of another 
without national capacity  diminishing.  Competition can only  work between companies of 
equal force  when each hopes  to  obtain the power- of co-decision.  This difficulty explains, 
more  than any  other phenomenon,  the  fact  that the  restructuring  leading to  the  merger of 
Aerospatiale - Matra/DASA, took place in a national rather than European context. 
The paradox is that from the moment that everyone, including France, accepts the necessity of 
the withdrawal  of public  share-holding,  and  that everyone recognises the  need to  obtain a 
certain dilution of share-holding, the resulting absence of pertinent means of control for the 
States over the arms industry and particularly over their strategies becomes a problem, with 
the exception of  the States where companies are in very strong positions. 
To  attempt  to  recover  the  equality  of power  between  States,  subterfuges  are  sometimes 
employed to  artificially overestimate the power of the national share-holding considered the 
weakest in the merger project.  The mechanism consists, when it is possible, of conserving 
this grouped share-holding whilst in parallel diluting the strongest national share-holding (e.g. 
certain  merger  projects  with  the  Italians,  offer  made  by  BAE  to  Thomson-CSF,  simple 
acquisition of a stake by BAE in Saab in Sweden).  When the companies and the States are in 
199 similar ranks, an approximation is allowed consistent with parity of the companies.  One can 
thus analyse the merger Aerospatiale-Matra/DASA.  Also in this case the uncoupling of the 
economic rights and the right to vote is witnessed (each partner having identical weight even 
if  they have got rid of some of  their shares). 
The  most convenient mechanism remains  the  constitution of joint ventures  that in  general 
allow the different partners to conserve the power of co-decision just like the mechanism that 
we can see in the GIE (Association for Developing Commercial Interests).  This joint venture 
can be  constructed on the 50/50 model when there are two share-holders, or according to  a 
more complex mode as in the new missile company Matra-BAE Dynamics or Finmeccanica, 
where despite a percentage of stakes in the company of 25% inferior to that of EADS and of 
BAE (37.5% each), a power of co-decision of 50150 was attributed within Alenia New BAE 
systems. 
However, everyone is conscious of the limits of  joint ventures in terms of productivity gains. 
In addition, the multiplication of  joint ventures does not favour coherent strategies of mother 
companies  and  opposes the  need of open communication and transparency wished by the 
share-holders and those who represent them within the companies. 
The difficulty to lead the European restructuring comes from the fact that the arms companies 
now function with the  logic  of private  sector corporate  governance,  but the  States are  not 
ready  to  accept  the  consequences  in  terms  of power  within  the  transnational  companies 
resulting from the classic economic mechanisms of company consolidation..  Moreover, it is 
the  weakest  States  that  will  want  to  defend  the  mechanism  of the  Golden  Share  as 
demonstrated by the proposition of  the Italian government to conserve such an arrangement in 
Finmeccanica. 
Faced with this difficulty, the Golden Share seems an ill-suited mechanism if it relies on the 
transfer of assets and all the more so since it questions the principle of freedom of shares for 
the share-holders.  Currently it doesn't seem possible to recognise power in the daily life of a 
company, specific to the State as share-holder, without challenging the principles of  corporate 
governance. 
The problem arises mostly in the principal acts of a company: transfer of  assets, major capital 
or  trade  alliances,  major  collaborations  and  investments.  It  is  thus  necessary  to  devise 
mechanisms  of public  and  private  inspiration  where  the  States  will  see  their  interests 
safeguarded and the companies will be able to function with maximum efficiency.  Since our 
starting point is  the  principle of free  access  to  technologies in the  context of transnational 
200 companies,  the  main  problems  affect  the  principal  acts  that  the  companies  are  called  to 
perform during their existence as well as the act of  distributing jobs. 
a)  Distribution ofthe power and strategy of  the companies 
On the first point, the agreement passed between Aerospatiale-Matra and DASA is symbolic 
since the main attributes of  joint ventures that were destined to  mark out the equal rights of 
the  States  were  commuted to  the  group  level,  transposing to  equal  rights  of the  principal 
share-holders  : principle of the  parity of share-holders of the two  countries,  power of co-
decision for the main decisions. 
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It is  difficult  to  interpret  this  agreement.  Some  could  see  a  system  of restrictive  co-
management  requiring  an  accord  between  the  parties  at  all  times.  Others  will  see  a 
mechanism that allows both parties to agree in the case of discord since no-one can impose 
their point of view on another.  It is certain in any case that the integration of management 
seems  to  be  a  regression  with  respect  to  British  joint  ventures  where  the  principle  of 
unanimity of  the directorate is adopted even if  the share-holders have equal rights. 
At this stage it seems that this mode of organisation of a transnational company can only be 
transitory.  It is  certainly an obligatory point of passage to  ensure better integration in the 
collaborative functioning of the company.  It supposes that the actors always have in mind the 
necessity to find compromises that won't hinder rapid decision making and a clear company 
strategy in terms of objectives.  It is a point requiring clarification for  d~ectors of the British 
companies and their share-holders who may be alarmed by the apparent complexity of such a 
mechanism. 
As for the question of the evolution of the share-holding, the companies Aerospatiale-Matra 
and the French State demonstrated a tendency seen developing in trade joint ventures and that 
can be  qualified as  a modem form  of the Golden Share : it is the  pre-emptive right in this 
agreement carried between French share-holders,  and  between  French and  German  share-
holders.  This pre-emptive right safeguards the share-holders and the French State without 
questioning the freedom of the private share-holders to  withdraw should they wish.  In the 
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1 October 1999 to 
"Paris-Match", the director of Aerospatiale/Matra, Philippe Camus, clarified the domains where there would be 
the power of  co-decision.  These domains are mergers and rapprochement with partners, and investments greater 
than 500 million euros.  In these cases, the power of  co-decision was presented as the right of  veto for the French 
share-holders.  The company organisation included a chief executive officer of  each nationality.  Thus Philippe 
Camus  explained that "in the  absence  of an  agreement  at  the  operational  management  level  of EADS,  the 
question will be escalated to the board of directors then to the presidents of the  two  share-holding companies, 
that is,  Jurgen SCHREMPP and Jean-Luc LAGARDERE."  This rule of co-decision can thus be extended to all 
domains in the functioning ofthe company and its power is in the hands of  industry. 
201 case of EADS, this pre-emptive right is matched with the obligation of the key share-holders 
to stay in the company until 2003. 
At this stage it is  difficult to  qualify the presence of the  State  as  excessive  and  not in the 
common interest, since the pre-emptive right is recognised between private share-holders and 
does not question the free  disposition of the share-holders.  On the other hand, their capacity 
of  intervention in company strategy, even if  it does not interfere with the daily management of 
the company since it is limited to three well identified cases, renders the French State into an 
active share-holder justifying the maintenance of a share-holding of 15%.  At this stage, it is 
clear that whether or not a State maintains a share-holding, the important issue is its capacity 
to dispose of  a power of  co-decision (and not decision) on the future alliances of  the company 
and it major industrial orientations.  It is certain that the French State must give clarifications 
to  the  private company directors  as  well  to  the  governors  of the  State for which they are 
country nationals, about the manner in which it counts using the rights that are granted to it. 
Overall  it  is  a  point  that  requires  discussion  at  the  highest  level  between  the  principal 
European countries with arms industries since these rights have only one justification, that of 
the constitution of  a Europe of defence according to the political and economic objectives that 
the States fix at the industrial and technological base of  defence. 
b)  the question of  the division of labour 
Globally,  the  principle  of "fair return"  within  transnational  companies  can  be  considered 
acceptable as long as three conditions are met . 
1)  It must be applied to a large volume of  activity that would imply going beyond the context 
of a simple trade joint venture of  transnational companies.  In effect, whatever the split of 
share-holding within a company resulting from a trade joint venture, if  the company only 
has a few products and one of  the countries decides not to  participate in the conception of 
a  new  product,  there  is  a  risk  that  the  theoretical  division  would  be  dramatically 
reassessed.  At any  time  one  of the partners could ask for the  complete transfer of the 
responsibility in its country or ask simply ask for the closure of an industrial site situated 
in the country not participatijng in the programme.  The larger the domain of activity, the 
easier  it  is  to  find  compensations  in  terms  of responsibility  and  the  distribution  of 
industrial sites.  It is within the company that this equilibrium must be found and not by 
way  of intergovernmental  accords  (MOU  - Memorandum  of Understanding)  between 
States at the time of launching the programmes.  History prove that the MOU generates 
202 rules that are too rigid, and that the system encourages Governments, responsible to  their 
electorate, to maximise their orders and thus the work comes back to them. 
2)  On the other hand, within the company this division should be decided upon by authorities 
that  are  not  linked  to  the  economic  results  of the  company  so  as  to  respect  the 
preoccupations of the  State as  client which are different to  the  company and the  share-
holders.  (It should not be  forgotten that the  consolidation of companies in a monopoly 
unbalances the producer/client relationship for the benefit of  the producer).  However, the 
decisions must always aim for the most rational distribution of  tasks for the companies. 
On this question, it seems unnecessary to associate the State to these objectives even within 
the company - by share-holders' pacts for example - due to the risk of the States putting too 
much  pressure  on  companies  in  order  to  protect  employment.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
transnational companies could set-up a type of contract of objectives with the  States where 
they are established, obliging them to set-up a balanced distribution of  jobs between countries 
according to their financing.  These agreements or this multilateral agreement would have the 
merit of removing from  the  company the  eventual  conflicts of interest between the  States 
concerning employment.  In  any  case it does  not appear possible that a State  share-holder 
could evoke this question within a company whilst the other States are not represented.  These 
rules, decreed in the name of public interest, would be acceptable for the share-holders in the 
sense that they inscribe themselves in a general context permitting the arms companies to be 
more competitive in a quasi-monopoly - elements particularly favourable  to  the creation of 
value as well as the permanence of  the activity exercised in Europe. 
Summary of industrial restructuring 
Indisputably under the pressure of the markets,  industrial restructuring is  well advanced in 
Europe to such a point that certain commentators estimate that it is complete.  It is true today 
that  two  major  companies  are  consolidated,  that  there  should  no  longer  be  any  problem 
privatising  Airbus  and  that  in  the  domains  of missiles  and  space,  the  consolidations  are 
practically complete. 
At the industrial level only two questions can be posed today : 
203 1)  Will the States of Sweden and Italy, along with company share-holders in their countries, 
be  satisfied with trade alliances concluded by much larger companies, EADS and BAE, 
despite the fact that their powers of  co-decision are recognised? 
2)  Will the share-holders of  BAE be satisfied with the conclusion of multiple trade alliances, 
transforming this company into a holding, or will they wish to conclude a major alliance 
at the top that can be done with EADS or a European company? 
As far as the relationships that the States maintain with the companies in their countries, there 
is still a long way to go, so it seems necessary to create a context favourable to genuine cross-
border activity in the domain of  defence at the European level. 
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